The Poetry of Friendship

Horace, EPISTLES I
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To Edmond and Eleanor Silk

ἀγαθὴ δὲ παραίτωσις ἐστὶν ἑταῖρον
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THE FIRST BOOK of the *Epistles* seems to have been relegated to second-
class status among Horace’s poetry. Unlike the *Satires*, *Odes*, and
*Epistles* II (including *Ars Poetica*), for example, it has not seen a major new
commentary in this century, and aside from E. Courbaud’s urbane study
(1914) and M. J. McGann’s important monograph (1969) the collection
has been recently discussed only in articles, or in general literary studies
such as Eduard Fraenkel’s *Horace* (1957), Jacques Perret’s *Horace* (1959),
and Gordon Williams’s *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (1968).
McGann, like Gregor Maurach (1968), largely restricts himself to a discus-
sion of their philosophical content. The recent death of C. W. Macleod
had deprived Horatian studies of much promising future scholarship on the
*Epistles*.

My own study began in 1967 at Yale, with an inductive analysis of
certain key poems in the collection, in order to disentangle their interpreta-
tion from the more historical approaches of Courbaud and Fraenkel.
“Every truly artistic production is an historical anomaly.” The philologist’s
task, as Cherniss saw it (1943), is first to “comprehend and interpret—that
is to help others comprehend as works of art the individual productions as
ends in themselves.” As applied to the *Epistles*, then, that would mean
examining what each epistle says as an “individual production,” and then
what they say collectively within their total arrangement. McGann’s in-
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sights regarding "reciprocal arrangements," moreover, invited reconsideration of Horace’s poetic purposes and choice of philosophical material.

My analyses of the Epistles have led to four published articles, dealing with Epistles 1.7 (Classical Philology, 1972), 1.8 (Mnemosyne, 1968), 1.13 (Humanities Association Review, 1973), and 1.19 (Phoenix, 1975). The controlling ethical theme which emerged was friendship: Horace systematically explores and applies, with affection, tact, sincerity, and a kindly sense of humour, the duties of amicitia. We see these officia applied in advice and invitation, in refusal and affirmation, and even in his own personal self-revelation. This devotion to friends and to friendship suggests a significant and consistent debt to Cicero in its mild "Academic" tone and in the allusions to his De Amicitia and De Officiis. It is Cicero who provides a paradigm for Horace in both the theory and practice of friendship.

In exploring Horace’s treatment of officia amicitiae I have offered an interpretation of all twenty sermones in the collection, concluding that they do yield collectively to the thematic and generic analysis that friendship suggests. Horace’s intentions in the Epistles as both a poet and a student of philosophy now seem much clearer. In any event, I hope this study will succeed at least in turning critical attention back to the Epistles. Such attention is long overdue.

I owe a special debt to Professor Niall Rudd for an illuminating and systematic introduction to Horatian sermo. In addition to his Satires of Horace (C.U.P., 1966), Rudd’s complete and elegant translations of the Satires and Epistles (Penguin, 1979) provide a fresh new basis for appreciating and enjoying Horace’s sermones. Thanks are also due to other colleagues and friends who have patiently read (or otherwise endured) parts of this work as it evolved. Professor Eric Smethurst of Queen’s University read the first draft of it, and his wise criticism along with that of the anonymous readers for the Canadian Federation for the Humanities removed many flaws of form and content. Flaws still remaining should be imputed solely to the author’s own perversity.

The American Academy in Rome and the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut have been most generous with their resources, and access to those libraries would in turn have been difficult without the assistance of the Canada Council through a travel grant (1972) and a leave fellowship (1977–78). That support allowed me to pursue Horace right to Rome and his Sabine farm. Timely help with revisions and typing was provided by the Advisory Research Committee of Queen’s University (1980). This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
PREFACE

I must finally express my profound gratitude to Professor E. A. Havelock and the late Professor E. T. Silk of Yale University for their own unfailing encouragement and counsel.

NIL EGO CONTULERIM IUCUNDO SANUS AMICO
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INTRODUCTION

In 20 B.C. Horace perfected, in the Epistles, his most mature poetic form. The first book of the Epistles comprised twenty poems of a type unique in literature but unmistakably linked to his own past achievements. Epistle 1.1, for example, tactfully declines Maecenas’ request to repeat his lyric triumphs. 1.13 reminds us that Augustus received a presentation copy of the Odes. 1.19 gives Maecenas an account of the irritations produced by his Odes’ success. These three epistles carefully recall Horace’s earlier claims to fame as a poet.

Publishing the books of Satires was not an original idea, nor the books of Epodes and Odes, and Horace proudly acknowledges his Greek models. But the Epistles were clearly different, for while verse-epistles were already familiar (as well as whole collections in prose), a planned sequence of twenty separate epistles to friends, all in hexameter verse, was an entirely original stroke.

The place of letters to friends in literature was well-established before Horace. The sole mention of writing in Homer refers to a letter. Letters occur in the remains of ancient Egyptian literature. Hesiod’s Works and Days consists of a protreptic and didactic epistle to his brother Perses, extolling the virtues of hard work in an unfriendly universe. Theognis addresses his elegies to Cyrnus. From later centuries we know of letters of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus; and of Cato the Elder, Cornelia, Spurius

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Mummius, Cicero (and his own correspondents), and Augustus. After Horace, Ovid, Seneca, Pliny the Younger, Saint Paul, and Fronto wrote and published epistles. But no writer attempted again a collection in hexameter. Lucilius' statement, "epistula item quaevis non magna poema est" ("likewise, any epistle which is not long is a poem"), reminds us, however, that individual poems could be considered as "epistles," such as those of Sappho, Theocritus, Catullus, Sulpicia, Propertius, and Ovid (Amores). Whether or not there was a Hellenistic prototype for such a full collection in hexameter (two of Theocritus' poems are epistles and there could have been one in Lucilius), there remains the strong argument ex silentio, for Horace normally took great care at every stage to name his models. (Viktor Pöschl has emphasized the concern of Roman poets to use their models in such a way as to become models themselves.) Vergil had imitated Theocritus, Hesiod, and Homer; Propertius, Callimachus and Philotas. Horace declared his debt to Archilochus (Epodes), Bion and Lucilius (Satires), Sappho and Alcaeus (Odes); but nowhere does he name his models for the Epistles. How might this be explained? Was the most likely model simply too republican? Cicero's letters, however, are characteristically political, not philosophical. What is more, Horace never denied that he had fought under Brutus. There is no reason why he could not have read some of Ad Familiares and even Ad Atticum. But it is my contention that Horace's debt to Cicero in his poetic letters to friends goes far beyond those.

Part of the answer may lie in the Epistles' close relationship to the Satires. Both types use the same meter (dactylic hexameter) to present similar personal, social, and philosophical concerns. They both portray men's foolish strivings, in defence of Horace's style of living and writing. There is as great a difference between Satires I and II as between Satires II and the Epistles. Satires I presents variations upon the monologue: serious dramatic sermons (diatribes), literary apologetics, memoirs, and humorous anecdotes; Satires II, variations on the dialogue with the satirist in the role of a largely passive spectator as others reveal their own moral failings. There is an "epic" dialogue (2.5), and one from Aesop (2.6). With the Epistles monologue returns, although the epistle form implies interested correspondents: "A letter is one-half of a conversation."

Among the fragments of Lucilius are apparent examples of epistles in verse. In Book V he addresses a friend who has ignored him during an illness (5.186–189W):

quo habeam pacto, tam etsi non quaeris, docebo,
quando in eo numero mansi quo in maxima non est pars hominum.
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In Book XXVI (689—719W) Congus is urged to write verse on contemporary affairs, not prose on past events. We may have examples here of two types of epistle that also occur in Horace: the occasional and the didactic. The evidence from Suetonius’ *Vita Horati* and from *Epistle* 2.1 suggests that Horace considered his third hexameter collection to belong (with the *Satires*) to his *sermones*. The generic differences between the *Satires* and *Epistles*, except for those dictated by the time, experience, and an altered perspective on life, are minor; not surprisingly so, for *sermo* (“discourse”) was the term applied by Cicero to his dialogues.

The relationship between form and content in the *Satires* has been discussed well by both W. S. Anderson and Niall Rudd, but their relationship to the *Epistles* remains to be defined. In *Horace: Sa Vie et sa Pensée à l’Époque des Epîtres* (1914), Courbaud has drawn attention to a unity of theme in the letters: that of life-styles. Horace claimed that the life and personality of Lucilius could be seen in his books, and Courbaud likewise saw in the *Epistles* a clear philosophical development in the poet: *Epistles* 1, 4, 5 reflect his Epicurean stage; *Epistle* 8, doubt, *Epistles* 6, 10, 11, 12, a Stoic sage; *Epistles* 14, 15, 16, mature *constantia*. He also regarded the *Epistles* as real letters. In 1919 appeared R. Heinze’s article, “Horazens Buch der Briefe.” To him the letter form was the poet’s pretext for expressing his thoughts, his plans, advice, opinions, and complaints: Horace’s most important model for the genre was the letters of Epicurus.

In 1931 two important studies were published. E. Turolla attacked both the philosophical conversion theory of Courbaud and the widely held view that the *Epistles* were autobiographical, suggesting instead that the work revealed cycles of philosophical experience moving toward inner peace.

E. P. Morris stated (“The form of the Epistle in Horace,” 1931), “The poet’s purpose was to put a real impulse or serious choice into designedly literal form and cover both with humorous colour. The personal address was the last added.”

E. Fraenkel (1957) returned to Courbaud’s view. C. Becker (*Das Spaatwerk des Horaz*, 1963) described them as realistic but fictive letters, offering their message to the reader, not the friends addressed. Studies by Gregor Maurach and M. J. McGann appeared in 1968 and 1969. Maurach worked out an elaborate system of order and interrelationships, presenting a basically stoic view throughout: “Experience was the basis of the *Epistles*, but they were much edited as we have them. Nor is there a systematic self-portrait.” For McGann they were neither strictly occasional poems nor poetic fictions, but a “complex set of reciprocal relationships”; nowhere does Horace’s private life appear, nor a spiritual autobiography. The *Epistles*, he contended, were a literary reaction to elegy. Elegy presented a highly subjective treatment of the reactions of a
lover, while the situation in an epistle was ethical, not erotic. The Epistles are treated sensitively by Gordon Williams in *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (1968). Williams sees in the Epistles "a new form of poetry—an almost unparalleled occurrence in Latin." The form allowed Horace to write in "the whole stylistic spectrum... an infinitely varied tone." His obsession with philosophy, however, was pretense, and his attitude toward the Greek professionals, "cavalier." Williams is concerned particularly with the purpose and effects of his use of anecdotes and autobiographical revelation. The most recent general study swings back to a philosophical interpretation. C. W. Macleod in his article "The poetry of ethics: Horace Epistles I" (1979), took "conversion to philosophy" very seriously as a key to understanding the collection: Horace "scrutinizes the pleasures, pains, and problems of living against a standard, a standard represented by philosophy... the author's experience, more than anyone else's undergoes that examination." Friendship is one of these ethical standards of moral existence.

None of these explanations aims at a full analysis of the Epistles as discrete poems within a carefully arranged collection. Their precise poetic definition requires careful interpretation of the poems as individual works and as groups. The Epistles of Horace must be read first as dramatic poetry, like Browning's monologues. They present tactful advice to his friends, either contemporaries or juniors, in circumstances which affect him as well. Writing to the youthful Tiberius Claudius Nero (9) calls for a different tone than to Celsus (8) or Scaeva (17). And the style and tone used for his remarks to Maecenas (7) drops noticeably when he writes to his bailiff (14). Even when we know nothing historically of the addressee, Horace's remarks suggest a great deal about him. His own friends may have met all of them at one time or another; we know Maecenas well, but very few others. Some epistles present clearer pictures of the addressee than do others: Florus (1.3) is too proud to make up with a friend, Celsus (8) is becoming unbearable and antisocial, Albius (4) is melancholy and avoiding his friends, while the bailiff (14) cannot stand life on the farm any longer and longs to return to the flesh-pots of Rome. But are these situations real or fictional? They all require interpretation as poetic constructs, arising often enough perhaps from genuine occasions and personalities. Blossoming into works of art transcending time and individuals they present a poetic statement of Horace's *humanitas*: the *vir bonus et sapiens* is seen among his friends and in the wider milieu of Roman society. The Epistles distil the best from his earlier poetry, reshaping it to a new form which is dramatic, personal, intimate, and at times lyrical. Major elements of the poetry arise from Horace's moral philosophy, especially his feeling for *communis sensus*, the sensitivity to the feelings of others; he is exploring tactful ways of guiding, admonishing, and responding to his
friends of all sorts and conditions, from the powerful and beloved patron, Maecenas, to the slave on his farm. The Epistles dramatize situations that draw the poet to his friends and require tactful responses by him. And because the speaker's viewpoint is sustained throughout the collection we receive a strong, even lyrical impression of his character.

While the possibility remains that some of the Epistles were actually sent as letters, they are best judged as fictional discourse. Literary dialogue presupposes the same degree of artificiality as the proscenium arch in a theatre; the epistle-form, considered as an imaginative and dramatic creation, has the potential of a lively illusion of reality. Horace achieves that "flavour of letters" with great economy. The reader or listener is eavesdropping, and is enticed into using his imagination to infer the entire situation.

If Cicero's letters are not the obvious model for the philosophical message of the Epistles (although they are suggestive of type or genre: advice or recommendations, for example), a pervasive Ciceronian influence does emerge when we consider the idea of formal letters collected according to addressee, genre, or topic together with the subject matter and dramatic implications of Cicero's dialogues. The De Amicitia and the De Officiis (dating with the Academics to 44 B.C.) discuss friendship and practical ethics from the point of view of a Roman sympathetic to the synthesizing and "sceptical" views of the New Academy. That group had taken these views over from Pyrrho and the Skeptics, but they were also identified with Socrates and Plato. Such views allowed for friendly and rational debate on any issue, a latitude which would have been congenial to the temperament of an orator. Such dialectic was free, he believed, from arrogance, and it encouraged good will and tolerance in debate. An Academic was a free man ("Modo hue modo illuc illud probabilius videtur"), a freedom in marked contrast, of course, to the restrictions of the Stoic logical positions. The Academic could invite refutation or improvement without loss of face. Reid rejects by definition the application to Cicero of the term "eclectic." Cicero and the Academics did not evolve a hybrid set of doctrines into an eclectic "system"; for system they wished to substitute a spirit of open-minded rational enquiry after the truth. Dogmatic assertion was to Cicero a fera et immanis belua, inimical to the true spirit of quaestiones. This suspension of final exclusive judgment was the lesson Cicero learned from the Academy, along with a sincere toleration of others' views.

Horace too had included the Academy among his centres of study (Epistle 2.2.43–45):

adiecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae,
scilicet ut vellem curvo dinoscere rectum
atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.
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Method seems to be paramount: "to distinguish the crooked from the straight"—"to seek for the truth." Horace's lines recall Cicero's De Consulatu suo (71–74):

Haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci,
otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris,
inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo
fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis.

At the very beginning of the Epistles Horace implies a debt to the Academy. "Quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum" (1.1.11) expresses inquiry into questions of theory and practice. "Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri" (1.1.14) recalls Cicero's own rejection of being addictus et consecratus to dogma. "Quo me cumque rapit tempes-tas, deferor hospes" (1.1.15) reaffirms Horace's strangeness to and independence of all dogmatic schools: he is likely to show up momentarily in any one of them, as Stoic or Hedonist. This first epistle to Maecenas stresses the fundamental importance of refuting false opinions and values, taking it as the beginning of excellence and wisdom: "virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima/stultitia caruisse" (1.1.41–42). Horace's frequently expressed deference about his own views is further evidence that in the Epistles his stance is Academic, rather than "eclectic." Such an hypothesis would account for two other characteristics of the philosophy of the Epistles. One is the frequency of ethical positions in the Epistles which are strongly Stoic: Courbaud was insistent in his identification of the Stoic sage in Epistles 6, 10, 11 and "mature constantia" in Epistles 14, 15, 16. On the express evidence of Cicero (particularly De Officiis) the Academy was reoriented by Antiochus, Philo's successor, who based its ethics firmly upon Stoic views. Even Horace's suspicions of the Stoic paradoxes in Satires 2.3 and 2.7 are quite consistent with the Academic position taken by Cicero. (Of course, unlike their ethics, the Stoic's dialectic was rejected by the New Academy as too dogmatic.) Cicero has little use for either the Epicureans' unintellectual physics or their ethics (not to speak of their lack of aesthetic concerns), but he does see in their regard for feelings of friendship something to be warmly praised: "sustinuero Epicurios, tot meos familiares, tam bonos, tam inter se amantes." It would not be surprising if any distinctively Epicurean stance in the Epistles were intended ad hominem, and concerned with friendship. This is certainly the case in Courbaud's "Epicurean" epistles, for example, in which Horace speaks so warmly to Maecenas (1), Torquatus (5), and Albius (4):

me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum. (Epistle 1.4.15–16)
Cicero’s initiation into philosophy had been conducted by Phaedrus the Epicurean, and it is certain that Horace too counted Epicureans among his friends.\(^{53}\)

The Academic philosophy, described by Cicero as “genus philosophandi minime arrogans maximeque et constans et elegans” suits the friendly spirit of the *Epistles*.\(^{54}\) Cicero had revised his *Academics* in order to dedicate them to M. Terentius Varro, himself an Academic. In 45 B.C. he wrote to Varro to inform him, and to solicit from him a dedication to himself of Varro’s own work, *De Lingua Latina*.\(^{55}\) In this letter he makes a revealing remark:

> Feci igitur sermonem inter nos habitum in Cumano, cum esset una Pomponius. Tibi dedi partes Antiochinas, quas a te probari intellectisse mihi videbar: mihi sumpsi Philonis. Puto fore ut, cum legeris, mirere nos id locutos esse inter nos quod numquam locuti sumus: sed nosti morem dialogorum.

Cicero’s friends might expect to find themselves conversing in dialogues that never took place, but it is also clear that the views of the Varro in the dialogue would be consistent with the ones he held.\(^{56}\) The same holds for the *Epistles*.

Horace assumed a different mask or stance with each change of poetic form. In the *Satires* and *Epodes* the poet praises, complains, preaches, and narrates. In the *Odes*, the *vates* (a bard of inspired utterance) persuades, praises, and reflects. The poet of the *Epistles* no longer plays the *vates*,\(^{57}\) but the mature mellow gentleman, full of rich experience and now retired like a gladiator or race horse from the public eye to the *otium* of the country.\(^{58}\) He is fond of seclusion, amiable, the essence of tact, and earnest in his endeavours to lead his friends by advice or tactful reproof away from error to tranquillity, virtue, and happiness. The epistolary form conveys and reinforces the mood of calm detachment of a serene and wise man, regarding the experiences and attitudes of others from his earned and chosen quiet retreat in the country. The sequence of letters presumes a writer who loves his friends with deep concern for their well-being and happiness.

If there is one ethical theme that the *Epistles* are meant (and admirably suited) to convey, it is friendship. Again and again the *Epistles* represent the thoughtful and tactful regard in which the poet, still aspiring to be a *vir bonus et sapiens*, holds his friends. Friendship involves him and those he addresses in a great variety of relationships. He writes to contemporaries who are his social superiors (Maecenas, Augustus) or his peers (Albius, Torquatus, Numicius, Fuscus, Bullatius, Iccius, Vala, and Quinctius), to others who are inferiors (Vinnius and his bailiff), and to younger men who
are both his social superior (Tiberius Claudius Nero) and his peers (Lollius, Florus, Celsus, Scaeva). In some epistles a three-way friendship is implied (1, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18).

Friendship was a constant theme of the schools of philosophy, recalling the famous discussions in Plato's *Phaedrus* of the inevitability of friendship among the “good”; and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where Socrates shows how in friendship virtue and utility are not incompatible with goodness or with each other. The most “clear and comprehensive” examination of friendship was Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle developed a classification with “virtue-friendship” as the highest level, “utility-friendship” as the lowest, and “pleasure-friendship” in between. Theophrastus later wrote a treatise in three volumes on friendship which has not survived but which Gellius tells us was one inspiration for Cicero's *De Amicitia*. The Stoics' view of friendship followed from the belief that the universal desire for human society was a manifestation of man's god-given reason: the interest of the whole was of prime importance, and the Socratic idea of the natural bond of affection between the wise and the virtuous, a “society of friends,” was sometimes expanded into the concept of a world-state. The Epicureans emphasized the value of friendship as productive of peace of mind, hence pleasure: “Friendship goes dancing through the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.” That relationship was practised in the “Garden” and beyond it, as their continuing reverence for Epicurus and their tradition of didactic letter-writing show.

Cicero addressed the *De Amicitia* to his own dearest friend Atticus (a confirmed Epicurean) and made its major speaker Caius Laelius, one whose friendship with Scipio Africanus and Lucilius Horace came to regard as exemplary. (Gellius tells us that Cicero left out most of Theophrastus' discussion of the conflict between friendship and duty.) Cicero acknowledged the divine origins of *amicitia* (relating *benevolentia* and *caritas* to it), seeing virtue alone as greater. *Amicitia* depends upon traditional Roman virtue and cannot exist without it, being in complete harmony with Nature. Only the good can truly be *amici* and only the wise can be good, since they will be naturally good—also faithful, upright, fair, generous, and free from passion, caprice, and insolence. These *officia* of true friendship shed a good deal of light upon the *Epistles* (Am. 24.88–89). The *virtus* that produces friendship must not be *dura* or *ferrea*, but *tenera* and *tractabilis*. To the Romans, *virtus* was something independently theirs already: an idea long tried in the fire of experience, and a rule of life which worked. A second likely source of Ciceronian influence on the *Epistles* is the *De Officiis*. That work is a monologue rather than a dialogue; like the *Orator*
it is an epistle, addressed to his 21-year-old son Marcus, studying in Athens. Cicero had retired from Rome at that time, and it was his intention to stay quietly in the country (3.1.1). *De Officiis* constitutes an epistle which is philosophic and protreptic, addressed by a father to his son. The subject matter is outlined in a letter to Atticus, Panaetius’ book *Peri tou kathêkontos* (“On Duty”) being its source. Cicero saw the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academics as the true Socratic guides to the important question of duties: “Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis, neque forensibus neque domestics in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eo et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpido” (1.2.4). In different tone and style Horace later expressed his impatience to learn “id quod/aeque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aequæ, aequæ neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit (Epistle 1.1.24—26). Cicero’s officia are first divided into the theoretical (ad finem bonorum) and the practical or expedient (usus vitae, 1.3.7). Panaetius had organised his officia under three headings: 1) honestum or turpe?; 2) utile or inutile?; 3) what is the relationship between honestum and utile? Four cardinal virtues comprising honestum are 1) wisdom (veri cognitio), 2) virtue (iustitia and beneficentia), 3) fortitude (magnus elatusque animus), and 4) (verecundia, temperantia, modestia).

Horace expresses similarly a “new” preoccupation with verum atque decens: i.e., the first of those four virtues (“truth” is itself the source of the others), adding “propriety,” which is the sum of them all. His search is open and modest and it rejects dogmatism (12); he is independent (14), acknowledging no ipse dixit (16—17); he claims he is “helplessly swayed between dogmatic Stoicism and the hedonism of Aristippus, an outsider to all the schools.”

To a hot-headed young friend he preaches a lesson on self-control (one aspect of the fourth virtue), offering as his text not the philosophers but Homer: “qui, quid pulcrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, / planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit (Epistle 1.2.3—4). Pulcrum-turpe and utile-inutile were concepts discussed in the first two books of the *De Officiis*, Cicero’s standard authorities being the Stoic and Academic schools. Epistle 1.6 is Horace’s response to a friend’s moral crisis: Numicius can find no standard by which to live, since virtue has proved untenable (15—16, 30—32). Horace’s prescription is an open and calm mind (nil admirari, 1), in accordance with a surprisingly simple guide to happiness: vive, vale (67). In the *De Officiis* Cicero had offered Panaetius’ view that taking virtus alone as the sumnum bonum produced inconsistencies between doctrine and practice; it would not admit of friendship, justice, or liberality, principles which make human society possible. The particular needs of the individual’s nature were paramount, not integrity of doctrine.
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 Epistle 1.7 raises practical questions about liberality and friendship. Liberality had been discussed as a subdivision of iustitia by Cicero,82 who anticipated Horace's analysis of his friendship with Maecenas and the gift of the Sabine farm. Gifts should not injure the recipient.83 They should suit the merits of the recipient, his moral character, and good will toward the benefactor. Gratitude must be properly shown, and gifts-in-return carefully considered.84 In Epistle 1.10, Horace discusses "life in accordance with nature," advocating the choice of the country over the city as a place to build and live (12—14). Cicero had discussed the relationship between propriety (decere) and nature: "Officium autem, quod ab eo [decere] ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae."85 So propriety supports Nature as the surest guide to the four virtues. A man should follow his own nature in individual actions and in life, a message appearing in the epistles to Bullatius (caelum non animum mutant, 1.11.27), Iccius (1.12), the bailiff (1.14), Quinctius (1.16), Scaeva (1.17), and Lollius (1.18).

The Epistles dramatize Horace's views of friendship. An important element in his relationship with Maecenas was beneficia, which figured prominently in the traditional Roman view of genuine patronage as a kind of amicitia, for beneficia either cement or ruin friendships. Horace's discussion with Maecenas of his own position on such matters (Epistle 7), and likewise with Scaeva and Lollius (17, 18), deal with this principle. The way in which good men confer benefits on their friends should reflect the character of both. Judgment, consistency, restraint, and moderation should all be apparent in a relationship that is truly an amicitia.86 His own friendship with Maecenas, and the gratitude and restraint with which he enjoyed the Sabine farm, are explored in his two finest sermones, Satire 2.6 and Epistle 1.7.87 In the Epistles we have a series of poetic studies in the duties of friendship. This preoccupation with friendship is constant from Satire 1.3 on:

hoc faciens vivam melius: sic dulcis amicis
occurrem. (Satire 1.4.135—6)
natales grate numeras? ignoscis amicis? (Epistle 2.2.10)
nil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico. (Satire 1.5.44)
quidve ad amicitias, usus recturne, trahat nos. (Satire 2.6.75)

When Horace returned later to lyrics, he still saw friendship and true happiness as inseparable (Ode 4.9.51—52):

non ille pro caris amicis
aut patria timidus perire.
The *Epistles* appeared when Horace was in his mid-forties. While he did not challenge (in volume) either of his models for *sermones*, Lucilius and Cicero, he was now ready for something for which they, his father, his teachers in Athens, his experience of life's harsh realities, his friendships, his return to the country, and his own character had prepared him: an urbane, and mature treatment of what it means to have (and be) a friend.

The development of friendship as a theme in the *Epistles* depends upon Horace's arrangement of poems and groups of poems. That arrangement does not seem complex or arithmetical (like that of the *Epodes*, for example) but it is effective. While consecutive and linear arrangement helped to make recitation both comprehensible and pleasurable, the work was also intended to be reread privately, when numerical or symmetrical patterns might be seen. The most obvious aspect of the *Epistles* linear sequence is the alternation of addressees in a repeating pattern. Maecenas (1) is followed by two younger friends (2—3) and then three other contemporaries (4—5—6). That sequence is repeated exactly in *Epistles* 7—12 (7, 8—9, 10—11—12); *Epistle* 13, for Augustus, is followed by three letters to contemporaries (14—15—16) and two to younger men (17—18). Maecenas is again addressed (19). *Epistle* 20 stands outside the frame of the first, second, eighteenth, and nineteenth as a coda to close the book. This frame pattern persists as we move toward the centre of the collection. *Epistles* 2—3 (young men) balance 17—18; 4—5—6 (contemporaries) balance 14—15—16. *Epistle* 7 (*potens amicus*) balances 13. At the centre of the collection, *Epistles* 8—9—10—11—12 relieve an otherwise symmetrical pattern, falling into a group of two (8—9, to younger men) and three (10—11—12 to contemporaries). If *Epistle* 10 is the axis of the collection (in some ways it is the most typical), that apparent eccentricity makes sense. The pattern emerges as follows: 1 + (2+3) + 1 + (2+3) + 1 + (3+2) + 1 [+Coda]. There are complementary thematic patterns as well. *Epistles* 1 and 7 deal with the poet's seclusion from Rome and Maecenas. *Epistles* 13 and 19 (and the coda) stress his place in the society of the great: he loves to get away from Rome, but is still proud of his acceptance there. The central axis (*Epistle* 10) contrasts the claims of town and country to his old friend, Fuscus. *Epistles* 3—4—5 offer invitations to friends to enjoy his hospitality. References to the poet's place of writing widen the landscape of the collection beyond simply Rome and the Sabinum (2, 7, 11, 12, 15).

The philosopher most frequently mentioned, curiously, is Aristippus (1, 15, 17) the hedonist: there is a time and place even for him. Horace is attempting to discover what is "true" (*verum*) and what is morally "right" (*decens*) (1, 2, 6, 10, 16); what is good and what is useful in social intercourse, especially in friendship (3, 7, 8, 9, 12); where moderation is to be found in the face of human ambition, materialism, greed, discontent, anxiety, self-indulgence, and surrender to the passions (4, 10, 11, 14, 15);
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how far freedom is a virtue, and what the ideal relationship is between an individual and a potens amicus (1, 7, 17, 18). For these quaestiones de officiis Horace has found practical examples of an approach drawn from true situations, casting his own friends in roles appropriate to their ages, stations, and relationships to himself. The Epistles are a celebration of a new era in Rome and of two generations who experienced and shaped it.
THE STRUCTURAL armature of the First Book of Horace's *Epistles* consists of four letters to his patrons: three to Maecenas (1, 7, 19) and one indirectly intended for Augustus (13). *Epistles* 1, 7, and 13 introduce three sequences of five: two to younger friends and three to his own contemporaries. The fourth (19) closes the main collection (1–19) on the same subject—his own poetry—and with the same dedication—to Maecenas—as it had begun. These four tie together a circle of personal relationships with individuals belonging to his own generation (that of Philippi and Actium) or the youthful one following it, stating the four important themes of the collection: the satisfactions of his poetic career, philosophy, friendship, and a well-earned retirement in the country.

**EPISTLE 1.1: To Maecenas (I)**

(Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena)

Maecenas:

(1) Are you saying, after all these years as my patron, that I should come back like some gladiator in country retirement (or aging racehorse) to the kind of verse I used to write? I'd be laughed at! (10) I'm through with elementary exercises, and am now searching for the True and the Appropriate, though not committed to any one school, and
following Virtue or Aristippus, as required. I long to find the universal principles behind moderation and personal happiness.

(28) We can all improve our physical health somewhat. The same is true of moral health: greed, desire, vanity, envy, wrath, sloth, drunkenness, passion can all be cured with the proper prescription. (38) The wildest can be tamed through cultivation. Virtue starts where vice ends, as with wisdom and foolishness. (42b) What effort you devote to avoiding a shortfall of money or votes! But happiness is really easier to achieve than that, provided you are free from envy and hopes. Virtues are far more precious than silver and gold.

(52) Here in Rome money is everyone's goal, from broker to schoolboy: character, intelligence, eloquence and reputation all take second place. (59b) Even children at play know better, chanting: "You'll be the king if you do it right!" This is better than laws and penalties, and will prepare you to face Fortune's arrogance with courage and independence.

(70) If I reject Rome's values, it's because everyone always wants something different. (91) Even the poor man is no better, and deserves to be laughed at as you laugh at me because of the cut of my hair or clothes. (97b) But you don't laugh at my moral inconsistencies or turn over to others your care for a friend who depends on you, knowing that such madness is chronic with me.

(106) In short, the wise man has all life offers: wealth, freedom, honour, looks, power, and health—except when he has heartburn.

This first epistle introduces a new stage in Horace's poetic life. We may know something already about his relationship with Maecenas as revealed in his earlier works (Satires, Epodes, and Odes I–III) and about his philosophical and poetic development. The Satires, Epodes, and Odes had all been dedicated to Maecenas, and one last lengthy ode to him (3.29) marked the culmination of that creative phase. Another landmark in that relationship is the archetypal "epistle," Satire 2.6.

This pattern of dedications is maintained here. A clear point of departure, however, is the epistle's tone, which seems no longer affirmative and confident for one who has so fully mastered his craft. It begins by declining Maecenas' request to write poetry, claiming he is now too old for it, and has lost the vigour and mental powers it requires (2–4). Horace is now interested solely in verum atque decens (11). "Truth with a laugh" (riden-tem dicere verum) has been altered to "truth with decorum." Despite his friend's request, and because of the warnings of his own Socratic vox, he will write poetry no longer. Ironic comparisons of himself first to a super-annuated gladiator, now escaped from ludus and ludicra, then to an aging race horse, echo Ennius and Cicero. He will speak from a new point
of view and in a new tone. The Capitol, solemn centre of Rome's religious life and history (Ode 3.30) gives way to the countryside: "Veianius armis / Herculis ad postem fixis latet abditus agro" (4—5). The actions of the gladiator are laudable, giving up ludus and populus for the quiet of the country, and offering due thanks to his patron, Hercules, for preserving him from the hazards of his former calling. In the midst of the din of city life, the fickle mob, and the ludi and munera, the voice of Horace's higher nature is heard (when he is ready to listen) urging him to abandon it all while he is able to enjoy something better. Also ironic is the conversion to a completely new style of life (versus et cetera ludicra pono), for versus apply to hexameter poetry too.6

The poet claims to have found a new calling as the result of conversion to philosophy. As an enthusiastic convert he is eager to detail his own change from indecision and weakness and persuade others to follow suit.7 This conversion is one key to understanding the Epistles. Another is the dedication to Maecenas, his dearest friend and patron; for the inseparability of sapientia and amicitia is a major assumption of Horace's sermones.

The beginning and close of the epistle are both intimately addressed to Maecenas, framing (as in Satire 1.1) a long central sermon on mempsimoiria. Both beginning and end are ironic, from the verse-refusal to write verse (because of this "new-found" urge to study philosophy) to the gentle undercutting of his apparently serious pose: the sapiens as the spiritual paragon of men. His own life runs to extremes from Stoicism (16f) to self-conscious hedonism (18f).8 But now he is convinced he knows what to do about it, and what the only guide to living is: philosophy (23—26).

A diatribe begins at v.29, urging modest, obtainable goals in the pursuit of correctio animi. The vices of avaritia (33), amor laudis (36), invidia, iracundia, inertia, inebrietas, amor (38), which are all forms of madness, can at least be alleviated by reason (34—35):

sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem posset et magnam morbi deponere partem.

The aim is cultura, in accordance with Cicero's definition: cultura animi philosophia.9 With the hope of reasonable success, the convert strikes out with a definition of virtue (41—42): "Virtus est vitium fugere, et sapientia prima stultitia caruisse." Progress is possible in virtus and sapientia if you can eliminate the opposites, vitium and stultitia.10 The point is thrust home by the forceful tu-form of the diatribe in an attack on men's false priorities and inverted values, the stock figures (merchant, miser, and ambitious politician) contrasted with a common prize fighter, who would recognize the ultimate worth of an unchallenged Olympic crown. The contrast between recte facere and rem facere emerges in the opposing views
of the Stock Exchange (and Schools) (53–59) and boys at play (59b–69). Public opinion is shown as worthless by the fable of the fox and the lion. Not only can the *populus* not agree about their own values (76–80), but no individual can be consistent even in his own preferences (81–90). Wealth and class do not make a difference: the man of modest means is just as fickle as the rich (91–93). The diatribe appears to end here with the imperative *ride* (91). The references to laughter suggest that Horace has turned back to Maecenas: *rides* (95) . . . *rides* . . . *neque rides*. Maecenas is not amused, however, and Horace’s plight is now more serious, for there are now both moral and personal considerations involved. It is one of Maecenas’ friends making himself ridiculous, and one who looks to him for support and example. As a friend, Maecenas would take charge of his care himself, not leave it to the courts to appoint a psychiatrist or guardian.

This contrast bears again on the epistle’s *recusatio* frame. First, Maecenas is humorously reminded that his friend the poet has serious problems that require a solution. Secondly, Horace reaffirms his friendship with Maecenas and his gratitude for its reciprocation. These issues reinforce the case Horace made in ironically declining at the outset to return again to the profession at which he has long laboured, and from which he has retired once and for all.

Finally comes the coda (106–8):

> ad summam: sapiens uno minor est *love*, dives, liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum, praecipue sanus, nisi cum pitvita molesta est.

These lines are full of commonplaces, from the versatility and supremacy of the Stoic sage to the ironic admission of the most basic of human weaknesses: indigestion. There is a parallel in *Satire* 1.3 (133–136):

> Vellunt tibi barbam lascivi pueri, quos tu nisi fuste coerces, urgeris turba circum te stante *miserque* rumperis et latras, magnorum maxime regum.

The exponent there of the doctrine of *sapiens rex regum* was a Stoic-Cynic evangelist. Though he was *rex regum* he had to abdicate his throne long enough to chase away the scallywags who pull his beard, and use his staff in a most uncerebral way! That scene had concluded Horace’s rejection of the Stoic paradox *omnia peccata paria*. The *rex regum* there retained about as much dignity as Horace does here, his stomach reacting to something unwisely eaten. The seriousness of the conversion to the philosopher’s life is undercut, though Horace had previously used it as his
Potentes Amici

excuse to Maecenas. This is not surprising if we compare his ironic re-
response to Trebatius’ recommendation to write an epic (Satire 2.1.12–20) 
and his determination to persevere with Lucilian satire. That too had 
edged on a farcical note, for Horace cut the legal ground out from under 
the comical old jurist. Having denied himself the skill to write epic, he 
there slips in a line or two of high style as proof (12–15):

Cupidum, pater optime, vires 
deficiunt; neque enim quivis horrentia pilis
agmina nec fracta pereunt cuspide Gallos
aut labentis equo describit cuspide Parthi.

That Horace is being consistently ironic in both recusatio and exhortatio 
can be further supported by his sketch of the poet who declines to accept 
his friend and patron’s request to write more versus because of a new 
obsession with philosophy (11–12):

Quid verum atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum:
condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.

His obsession is expressed by the parallels of the lover longing for his 
unfaithful mistress, the indentured worker, the minors who must obey 
their mothers, and the poet’s own uncritical expectations (20–26). Sapien-
tia is the answer for all. Ignorance is a threat to happiness.

Horace’s self-caricature as an eager convert parallels those of Damasip-
pus (Satire 2.3) and Catius (Satire 2.7). The satiric theme of the madness 
of all fools, including the one who laughs at the madman, here recurs with 
a nice twist (Maecenas does not laugh at his friend’s foibles), as well as that 
of the sapiens rex (97). Even the analogy of Proteus (Satire 2.3.97) is 
repeated in the epistle (90), and a hit at Horace’s passion for renovations. 
Satire 2.2 is similar: the old farmer Ofellus discourses on the sins of luxury. 
Horace describes Ofellus as “rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque 
Minerva” (3), much like the mask that Horace dons in this epistle (14–15):

nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri,
quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.18

Ofellus too mentions the painful results of over-indulgence in rich fare (76) 
(“stomachoque tumultum / lenta feret pitvita”) while in Epistle 1.1, the 
sapiens is “praecipue sanus, nisi cum pitvita molesta est” (108). This does 
not seem to be a commendation of eclecticism, but rather an ironic image 
of one engaged in rudderless, aimless, philosophical pursuits, and a 
“stranger” to the inner circles of all the schools. As suggested earlier, these
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claims suggest a philosopher in sympathy with Cicero’s Academy, comfortably detached from dogmatic commitment to any sect but ready to embrace such teachings as seem probable and congenial, including especially the humane Stoicism of Panaetius and the concern for the “mean” of the Peripatetics.¹⁹

Two matters remain to be resolved: the relationships implied between the poet and Maecenas, and between this poem’s content and the remainder of the book. Like Epistle 1.7, 1.1 has also been interpreted as a declaration of independence and a reproach of Maecenas’ indifference to his friend’s real spiritual needs.²⁰ Its ending has suggested to some a lack of full commitment, though establishing the ethical preoccupation of the collection.²¹

What Maecenas had asked his friend to write we are not told. The praise of Veianius abditus in agro suggests that Horace is already in the country. Whatever the imaginary commission, it might have entailed giving up his country retirement to take up again what he now considers to be mere ludica. Such hazards are as repellent as the return to Rome urged by Maecenas in Epistle 1.7.4 (dabis aegrotare timenti). He anticipates Maecenas’ skeptical question: “ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo lare tuter” (13). This might have pressed for a firm commitment from Horace (“I’ve become a Stoic” or “I’ve joined the Epicureans”), but he is too Protean for that. Like Ofellus, he claims no affiliation—only a sincere inconsistency. A convert’s longing to learn the answers to his problems is brought out in a series of three comparisons which introduce his own precise and impatient position: “restat ut his ego me ipse regam solerque elementis” (27).²² The discourse begins with a fervour calculated to impress Maecenas with the urgency of his case. Maecenas must realize how serious the scourge of inconsistency is, and how bad a case of it Horace has. Maecenas laughs at him when he goes about badly groomed (93—95) but not when his desires prove as inconsistent as his dress (96—99). Maecenas does not laugh, because the poet is a friend and because his madness is chronic (insanire sollemnia). Nor is he disposed to have the poet declared incompetent by a magistrate, having accepted guardianship himself. Even a badly-cut nail is a source of parental vexation (103—105):

rerum tutela mearum

cum sis et prave sectum stomacheris ob unguem
de te pendentis, te respicientis amici.

Here is an echo of Satire 1.3 with its message of forbearance toward the faults of friends (26, 33, 140). Stertinius had spoken in a similar vein (Satire 2.3.51—3):
POTENTES AMICI

hoc te
credo modo insanum, nihilo ut sapienior ille
qui te deridet caudam trahat.

This irksome passion for philosophy is quite sincere, (it may not last, of course) and Maecenas ought to endure it as a minor irritation. But like Martha Cratchit hiding in the corner, Horace can keep a straight face no longer:

ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Love, dives,
liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
praecipe sanus, nisi cum pitvita molesta est.

Although Horace has pulled Maecenas' leg, the recusatio has a serious purpose, that of guiding us to the rest of the collection. Beginning and ending with the idea of friendship, it establishes a gentle Academic tone for philosophical discourse, abandoning the formal ambitiousness of the Odes and making clear its relationship to the Satires. It recreates the rural setting of the second book (Satires 2.2 and 2.6). A consistent perspective is established with the principle of decorum (Non eadem est aetas non mens). Reading on to the Epistles to Lollius, Florus, Albius and the rest (and Maecenas again in 1.7 and 1.19) we shall find the poet in the mellow autumn of his career, now on his farm with books, memories, and—best of all—letters for his friends.

EPISTLE 1.7: To Maecenas (II)
(Quinque dies tibi pollicitus me rure futurum)

Maecenas:

(1) I know I have broken my word by staying at the farm a whole month. But I also know that you share my concern for my health and understand why Rome is not the place for me to be in August. Nor can I endure the cold winter there; so I'll go to the coast and see you in the spring.

(14) Your generosity has always been sincere and wise, and those gifts have matched your estimate of my qualities. I shall continue to try to live up to it. But your demands upon me require more than I now have: youth and vigor. (29) I know the fable of the fox whose bloated stomach prevented escape from the corn bin; but it doesn't apply to me, as I've never wanted more than I have. (40) The story of Telemachus' modest response to Menelaus' fine gifts is more appropriate to our situation. Moderation recommends Tibur and Tarentum (not Rome) to me.
(46) Contrast the story of Philippus and Volteius Mena, a small-time auctioneer. Philippus was intrigued by Mena’s fastidious and independent spirit and modest wants, and after finally persuading him to dine with him lured him to his Sabine farm. (78b) Then he gave him money to buy one of his own, but all for his own amusement as a practical joke. Mena became obsessed with farming, and when theft, drought, and sickness struck he galloped distracted back to Philippus, all scruffy and unkempt, to beg for his old life back. (96) He was right to do so, but it would have been better rather for him always to have kept to his own proper yardstick for living.

The Seventh Epistle is prepared for in two ways. We have been given some hints about the nature of the poet’s relationship with Maecenas (Epistle 1): an easy relationship marked by a deep reciprocal concern for the well-being and feelings of each other. Horace was not afraid to say no to a request which he felt it would not be an act of decorum for him to grant. The intervening epistles (2—6) deal with specific concerns of five of his friends. Good humour is never far away, but at bottom is a core of seriousness which culminates in the sermon to Numicius (6). Then Horace addresses Maecenas once more. After giving advice to friends on social and ethical concerns, he must deal with a problem of his own: how to justify to a friend and patron his failure to return to Rome as promised. It is an example of the kind of tact that can sustain a friendship in a difficult situation. In fully understanding this epistle, we shall be in a better position to evaluate the rest.

The poem has generally been taken (beginning with the ancient commentators) as the most personal and occasional of the entire collection: i.e., if it is not the actual document by which Horace declared his independence from Maecenas, it is at least a poetic record of the event and published with the agreement of both parties.23 How far are we to believe an actual historical rift between the poet and his patron is represented?24 There also remain some apparent logical flaws in the poem’s argument unresolved.

Bearing in mind Cicero’s comment to Varro on the element of fiction in his dialogues (Fam. 9.8.1), there is clearly no way of determining how much historical fact Horace has given us. Our business is to determine what the poet says and implies about the immediate dramatic situation (1—13, 25—28). Two thirds of the poem are devoted to analogies drawn from rustic and urban life, beast fable, and epic, providing the work with a rich and varied texture. The rest consist of reflections and comment.

Horace dramatizes a situation in which, before going to the country for a few days in August, he promised Maecenas to return soon to Rome. At the beginning of September he has not returned, and learns that he is sorely
missed (1—2). The reasons for his absence are clarified in terms of his fear of the city in September (3—13), and sense of inadequacy for the kind of life the city demands owing to his advancing years and delicate health (25—28):

quodsi me noles usquam discedere, reddes
forte latus, nigros angusta fronte capillos,
reddes dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum et
inter vina fugam Cinarae maerere protervae.

The conflict in the poet’s feelings for the city and the country vividly recalls another treatment of the whole question published some ten years earlier.

Satire 2.6 is, in Niall Rudd’s words, a poem about wishes. Its motivation is the fulfilment of the poet’s fondest dreams, and he modestly prays to Mercury to allow him simply to keep what he now has, free from any taint of envy for anyone else (“ut propria haec mihi munera faxis,”) a prayer he utters again to Apollo: “frui paratis et valido mihi, / Latoe, dones” (Ode 1.31.17 f.). Then he sketches the features of life in the city which Maecenas’ gift allows him to escape: mala ambitio (18), autunnus gravis (19), and Libitinae quaestus acerbae (19). He resents court appearances (24), especially in the winter. He must battle his way through mobs in the street (28), enduring envious jibes at his friendship with Maecenas (which he admits give him much more satisfaction than they intend). Even on reaching the Esquiline, the strain continues: “aliena negotia centum / per caput et circa saliunt latus” (33 f.). Horace plays down the importance of his role in Maecenas’ daily round (41—46), one which makes his dealings with others extremely sensitive and causes resentment. This is all a waste of time compared to the joys of the country: reading, napping, diversion from his responsibilities in the city, and talk of philosophy. The Satire concludes brilliantly with the fable of the town and country mice, underscoring the antithesis of otium rusticum and negotium urbanum. The poem is both a fine piece of self-revelation and a thank you to Maecenas.

There is no admission in Satire 2.6 that the poet was not adequate to the physical strain of his life in the city. In Epistle 1.7, however, we have a man now forty-five years old reassessing his position: his lungs are weak, his hair is getting thin, his laugh grates, and his prowess has sadly slipped (25—28). Horace uses his health as an excuse for his already prolonged absence and as grounds for prolonging it still further. He tempts this further with expressions of regret and affection: mendax desideror (2), dulcis amice (12), vates tuus (11), si concedes (13). He will return cum zephyris ... hirundine prima (13). Lines 1—13 are a graceful apology to Maecenas, in which the poet’s somewhat surprising plans to go to the seashore when the snows come appear as a compliment in terms of
Horace’s confidence in his friend’s affection and understanding, rather than as wilful determination to have his own way.

Horace takes the opportunity to expand the issue of his preference to one of broader significance. He praises Maecenas’ past generosity, beginning with a rustic anecdote from his own part of Italy (14—19) as a contrast to their own relationship. What the Calabrian farmer has to give are the pears which lie on the ground of his orchard. They are of no particular consequence to their owner, and if they are still there before the day is out the pigs will eat them. The farmer presses them upon this visitor with a zeal out of all proportion to their worth. The stranger, for his part, remains tactfully appreciative but firm in his insistence that he has no use for them. The anecdote is a stringent comment upon real generosity: “haec seges ingratos tulit et feret omnibus annis” (21). The collocation prodigus and stultus express foolish extravagance and total lack of discrimination in making benefactions, defects which lead to the worst of social sins and friendship’s bane, ingratitude: “nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est” (Cic. Off. 1.15.47). Yet there is nothing here to suggest that Maecenas was ever indiscriminate in his favours (22—24):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus} \\
\text{nec tamen ignorat, quid distent aera lupinis:} \\
\text{dignum praestabo me etiam pro laude merentis.}
\end{align*}
\]

The poet has moved from his apology and plea for further time away from Rome into a discussion of the anatomy of generosity. The topic had already been explored fully by Cicero in the De Officiis. Each of the three elements in an act of giving must be fully proportionate and complementary: the giver, the recipient, and the gift. The giver must render his gifts with careful consideration, not compulsive haste, and not to just anyone. The recipient must be chosen for his dignitas, with regard for his character, devotion, and service, specifically for his virtutes, modestia, temperantia, and iustitia. This is what Horace means when he reminds Maecenas of his own practice and the virtues of their friendship. It is therefore easy to take him at his word in his promise to be dignus in the future as he has been in the past. He says below: “saepè verecundum laudasti, rexque paterque / audisti coram, nec verbo parcius absens” (37—38). Such sentiments lie behind the statement, “non quo more piris vesci Calaber iubet hospes / tu me fecisti locupletem” (14—15).

We are now brought back (25) to the first subject, Horace’s absence from Rome and Maecenas’ desideratio. Horace is now completely unfit for life in the city. His weaknesses remind us of the strain he had described in Satire 2.6: he now lacks forte latus and dulce loqui as well, requirements of the man of activity and sophistication in Rome.
Then follows the fable of the fox in the grain bin (29—33). What is its allegorical relevance to the discussion? Does the weasel represent a particular person (even Maecenas?) or just an envious social climber such as we have already met (Satires 1.9 and 2.6)? Does the fox represent Horace? That depends upon our interpretation of v. 34: "hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta resigno."

If resigno here is really equivalent to reddere or rescribere, then the poet is pleading guilty to the analogy and to his own moral culpability. Yet nowhere in this poem does Horace allow us to accuse him (as the fox is accused) of gorging himself until he loses his shape. He represents himself as recipient of Maecenas' generosity in terms of modestia, particularly important if the Ciceronian discussion is relevant. Lines 35—36 seem to say that Horace affirms his moderation in life by refusing to envy either the poor or the rich, since he now, thanks to Maecenas, has everything he needs to be happy. Even the pseudo-Acro commentary sees an inconsistency in 37: "mire, quia nunc nuce paulo asperior est." K. Büchner has suggested that cuncta could mean Maecenas' city favours alone. To Horace the Sabine farm was parva (Ode 2.16.37) in the best sense.

The crux of the inconsistency could be the two verbs in v. 34. Both Porphyrian and pseudo-Acro identify compellor with compellere: si cogatur (Porph.), si . . . non concedatur (ps.-Acro). But why should a fable compel anyone to repent of something he has not done, particularly if some envious outsider (procul) adduces it? It makes better sense (with Lewis and Short) to understand compellare, "to accost, accuse, attack, impugn," a verb regularly used with such ablatives as edicto (Cic. Phil. 3.7.17) and lege (Fam. 8.12.3). The Latin then can mean, "If I am the man impugned by this fable . . ." But if Horace really affirms that he is "returning" everything, it must be an admission that he has accepted too much for his own good. What else can resigno mean? It is a very uncommon Latin word, in both prose and poetry. Horace has used it already in its literal sense of "unseal" (testamenta resignat, 9); he also uses it in Ode 3.29.54, usually glossed as reddere or rescribere (resigno quae dedit). Persius uses it when he speaks of unsealing the contents of the heart: totum hoc verba resignant (5.28). That the word's meaning was not always clear is shown by Servius' note on Aeneid 4.244. Some ancient commentators maintained that in the expression lumina resignat Vergil meant not that Mercury was "opening the eyes" of the dead for the trip to the underworld, but was rather "dimming the vision" at the moment of death. Cicero uses the expression oculus conturbatus (Tusc. 3.7.15), turbare being the alternate meaning Servius cites for resignare. Quintilian uses the expression ceram turbare, "break the seal" (12.8.13).

We find resignare in the sense of "annul, cancel, invalidate, destroy, rescind" (Lewis and Short) in Cicero and Florus. Cicero uses the word only
twice, once in the literal sense of opening a letter, and once in the sense of “conturbare” (Arch. 9). There his expression is omnem tabularum fidem resignasset, “destroyed completely the reliability of the records.” Florus may be imitating the passage: ne quid ex constituti fide resignaret (2.17.14). Therefore Horace’s phrase would mean, omnem criminis fidem resigno, or cuncta (sc. crimina) resigno: “If I am the man impugned by this fable, I refute it all!” Horace is defending his past conduct as consistent with his own and Maecenas’ views, not admitting a fault or taking drastic measures to reform. The sentiment is similar to Epistle 1.16.39—40: “mendax infamia terret / quem nisi mendosum et medicandum?”

It now remains to see whether the interpretation is borne out by the rest of the Epistle. Vv. 35—38 are a statement of the modestia Horace claims and which confers upon him the dignitas required by the ideal recipient of benefactions. The last hurdle, v. 39, can be removed. “Inspice si possum donata reponere laetus” can be translated “Ask yourself whether I can be happy just to keep what has (already) been given to me.” The choice of this meaning of reponere is consistent both with the tone of 34—38, and with Horace’s own usage. He does not use the word in the sense of “give back” or “forgo,” but rather “put where (it) belongs” or “lay up.” Reponere has a meaning close to componere. Cicero uses the hendiadys “condendi ac reponendi scientia” (N.D. 2.62.156); Horace, “condo et compono quae mox depromere possum” (Epistle 1.1.12). Reponere and componere are a metrical doublet. The sentiment is echoed by Tibullus (1.1.77—78): “ego composito securus acervo / dites despiciam despiciamque famem,” the very object of Horace’s prayers in Satire 2.6, and Ode 1.31.

But how does the exemplum of Telemachus and Menelaus follow? As in vv. 14—19, a triangular situation depicts the ethical interrelationships between the giver, the recipient, and gift (40—43):

Haud male Telemachus, proles patientis Ulixei:
“Non est aptus equis Ithace locus, ut neque planis porrectus spatiis nec multae prodigus herbae:
Atride, magis apta tibi tua dona relinquam.”

For Telemachus it is not a matter of returning gifts previously received, but of making a tactful choice on the principle of appropriateness. In the Greek (Od. 4.602), the verb is “forno” (leipso). Menelaus offers him first what he considers would be worthy (dignum) of him: three fine horses and a chariot. But while it is worthy, the gift is not appropriate (decens) since Ithaca is not suited to fast horses. The young man is not afraid to give his xenos an honest opinion. He has sufficient confidence in both the older man’s sincere regard for him and his own position to ask for something else smaller in size and more appropriate, something appropriate for his host to
give: a valuable keepsake from his storehouse (Od. 4.600). By his reply
Menelaus shows that he fully understands Telemachus' reasons for declin-
ing the gift, and the tact beyond his years thus displayed (609–12). The
substitute gift is a choice heirloom, a silver crater with a golden rim made
by Hephaestus, which Phaidimos, the king of the Sidonians, had given to
Menelaus (613–19). The whole experience serves to cement the bond of
affection and respect between the two friends. Horace's interpretation of
the exemplum is not far to seek (44–45): "parvum parva decent: mihi iam
non regia Roma / sed vacuam Tibur placet aut imbelle Tarentum." Rome
and Maecenas' further bounty are no longer suitable for him. He is a
person of small consequence, needs, and stamina. The adjectives parvum,
vacuum, and imbelle contrast with regia to remind us of what he is asking,
and what he has always asked for—the opportunity of enjoying what he
has, and living according to his own standard. By his conduct Menelaus
represents both a compliment to Maecenas and Horace's hope that this
friend will understand.

The anecdote about Philippus and Volteius Mena (46–95) is the final
reprise of the theme. Büchner aptly describes it as a karikierte Spiegelbild. Both parties are responsible for the debacle. Philippus' motives are wrong.
He presses his favors upon Mena and enjoys watching him carried away by
them. Cicero provides a commentary upon such benefaction (Off. 1.14.42):

Videndum est enim primum, ne obsit benignitas et eis ipsis quibus
benigne videbitur fieri, et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit
quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuat. Id enim est
iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam
et qui gratificantur cuiquam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle vid
ceantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi adsentatores
iudicandi sunt.

Mena in turn becomes uncontrolled and immoderate as a result of his
change of fortune and his desire to become rich: "immoritur studiis et
amore senescit habendi" (85). He is totally unprepared for failure and
frantically seeks the quickest way out of his predicament. The moral (97),
"metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum," ends both the tale and
the epistle. As Cicero put it: "ea tamen (i.e. universa natura) conservata
propriam nostram sequamur, ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora,
tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regulam metiamur" (Off. 1.31.110).
The apparent resemblances to the events of Horace's friendship with
Maecenas are intended only to intensify the contrasts. Horace has again
used a triangular exemplum to clarify the whole issue of benefactions
between viri boni et sapientes.
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The theme of the Epistle is not independence, but rather the fitness of aspirations as measured by one's proper nature. It is developed within the framework of a request from Horace to Maecenas to be forgiven his extended absence and allowed further time away from his friend. This theme of decorum is applied to giving and receiving, providing generous and tactful grounds for the poet to ask and his friend to grant.

EPISTLE 1.13: To Vinnius (and Augustus)
(Ut proficiscentem docui te saepe diuque)

Vinnius:
(1) As you were setting off, I told you again and again to choose exactly the right moment to deliver my rolls, sealed, to Augustus. Don't let your very enthusiasm spoil things for me. (6) If your pack rubs, rest it. Don't slam it down where you're told and bring ridicule on your father's name, Asina. (10) Forge on over hill river and bog. When you reach your objective, guard it where it is; don't lug it about like some bumpkin or crone! (16) Don't gossip about your sweaty job on Caesar's behalf: just go on, and ignore others' curiosity. (19) Carry on, and farewell. Watch you don't miss a step and botch the whole mission!

The third epistle in the group addressed to his two patrons is very different from the others, being the only one never to refer to Maecenas. While it singles out Augustus as one who appreciates his poetry, it does so humorously and indirectly in a sort of memorandum to an unknown Vinnius who is being entrusted with the task of delivering a copy of some signata volumina or libelli (papyrus rolls) right to the princeps. Augustus is referred to as one who must be approached tactfully and opportunely, a characteristic previously touched upon in Satire 2.1 (17—20):

haud mihi dero,
cum res ipsa feret: nisi dextro tempore Flacci
verba per attentam non ibunt Caesaris aurem:
cui male si palpere, recalcitat undique tutus.

There the most powerful man in Rome was compared to a wary stallion—if rubbed the wrong way he would kick! Such a joking relationship is suggested by the Suetonian life, where Augustus twits Horace in a letter about his height and corporation. In another letter, Augustus chided Horace for not addressing him (mecum potissimum loquaris) in his sermones: “an veteris ne apud posteros infame tibi sit, quod videaris familiaris nobis esse?” (Horace finally addressed Epistle 2.1 to him.) Those sermones are most likely Epistles I, where Horace does not address Augustus directly.

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Epistles I was Maecenas' book, and while it was appropriate and politic to acknowledge his friendship with Augustus, he did not want his patron upstaged or Augustus slighted, as a single letter addressed to him might have done. Both friends would have understood his tact.

Of the twenty poems in Book I, four involved discussion of Horace's own poetry. Epistle 1.1 explains why he has changed his mode of writing from lyrics to epistles. 1.19 (also to Maecenas) discusses Horace's critics. 1.20 is l'envoi to the collection.

The form of Epistle 13 has been described as the least epistolary. Its real message is intended not for his inept "friend," Vinnius, but for Augustus (just as 1.8 is addressed to the poet's muse but intended for Celsus). Vinnius is taking some rolls of Horace's poetry to the emperor, perhaps the Odes. (Attempts have been made to date the poem from this.) Vinnius' family uses the name Asina as cognomen (8), and judging by the diction and emphasis he is a common person whose sense of tact and decorum, in the eyes of his correspondent, do not inspire confidence. Why then has the poet bothered to give him the mission at all? There ought to be a better choice. Or is his characterization important dramatically?

Vinnius had set out with the books only after considerable coaching about the urgency of his mission and the delicacy required in delivering them personally to the emperor. After he has gone, the poet feels further qualms and at the first opportunity sends this note after him, hoping it will overtake him en route.

Vinnius is characterized by what Horace says to him and his manner of saying it, so full of his apprehension about the messenger's competence. His social standing is suggested by the satirical and superior tone of the poet (neutralized by an amused, detached concern for the books), and also by the suspicion that he will gossip with the vulgus (16) and exaggerate the hardship of this mission. He may trip over his own feet finally, and bungle the whole thing. Yet Horace lets him go. We may infer that Vinnius is not a slave since his family has a cognomen, and that he is probably not a freedman or a tenant farmer since he is a person one might expect to see near the emperor.

There is an explanation for the apparent necessity of using Vinnius which seems to be confirmed by the internal evidence of the epistle itself: Augustus is a long distance away (10-11), and Horace must accept whomever he can find. Dramatically, his note is to overtake Vinnius en route. The relatively short journey from the Sabine farm to Rome does not seem to fit, however, unless we assume a very great deal of irony (10, viribus uteris per clivos flamina lamas).

Horace wishes Vinnius to be recognized by the kind of language used to address him as a type. We find that one type of diction recurs, such as sarcina (6), abicito (7), iuberis (7), viribus uteris (10), victor propositi (11),
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*positum servabis onus* (12). Together, these words have a military ring, lending the similar colour to *proficiscen*tem (1), *reddes* (2), *signata* (2), *perferre* (7), *ferus* (8), *mandata* (19), *vade* (19). Sarcina, for instance, occurs only here. *Proficiscor* occurs twice in Horace (cf. *Epistle* 2.2.20, where Julius Florus is going on campaign in the east on Tiberius' staff). *Minister* need not have a servile connotation, for Cicero refers to Quintus' gubernatorial staff (*Quint. Frat.* 1.1.3) as *ministros imperii tui*, and Horace refers to Jupiter's eagle as *ministrum fulminis alitem* (*Ode* 4.4.1). His use of *victor* and *vires* both tend strongly to the military, and the "sweat" of battle is an image in *Ode* 1.15.10. Finally, the words *lama* (10) and *glomus* (14), both occurring once only in all of Horace (very rarely at all in literary Latin), reveal that the poet wants to appeal to Vinnius through vulgar diction, and characterize not himself but his recipient.

This choice of diction, to repeat, betrays Vinnius as a soldier belonging to the lower ranks. He is keen and forceful in carrying out his duties but inclined to gossip, ill at ease in aristocratic company, and clumsy on his feet. The fact that he may obtain personal access to Augustus must further qualify our assessment: he is likely to be a centurion. Horace's condescending tone would be quite appropriate then, since he was himself a friend of the *imperator* (and a retired *tribunus militum*). Such an identification would give an ironic edge to vv. 13–15: no senior noncom, no matter how clumsy, would relish comparison with a callow rustic, a beery old crone in a play, or an obsequious and unsophisticated voter-come-to-dinner.

The style of *Epistle* 13 is baldly rhetorical, notably in the use of the triplet and tricolon reinforced by asyndeton. This occurs four times, single words alternating with clauses: *si validus, si laetus erit, si denique poscet* (3); *per clivos flumina lamas* (10); *ut rusticus agnum, ut vinosa glomus furtivae Pirria lanae* (14); *ut cum pilleolo soleas conviva tribulis* (15); *vade, vale, cave* (19). Within this scheme the devices of anaphora and ascending cola are used, adding forcefulness to the admonitions. This forcefulness, considered with the diction, the pun on the *paternum cognomen*, and the double irony at the expense of both Vinnius and Horace make for a self-effacing, and complimentary covering letter for a presentation copy of the *Odes* to Augustus. V. 3 can be taken as the nub of the message to the emperor: "I hope this does not reach you at a bad time. I hope you're well. Your acceptance is a great compliment."

Whether Horace actually sent this poem along with his *volumina* or intended it to be a dramatized acknowledgement, is guesswork. According to Suetonius the emperor had received on one occasion a special delivery of a single *libellus* by a certain Onysius, and had replied wittily. But while there seems no reason to link this occasion with that one, there is still important evidence to consider, with regard to both the identity of Vinnius and the date of the event.
Vinnius is called Vinnius Asellus in the MSS titles (Porphyry gives Asella). Either would give a point to the pun (8-9). But the suspicion persists that this cognomen is an inference from the text, and is far from conclusive. Ps.-Acro independently offers us C. Vinnius Fronto as his name and maintains that Asella is his father's cognomen.\(^47\)

More recent attempts have been made to identify Vinnius. That of Bernays (and later T. Frank) has been revived as recently as 1951: i.e., Vinnius is the Onysius mentioned by Suetonius (the Latin pun on Asina parallels onos: Onysius). E. Fraenkel disposed of that.\(^48\) The best suggestion was put forward in 1959 by R. G. M. Nisbet: Horace's Vinnius could be a man mentioned by the elder Pliny (H.N. 7.82), a certain Vinnius Valens who was a centurion in Augustus' Praetorian guard. Renowned for his prodigious strength, his name and exploits were recorded.

At Vinnius Valens meruit in praetorio divi Augusti centurio, vehicula cum culleis onusta donec exinanirentur sustinere solitus, carpenta adprehensa una manu retinere obnixus contra nitentibus iumentis, et alia mirifica facere quae insculpta monumento eius spectantur.

Valens could be an honorific cognomen of which Vinnius was sufficiently proud to have it recorded in addition to (or instead of) Asina or Asellus. This could also explain the specificity of paternum cognomen: "your inherited cognomen (not your acquired one)."\(^50\)

Considering the internal implications of Epistle 13 we might reconsider the dramatic date and setting. If 23 B.C. is the date of the publication of Odes I—III and 20 B.C. that of Epistles I, we have a rough pair of limits. Augustus was abroad from late 22 B.C. till October, 19 B.C., in Sicily and the East, and was away when the Epistles appeared as a collection. If Vinnius has a long journey ahead of him (and this is not just ironic exaggeration), then his reputation and the fact of Augustus' absence might suggest him to be travelling down the Appian way to Brundisium or Sicily, en route to Augustus' headquarters.\(^51\) Such a character would be more at home there than in the palace or an imperial villa, and ideal for conveying despatches.\(^52\)

The contribution of Epistle 1.13 to the collection is obvious. Aside from lighter moments, Epistles 2—12 are quite serious, especially 7 and 11. With 13 we are given a completely light-hearted piece on a subject dear to the poet's heart—a spoof on Ode 3.30. The "monument of enduring bronze" can be smashed to bits by a stumble! The poem prepares us for the more subtle humour of 14 and 15 and the tour de force of 20. It is Horace's modest and detached acknowledgement of the importance of his work and standing. The cast of characters is universal in appeal. It must certainly
have amused Augustus, a function of the Muses which his friend valued highly (Ode 3.4.37–40):

vos Caesarem altum, militia simul
fessas cohortes abdidi oppidis,
finire quaerentem labores
Pierio recreatis antro.

EPISTLE 1.19: To Maecenas (III)
(Prisco si credis, Maecenas docte, Cratino)

Maecenas:

(1) As you know, a heated controversy persists between the “waterdrinker” and “winedrinker” schools of poetry. The moment I declared for the latter (with Homer, Cratinus, and Ennius) our poets began to strive in their cups by night and reek by day. (12) It’s folly to imitate the eccentricities, not the virtues, of models. (If I went around pale they’d bleach themselves.) (19) What slavish critics I have! I struck out confidently along untrodden paths; my originality consisted in introducing Archilochus’ meter and spirit to Latin without his vindictiveness, just as Sappho and Alcaeus also adapted his muse. I love to write original poetry for liberated readers.

(35) Why then do critics praise me in private but scorn me publicly? Because I don’t use bribes, or promote their grammar-schools with personal readings. (42) So when I ask to be excused on the grounds that trifles shouldn’t be dignified by performance in crowded halls, they suspect I am ridiculing them and they become hostile. I don’t want a brawl with anyone, but innocent sport leads to rage, and rage to all-out war!

Epistle 19 completes the main structure of the collection, addressing Maecenas once more and recalling for a third time the poetic triumph of Odes I-III. The “former” poet is in rural retirement, and caught up in social and ethical questions vital to himself and his friends. It is significant, therefore, that although he has “put verse aside,” his public image as a poet still concerns him deeply, a concern already expressed with ironic self-effacement in 13. It resumes here in a quite different tone. To Fraenkel it was “the only thoroughly bitter document we have from Horace’s pen.” Other reactions to it vary widely from Villeneuve (“sans âpreté”) to Wili (“one of the truest epistles since no irony puts its statements in doubt”). Even its epistulary shape arouses critical disagreement.

Two facts seem clear at the outset. The subject of the epistle is his own poetry. It is addressed to his friend Maecenas in a special capacity
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(Maecenas docte), in an appeal to his literary discrimination. The opening of the letter is intended to engage the *vir doctus* in his friend’s literary polemics and ironic humour.

From comedy and satyr-play (1—5) the examination of wine’s poetic virtues moves to Homer and his Roman counterpart, Ennius (6—8a). Homer’s agreement is inferred from his numerous epithets for wine: “honey-hearted,” “manly,” “satisfying.” Ennius has left us a fragment to reinforce the irony: “Numquam poetor nisi si podager.”

After this series of *testimonia*, Horace returns to a critical edict of his own (8b—9): that those who never unbend cannot expect to write poetry, and they should devote themselves to something else. He maintained that since even austere old Cato knew when to relax, his friend Messalla should do so also (*Ode* 3.21.9—12):

\[
\text{non ille, quamquam Socraticis madet sermonibus, te negligit horridus:}\]
\[
\text{narratur et prisci Catonis saepe mero caluisse virtus.}\]

But response to this remark was quite perverse. Other “poets” immediately took to drink! Contrast is stark between the *doctus Maecenas* (who Horace expects will understand) and all those poetasters who flock wherever they believe they are led. Horace could rise to inspired heights in praising wine’s role in the *poeticus furor*. (*Odes* 2.19 and 3.25 express such fine madness.) But while indispensable, it may easily run to the sort of extremes which the *Ars Poetica* describes (472—474):

\[
\text{certe furit, ac velut ursus, obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clatros, indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus.}\]

Contemporaries had seized upon a single aspect of Horace’s poetry with disastrous results (12—16). Cato and Timagenes were imitable in only very superficial respects, for their intellectual capacities, personalities, and achievements were beyond the reach of inferior talents. It is precisely at this point that Horace returns to himself (17). So far he has moderated his pride in his achievement. He does want us to know (Maecenas knows already) that he has a rabid following among the *mali poetae*, even if that falls far short of the ideal. With vv. 19—34 the epistle reaches its highest poetic feeling, in an antithesis between himself and the mob, the leader and the led. Apostrophe, loaded diction, the fierce pride are all heightened by an evocation of Lucretius, ("avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante trita solo") and the Alexandrian tradition they recall. In this
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elevated tone Horace expresses his personal theory and practice of lyric imitation. The principle of exemplar vitiis imitabile is supported by the practice of Horace's own models. Sappho on occasion and Alcaeus too had imitated Archilochus' tone and rhythms, but both found their own material and avoided those features of Archilochus which seduced lesser poets, such as his obsession with revenge. The conclusion of his personal statement repeats the claim (first made in Ode 3. 30) to be the first lyric poet in Rome:

hunc ego, non alio dictum prius ore, Latinus
volgavi fidicen.

A second idea (33b—34) is added to this discussion with Maecenas of the poet's craft:

iuvat inmemorata ferentem
ingenuis oculisque legi manibusque teneri.

Choice of audience had long concerned poets, including Horace. In Satire 1.4 Horace had maintained that he wrote for the few, excluding both the mob and individuals (71—72):

nulla taberna meos habeat neque pila libellos,
quis manus insudet volgi Hermogenisque Tigelli.

The ingenui (34) exclude the volgus and second-rate professional critics (servom pecus), for they show independent spirit and taste.

Horace's views on both originality and public response are consistent with those expressed earlier in the Satires, and are not those of a poet to whom a bad press is either a new or an intolerable experience. The opinions he cites (35—36) are favourable, but in public those same critics become derogatory and unfriendly. They recall Pantilius, Demetrius, Fannius, and Hermogenes Tigellius, professional critics (grammatici) in whose schools lesser reputations are made or broken. Horace had sent them packing once before in Satire 1.10 (90—91):

Demetri, teque, Tigelli,
discipularum inter iubeo plorare cathedras.

And one would not expect him to court them now. It seems that his situation has not changed much in fifteen years: now or then critics flatter
him to his face but condemn him behind his back. But he had been above it all (Satire 1.10.78–80):

men moveat cimex Pantilius aut cruciet quod vellicet absentem Demetrius aut quod ineptus Fannius Hermogenes laedat conviva Tigelli?

The ingrati lectores include slavish imitators, the volgus, and hypocritical grammatici. When Horace rejects any attempt to flatter or otherwise accommodate any of them in the interest of popularity or a good press he does so in terms of ingenuitas. The two sections of the epistle hinge upon this ambivalent term. His imitators are not ingenui, because they are servum pecus; nor are his scholastic critics, since they are not “open” or “ingenuous.” By contrast he had a candidus iudex (Epistle 1.4.1) in his friend Albius. Similar affection was reserved for Quintilius Varus, a severe and uncompromising critic (Ars P. 438–444):

Quintilio siquid recitares, “corrige sodes hoc” aiebat “et hoc.” melius te posse negares bis terque expertum frustra: delere iubebat et male tornatos incudi reddere versus. si defendere delictum quam vertere malles, nullum ultra verbum aut operam insumebat inanem, quin sine rivali teque et tua solus amares.

Here is a true picture of the frank criticism enjoyed by Maecenas’ friends, its openness and objectivity recalling Horace’s description to the “bore.” As auditor et ultor (39) in the intimate recitations of Maecenas’ friends, he is not likely to be in any way dependent upon the professional critics for either advice or favour.—“Hence their chagrin!” (hinc illae lacrimae, 41). Yet they continue to badger him to recite in their schools.

To illustrate the situation for his friend and conclude the epistle, Horace dramatizes a typical encounter (416–49). It is natural to regard this as a disturbing kind of confrontation for Horace, but there is a controlling principle. The audience is Maecenas, and it is an unswerving devotion to him and his friends that produces it. We saw an analogue in Horace’s earliest “epistle,” Satire 2.6. The issue there was political, not literary, but Horace’s insular position as a member of Maecenas’ group had produced hard feelings (47–54a):

per totum hoc tempus subiectior in diem et horam invidiae noster. ludos spectaverat, una luserat in campo: “fortunae filius” omnes.
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frigidus a rostris manat per compita rumor:
quicumque obvius est, me consulit: "o bone—nam te
scire, deos quoniam propius contingit oportet—,
numquid de Dacis audisti?" "nil equidem." "ut tu
semper eris derisor."

That carping at him for his aloofness as the friend of Maecenas did not
dismay him: "hoc iuvat et melli est, non mentiar. . . " (32). There, as in
this epistle, Maecenas was the imaginary correspondent, and his circle of
friends meant everything to Horace.

Nor is the attitude toward the recitatio a response to new circumstances,
as it remained constant in the Satires:

non recito cuiquam nisi amicis idque coactus,
non ubivis coramve, quibuslibet in medio qui
scripta foro recitent, sunt multi quique lavantes:
suave locus voci resonat conslusus. (1.4. 73—76)

haec ego ludo
quae neque in aede sonent certantia iudice Tarpa
nec redeant iterum atque iterum spectanda theatris.
(1.10. 37—39)

With this background we may approach the irony of the final confronta-
tion in the epistle. By now Horace’s tone has shifted from ironic detach-
ment (1—18) to passionate affirmation (19—34). His poetry had passed the
scrutiny of his friends (whose judgement is all that matters), and won the
grudging appreciation of outsiders. The final confrontation is recounted in
the spirit of Satire 1.9. Then his desperation to escape the clutches of the
bore who would break into the charmed circle was relieved by Apollo. Now
Horace confronts the spleen of one of those grammatici who would force
him out into the world of critical hypocrisy and petty rivalries. But no deus
ex machina appears. (The vir bonus et prudens must extricate himself by
his wits. We are left to guess whether he escapes or not.) As in the satire
where an epic allusion heightens the awkwardness of the situation, this
vignette finally breaks off with the battle about to erupt in full fury (48—49):

ludus enim genuit trepidum certamen et iram,?7
ira truces inimicitias et funebre bellum.

Epistle 1.19 returns us to Horace’s world of belles lettres. The focus is
now upon the reception of his lyrics by a wider public beyond Maecenas
and his friends (the true ingenui iudices). On the one hand are the slavish
imitators, and on the other hypocritical academics whose public critiques depend upon bribes and personal recitations. Horace reiterates his aloofness from them both to Maecenas and indirectly his debt to him, using highly conventional and learned language to match his friend's accomplishments. The high assertion of vv. 19—34 and the statement of vv. 35—41 are framed by the ironic humour at the beginning and end. The witty handling of the wine and poetry topos leads to the theme of imitation (a coda to Ode 3.30) in which the meaning of "princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos deduxisse modos" (3.30.14—15) is clarified and the tone recreated.

At the conclusion, the light-hearted tone of the opening verses is re-established in a brief but lively dialogue. Horace has left the magisterial safety of the praetor's chair (8—10) only to find himself at the mercy of one of his hostile critics. After comparing the encounter to a kind of schoolboy scuffle ("you know how they fight") he inflates the seriousness of the situation and reminds us of the opening of the epistle (7—8) with an Ennian line. The ethical antecedents of this final encounter are analysed by C. W. Macleod in terms of Plato's dialectic, travesty of which is "characterized by the metaphor of fighting". In Macleod's view, the adversary actually shows Horace to be "lacking in frankness (parrhésia)" and has by his candour done the duty of a friend. He turns out, then, to form a good rather than a bad counterpart to the flatterer-imitators; and he achieves in the moral sphere what Horace requires of the literary critic in the Ars Poetica (438—52) and finds in Tibullus (Epistle 1.4.1) . . . The wheel has come full circle. At the end of the poem, as at the beginning, we are left wondering whether the practice of poetry does not entail some folly, be it drunkenness or vanity. So Epistles 1.19 poses a version of that dilemma about the poet's craft and character which underlies Horace's thinking in all the literary Epistles. Horace's lyrics represent a moral no less than an aesthetic standard for poetry; but can that standard be maintained in the person of the poet?

Macleod's analysis of the epistle is valuable for its contribution to our understanding of both its poetics and ethics. However, I believe he misses the mark in comparing his adversary with Albius and Quintilius. Their criticisms are technical, while the former's are not, for he wishes to pull Horace out of the secure circle of his literary friends and have him recite in his school. Horace does not need that "friendship," any more than he needed the support of Tigellius or the bore. Are then those who hound him to be more "frank" in Satire 2.6 (50—58) also doing him a moral favour?
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Horace is the butt of his own joke, true, but just as he was in Satire 1.9. Then as now he portrayed himself as ludicrously unable to cope with the outside world; but his inner principles are still just as firm.

In this epistle, as in Satires 1.9 and 2.6, Horace makes Maecenas and his friends indirect foils for his own experiences and feelings. Epistle 1.19 is a dramatic echo of Ode 3.30, set in a milieu little changed from that of the Satires, written fifteen years earlier. Given the facts of Horace’s situation, the identity of the friend addressed, and the personality he reveals in the first eighteen epistles, it would not be surprising to find the poet reacting with pride rather than bitterness or unease to a situation long anticipated: “Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.”
The four epistles addressed to Horace’s potentes amici, Maecenas and Augustus (1, 7, 13, 19), showed the kind of tact such friendships require, for he wanted to give Maecenas most of the attention without slighting Augustus. The fifteen remaining epistles, excluding the coda (20), are divided among fourteen other friends: six to younger ones (Lollius Maximus is addressed twice) and nine to his contemporaries. The importance of those younger men in the poet’s book can be seen by the fact that two pairs of poems (Epistles 1.2, 1.3 and 1.17, 1.18) provide an inner frame supporting the Maecenas-epistles (1.1 and 1.19), and young Lollius joins Maecenas in opening and closing the collection. Importance is given to the three pairs addressed to younger men by the inclusion of Augustus’ stepson, Tiberius (1.9). The background of Epistles 1.3, 1.18, and 1.9 is Tiberius’ campaigns in the east, for membership in his cohors was a prize for the ambitious Julius Florus, Titius, Celsus, Munatius, and Septimius.

All six of those epistles deal with strains in friendships. How can Lollius be shown the need for self-control? How can he reconcile Florus and Munatius? What can be done to prevent Celsus from losing his chances and his friends? How should Horace accede to Septimius’ request? How should he help Scaeva and Lollius achieve a proper perspective on amicitia with the great?
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EPISTLE 1.2: To Lollius Maximus (I)
(Troiani belli scriptorem, Maxime Lolli)

Lollius Maximus:
(1) While you've been studying rhetoric at Rome, I've been rereading Homer here at Praeneste—and concluded that he's a better moral teacher than either Chrysippus or Crantor. (5) His Iliad is a cautionary tale of human folly and vice: treachery, craft, crime, lust and wrath. (17) Ulysses, conversely, is Homer's practical model of virtue, wisdom, and fortitude, prevailing as he did over the Sirens and Circe. In the good-for-nothing Phaeacian youth, to whom idleness and nobility are all the same, we are to see ourselves.
(32) Rouse yourself, then; make a start by worthwhile studies in mastering the passions. Moral health is as important as physical. (40) Time waits for no one. (44) He who has sufficient is truly happy, for wealth itself does not bring happiness, but rather correct use of it. (51) Desires and fears ruin it. Reject pleasure, greed, and envy. (59b) And control your temper, or it will you. Youth is the time for such training; so seek out now those who can make you a better man. (70b) Whatever you do, mind, I'm not one myself to wait for those behind me in life's race to catch up—or to press on the heels of those ahead.

In this epistle, as in others, we are not so concerned with the identity of Lollius Maximus as with seeing how Horace has dramatically explored the officia amicitiae. The addressee shifts in the first two epistles from an important contemporary to a young man still receiving a rhetorical education at Rome. In Epistle 1.1 the exempla of the gladiator Veianius (4—6) and the aged race horse invoked a scene of quiet retirement in the country. In Epistle 1.2, therefore, antitheses are already established: Horace is middle-aged, at ease in the country and rereading his Homer at Praeneste, while Lollius is young and practising declamation in the city.

The epistle begins with antitheses between Homer and rhetoric, Praeneste and Rome, experience (relegi) and youth. Lollius is probably still studying (puer, 68) under a rhetor, and has not read Homer since he reached the age of declamation. Horace now suggests he take another look at his elementary school texts; his appeal to authority is not made to the philosophers Chrysippus and Crantor, but to Homer. (Those two philosophers represent the Stoic and Academic schools.) Horace's concepts of pulcrum and utile are the basis of the two categories of Cicero's officia: theoretical and practical ethics. The object of philosophical deliberatio for Cicero was to resolve the claims of the honestum (pulcrum) and of the utile: quod turpe sit, id numquam est utile.
In a tactful *capitatio benevolentiae* Horace implies that his friend Lollius knows something about this theme already, and he does not press for his undivided attention. Since a story is always useful for this purpose, he recalls the plots of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (6—22). The epic tone of this whole passage can be felt from its poetic diction (*duello*, 6) and patronyms. The free translation of *Odyssey* 1.1—6 draws a vivid distinction between the merits of the two poems as moralizing works: the cautionary tale as opposed to the exemplary. The allusions to Homer have introduced the themes of rational and irrational behaviour, and Horace now assumes Lollius' familiarity with them (22—26). Then the argument begins to veer away from Homer's characters to less heroic figures: Horace, Lollius, and mankind in general (27—31):

```
nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati,  
sponsi Penelopae nebulones Alcinoique  
in cute curanda plus aequo operata iuventus,  
cui pulchrum fuit in medios dormire dies et  
ad strepitum citharae cessatum ducere curam.
```

Understanding this troublesome passage calls for reference to Horace's models. When he calls men *numerus* (*arithmos*) (27), he is probably thinking not of Homer but Aristophanes (*Clouds* 1203), whose Strepsiades berates his audience by calling them also “stones,” “sheep,” and “piled-up wine jars.” He then quotes the *Iliad* (6.142ff), recalling the words of Diomedes to Glaucus: “If you are a god I will not fight you, *but* if you are one of us mortals who devour the fruit of the earth . . ..” Echoes of the Greek further the contrast between the true godlike hero (Ulysses) who is our model, and those who succumb to their appetites. The *sponsi Penelopae* are gluttons, of course, and wastrels, and Horace's description of the Phaeacian youths is in the moralising tradition. Since Homer's Phaeacians were obsessed with dining, music, dancing, changes of clothes, hot baths, and bed (*Od. 8.248*), they became models of hedonism.

A well-known crux in this passage needs to be considered in this context. The manuscript alternate in giving *somnum* or *curam* as the last word of v. 27. Homer does not picture them going to sleep to the sound of the lyre. Nor is the *strepitus* (“din,” “twanging”) of a lyre likely to induce sleep, especially since they have just awakened. (They are hedonists, not hibernating bears.) But most crucial, are they subject to *cura*? Horace has just told us that they are, for they preen excessively: “in cute *curanda*” (29). In this ironic passage the Phaeacians become models of vanity and sloth, vices which they indulge most carefully. *Cessatum ducere curam* is syntactically easy.

The Phaeacians provide the springboard for Horace's lesson for young
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Lollius (32—43), tactfully prepared for by friendly reminiscences about an author they both admire and the admission that everyone is more or less guilty of such behaviour. The best commentary upon this passage is Persius’ expansion of it in Satire 3. There he aims a Cynic sermon at a profligate youth, still asleep as noon approaches. Persius’ images include that of soft clay that needs to be worked, much and soon (23—24):

udum et molle lutum es, nunc nunc properandus et acri
fingendus sine fine rota.

Persius also picks up the threat of a dropsy to the self-indulgent for which hellebore will be too tardy a cure (63—64):

Helleborum frustra, cum iam cutis aegra tumebit,
poscentis videas.

The wise thing is to prevent the disease at its onset (64): venienti occurrite morbo. Persius’ analogy is to the care of the soul, philosophy (66): “discite, o miseri, et causas cognoscite rerum.” His satire ends with a warning against ira (3.116—118):

nunc face supposita fervescit sanguis et ira
scintillant oculi, dicisque facisque, quod ipse
non sani esse hominis non sanus iuret Orestes.

Ira, the moral result of indulgence, sloth, and the neglect of philosophy in youth, was characteristic of Persius’ lazy youth: turgescit vitrea bilis . . . findor (9—10). Horace, like Persius after him, moves from the image of dropsy (excess and indulgence) to acceptance of a mean in life (44—59a). The lesson here is control of the passions for gain and pleasure which foster greed and fear, envy and jealousy; there can never be peace of mind or enjoyment when they dominate. The soul, like the tainted jar, must be purged by philosophy or the good will spoil. As in Persius (3.35—43), the exempla of victims of the passions and foes of virtue are the tyrants of Sicily. Persius, by bringing his sermon back to the subject of wrath as the symptom and product of intellectual sloth (portrayed by his irritable youth), is following the pattern of Horace, who had alluded to the destructive force of such passions before Troy (6—16).

Lollius emerges as a young man of potential, but prone to moments of irrational behaviour, especially in losing his temper. Otherwise Horace’s sermon and appeal both lose point. Horace’s problem is to touch on this vice tactfully and suggest a remedy. Such is the duty of a wise friend,
Cicero assures us; it must always be carried out in such a way as is appropriate (decens) to the nature of the person addressed. Hence the emphasis upon the calm and serene mood of the writer, now writing from Praeneste and finding time in his retirement to read his Homer again. With warm allusions to both epics, Horace recalls their basic moral exempla: the folly of the irrational appetite and the virtues of restraint and reason. These lessons are illuminated by lively translations and allusions which give the epistle moments of high poetry.

Lollius is caught, and ready for his lesson. Since even bandits get up before daylight (32), he must do so now to improve himself. If sloth can be dispelled greed can be attacked, a vice that inflicts jealousy and envy (51—59). The topos of the ears aching with caked filth (53) leads into that of the tainted jar. This is picked up again in vv. 67—70 with clear allusion to the importance of acting while young (69—70): “quo semel est inbuta recens servabit odorem testa diu.” The sermon moves through pleasure (voluptates, 55) and envy (invidia, 58) back to wrath (ira, 59) with images stressing the aptness of youth to the lessons of philosophy. It concludes with a coda of less than two lines. As he had undercut the mock solemnity of Epistle 1.1 with the picture of the philosopher with heartburn, so Horace leaves Lollius with no misconceptions about his own tolerance and easy-going view of the whole matter. He maintains a pace appropriate to himself, and hopes Lollius will do the same, for his own sake.

It is illuminating to see how Persius used Horace’s ideas and images. (The scholia record that Persius alluded to Lucilius in Satire 3.) Perhaps Horace too was still finding inspiration in Lucilius. If Warmington is correct in seeing in Lucilius IV traces of a satire “on the simple city or country life of the poet’s own day contrasted with the luxury of the towns,” then it would have been a congenial piece for imitation in the Epistles. Of the twenty-two odd lines Warmington attributes to this satire, 165 (W) may fit: qui edit se hic comedit me.

We are on surer ground in finding sources of inspiration in Cicero’s De Officiis. That treatise on practical ethics was composed as an epistle to his son, and it concludes (3.33.121) with the wish that young Marcus would cherish those three books among his notes from Cratippus. His conduct had been notorious; so it may not be irrelevant that Cicero concludes with a discussion of temperantia. Better reports had been coming back by May of that year (Fam. 12.16) and the young man’s letter to Tiro in late summer had promised complete reform (Fam. 16.21).

The theme of the De Officiis is moral goodness (honestum, decorum) and its relationship to utility and advantage (utilitas). The writer is concerned with behaviour in society, not speculative philosophy. Of the two parts of the soul, appetitus and ratio, the latter must prevail (1.29.102):
Efficiendum autem ut adpetitus rationi oboediant. . . . Nam qui ap-petitus longius evagantur et tamquam exultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ei sine dubio finem et modum transeunt. . . . Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt.

Horace likewise urges Lollius to strive for goodness (studiis et rebus honestis, 36) and to avoid desire and fear (qui cupit aut metuit, 51); he is to shun dissipation (sperne voluptates, 55) and greed (semper avarus eget, 56) and find the proper limit (certum voto pete finem, 56). These ethical ideas were part of a common storehouse (Cicero and Horace had both read their Crantor and Chrysippus). Horace seems to be thinking of a quotation from Chrysippus in the De Officiis (3.10.42):

Scite Chrysippus ut multa: "Qui stadium" inquit, "currit, eniti et contendere debet quam maxime possit ut vincat, supplantare cum quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet: sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est."

Cicero uses this analogy to reinforce the interdependence of honestum and utilitas. In concluding, Horace makes it clear that while he too is running to win life’s race he will not mind losing. He will run a private race in accordance with his own nature, and will rejoice in a friend’s success (70—71):

quodsi cessas aut strenuus anteis,
nec tardum opperior nec praecedentibus insto.

In discussing action in accordance with one’s own nature, Cicero cites the exempla of Cato, Ajax, and Ulysses (1.31.113):

Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus adfabilem esse se vellet! Domi vero etiam contumelias servorum anciliarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando quod cupiebat veniret.

Ulysses had not succumbed to Circe or Calypso nor yielded to his own wrath at the insults and immorality he found at home. Horace cites his calm endurance in encountering the Sirens and Circe (21—26) as worthy of emulation. Horace’s Homeric exempla may have been suggested by
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that work. (The preacher himself is cheerfully engaged in the same enterprise of mending his own ways.)

The warmth of Horace's personal recollections of his own passage from Homer to philosophy is made clear in a later epistle (2.2.41-45):

Romae nutriti mihi contigit, atque doceri,  
iratus Grais quantum nocuissit Achilles.  
adiecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae,  
escilicet ut vellem curvo cognoscere rectum  
atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.

In the Academics (1.5.19) Cicero refers thus to Platonic dialectic and the importance of living according to nature:

quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravomque,  
quid sentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura repetebant eique parendum esse dicebant  
neque ualla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur.

Horace's wistful recollections of his carefree days at the Academy (the only formal contact we know he had with any school) contain another allusion to Cicero already cited.22 In the De Consulatu Sue, Cicero's Muse Urania praises Roman religion. That piety had been supported by his philosophy (71-74):

haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci  
otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris, 23  
in Academia umbrifera nitidoquo Lyceo  
fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis.

The term artis (74) represents the fruits of study in shady groves. Cicero was called away all too soon to duty (75-76):

E quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae  
te patria in media virtutum mole locavit,

as was Horace (2.2.46-48):

dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato  
civilisque rudem belli tulit aestus in arma  
Caesaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.

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This suggests another dimension to Horace's intentions in writing this way to his young friend. For Lollius this is not a call to asceticism but to the joys of discovery, peace of mind, and friendship.¹⁴

EPISTLE 1.3: To Julius Florus
(Iuli Flore, quibus terrarum militet armis)

Julius Florus:

(1) I am eager to know where Augustus' stepson, Claudius, is campaigning. Thrace? The Hellespont? Asia? (6) And what of all your writing there? Who is celebrating Augustus' deeds? (9) Is Titius composing Pindaric verse, or tragedy? (15) And Celsus? Is he heeding my advice about plagiarism? (20b) And yourself? Are you progressing in law, or poetry? (25b) If you want to follow "heavenly wisdom" and win the esteem of others (and your own), forget that cold-compress cure you've applied to your troubles. (30) How do you feel about that quarrel of yours with Munatius? (34b) Such a breech of the bonds of brotherhood is unworthy of you both. A heifer awaits your return home as friends.

This epistle has not attracted much attention.²⁵ Heinze referred to it as "a real, if somewhat stylized letter." The fact that some of the names mentioned in the poem are easily recognized, and that the historical setting is clear, has discouraged enquiry about its tone and purpose. The expressions frigida fomenta (26) and caelestis sapientia (27)²⁶ are still not fully understood.

The dramatic setting of Epistle 1.3 reveals Horace writing to a young friend, Julius Florus, who is serving on the staff of Tiberius Nero somewhere in the east.²⁷ (If the date is 20 B.C., Tiberius is twenty-two years of age.)²⁸ We are given some of Florus' young friends' names and off-duty pursuits, and insight into their personalities. Titius, for example, has the foolhardy courage to imitate the inimitable Pindar.²⁹ Celsus is a pathological plagiarist, and Florus himself a promising jurist and poet. Munatius, a mutual friend of Horace and Florus is also named: the epistle concludes with the poet's appeal for a reconciliation between Florus and Munatius who are estranged. An informal letter requires no justification of its structure, and this epistle would seem at first glance to fit that classification.³⁰ Here is a letter in verse from a man in his forties to one in his twenties; it asks pertinent questions and imparts earnest advice. How do the themes of literature, philosophy, and friendship fit together?

Guillaume Stégen has proposed that the point of the epistle is literary admonition: i.e., Horace holds out the accomplishments of Florus' peers as an incentive to emulation.³¹ For Stégen, the key word is audes (20: ipse
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*quid aude?*). He sees clear contrast between this and *quid mihi Celsus agit* (15). It is still difficult, though, to see why the poem ends as it does, eleven full lines devoted to philosophy and friendship. Stégen’s view that vv. 23–36 comprise the advice that Florus emulate the others seems simplistic. And one would have expected at least a subjunctive in vv. 23–25, rather than a confident statement of fact:

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seu linguam causis acuis seu civica iura
respondere paras seu condis amabile carmen,
prima feres hederae victoribus praemia.
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This seems to be unalloyed praise. The present contrary-to-fact condition in vv. 25b–27 presents a much more admonitory tone:

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quods
frigida curarum fomenta reliquere posses,
quod te caelestis sapientia duceret, ires.
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So it appears unlikely that literature and law can be the source of any unity to be found in *Epistle* 1.3.32

There is really only one theme that runs through the entire epistle: friendship and its *officia*. The letter is addressed to a friend, and controlled by earnest concern for him and for their mutual friends: *scire laboro* (2), *hoc quoque curo* (6). We see Florus in his literary relationships with his group and in his personal relationship with Munatius; he appears as a kind of close confidant, sharing Horace’s insights into their friends’ strengths and weaknesses. Yet at the conclusion it is Florus who needs an admonition to mend his fences with Munatius, and it is upon the three friends (Florus, Munatius, and himself) that the epistle finally focuses.

The writer begins with two earnest questions. Where are Florus and Tiberius now? (1–5). What are the others doing in their literary pursuits? (6). The questioning then becomes specific, involving Florus in a stream of personal details, and allowing us some insight into the personalities concerned (7–8). Then two individuals are singled out: Titius (9–14) and Celsus (15–20a). Titius is spoken of with admiration as a daring poet in the high lyric style (9–11). Then come more intimate questions: *ut valet? ut meminit nostri?* (12). And the enquiry about Florus’ own pursuits (12b–14). Horace goes on, however, to enquire about another mutual friend and poet, Albinovanus Celsus (15–20), in a more trenchant tone.33 It is not until the epistle is half done (21) that he concentrates fully upon Florus. The epistle might have ended with a fulsome tribute to him (20b–25a), but the compliment ends unexpectedly after the fifth foot of v. 25. When that sixth foot sounds (*quods*), the tone has changed. With this
shift comes a new topic, moral philosophy (25b–29)—and two difficulties. What do *frigida fomenta* refer to? How does the passage as a whole effect the transition from the literary life of Florus and his friends to the estrangement of the former and another mutual friend, Munatius? The two are interconnected.

To consider vv. 26–27 first, there is a clear antithesis between the *frigida fomenta* and *caelestis sapientia*; for to abandon the one is to espouse the other. But Florus is still in the dark. “Heavenly wisdom” is familiar as a Stoic idea, but could also be Platonic, or even Epicurean. This *caelestis sapientia* is important to all who wish to retain the esteem of their fellows and themselves: “si patriae volumus, si nobis vivere cari” (29).

There is another passage of Horace to offer a key. In *Satire* 1.3 he examined the stoic paradox that “all offences are equal” (*omnia peccata paria esse*) as it affects friendship. Just as parents minimize their children’s deformities, and lovers those of their beloved by using nicknames and euphemisms (38–53), so should we preserve our friendships (53b–54): “opinor / haec res et iungit iunctos et servat amicos.” Whatever colouring *caelestis sapientia* imparts, the phrase does refer to friendship. Compare this view from the *De Amicitia* (6.20):

Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem, haud scio an excepta sapientia nil quicquam melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum.37

Juvenal, writing a century later, proclaimed the divine origin of the capacity for human sympathy and friendship (15.142–146):

separat hoc nos
a grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli
sortiti ingenium divinorumque capaces
atque exercendis pariendisque artibus apti
sensum a caelesti demissum traximus arce.145

This god-given *ingenium* and *sensus* make social contract possible (147–150) for Juvenal. When the world began, our common creator endowed the beasts with life alone, but us with a soul as well:

mundi
principio indulsit communis conditor illis
tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos
adfectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet.38
In a dialogue by Xenophon (Mem. 2. 3) the inseparability of two brothers is discussed. In response to Socrates’ insistence that Chaerocrates be reconciled with his brother Chaerophon, the former replies (19):

"Pairs of brothers, in my opinion, were made by God to be of greater service the one to the other than the two hands, and feet, and eyes, and everything else that nature has given to men as fraternal pairs."

Clearly the sapientia which applies to the bonds of friendship may properly be called caelestis; the frigida fomenta which Horace is discouraging as a cure for Florus’ curae may be the “cold shoulder” response to some quarrel (25b—29). The apparent ambiguity is relieved by the last seven lines, in which Horace goes on to specify one cura, the state of Florus’ friendship with Munatius (30—31). Then the medical metaphor of v. 26 is resumed, this time of suturing a wound and healing a friendship: “an mala sarta / gratia nequiquam coit et rescinditur” (31b—32a). This irrational disregard for the sacred nature of friendship seems to Horace (as to Juvenal) more appropriate to a brute than to the sapiens: “ac vos / seu calidus sanguis seu rerum inscitia vexat / indomitos cervice feros?”

Two great Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism and Epicureanism, both esteemed friendship as a means to life’s fulfilment. To the Epicurean it produced ataraxia, so was conducive to pleasure. A connection between amicitia, caelestis sapientia, and patria, however, must be Stoic-oriented. Stoics saw a universal society of gods and men: “Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum... ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus.” Within this civitas there exists a natural bond of friendship between the wise and virtuous: “Censent autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute amabilis. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur.” Seneca maintains that only the wise man possesses the art of making friends: faciendarum amicitiarum artifex.

In this light, then, vv. 25—29 present an appeal to the study and appreciation of friendship. Caelestis sapientia puts man in right relations with his patria (whether his own state or universal society) and with himself: “si patriae volumus, si nobis vivere cari” (29). But the initial thrust of the passage is left ambiguous and not explained until 30ff. This ambiguity must be considered in terms of the purpose of the whole epistle. As well as this other information, Horace goes on, tell me this too: how important to you is your friendship with Munatius? Are unreason and lack of understanding keeping you apart? For the first time the two estranged friends are addressed as vos in v. 32, which continues to the end (34—36).

It is apparent that this reproof to Florus and Munatius has been the
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object of the epistle. Eighty years later the satirist Persius wrote: “vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico / tangit et admissus circum praecordia ludit” (1.116—117). In Epistle 1.3 the friend is Florus and the vitium is failure to mend a friendship. First the writer must gain Florus’ confidence (admissus), which he accomplishes by claiming his real interests lie in the travels and activities of his friends (1—20). He then takes Florus into his confidence by speaking of Titius’ works and his apprehensions about Celsus, then praising his work in poetry and law (20—25).44 The first suspicious note is the quodsi (v. 25). Since Florus is puzzled and curious, Horace gently makes his point: “Include also in your letter how you feel about a reconciliation with Munatius.” The reference to male sarta gratia appears to explain the frigida curarum fomenta: both are ineffectual (even harmful) remedies for ailing friendship, especially when passion and misunderstanding aggravate the condition.45

The final three lines constitute a more direct appeal: ubicumque locorum vivitis serves as both emphasis upon the need for reconciliation and a reminder of what he had insisted he wanted to know at the outset. The fact that their behaviour is indignum is expressed as an attribute, rather than a predication: it is within themselves to correct. Lastly, Horace has made a vow (to which god he does not say) of a heifer for their reconciliation and return: he is waiting to wine and dine them both as a pair reunited in friendship.46

The mood and purpose of this epistle—perhaps of the whole collection—are illuminated by Cicero (Am. 23.88):

Sic natura solitariam nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum admittitur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcisissimum est. sed cum tot signis eadem natura declarat quid velit, anquirat, disideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ca quae ab ca monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas turn evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. Una illa subeunda est offensio ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.

Neglect of our duties causes much harm, as Cicero warns, but those that pertain to friendship are ignored at the greatest cost (Am. 22.85):

Sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis... nam, implicati ultra et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias
Horace has explored the problem of healing a friendship broken by *incuria* with a poem in which a friend is to be tactfully reproved according to Cicero's prescription (“et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt”). Reminding Florus of the Stoic ideal, he affectionately sketches the lively background of the cohors and the pair of friends and assumes the obligations of praise and frank reproof. Then he reminds Florus tactfully of his obligations to his circle, his friend, his correspondent, and himself. The epistle closes with a prayer—plus an invitation to a dinner for three.

**EPISTLE 1.8: To his Muse**

(Celso gaudere et bene rem gerere Albinovano)

Muse:

(1) Convey my best wishes to Albinovanus Celsus for his happiness and success as Nero's aide-de-camp. (3) If he asks, say I show strong signs of producing lots of good things, but lack both direction and satisfaction in life. (4b) Not that my farm is not prospering: it's just that I suffer from the kind of melancholy that perversely refuses all attempts to cure it by my doctors and friends, and clings to misery and chronic discontent. (13) Then ask how he is handing himself and his job, and how the prince and his staff like him. (15) If he replies, “Fine—,” remember to be glad, but straightway to pour this in his ears: “Celsus, as you bear your good fortune so will we bear you!”

The epistle to Albinovanus Celsus provides the one example in the *Epistles* of Horace's invocation to his Muse. We can see how the change in genre from lyric to epistle is reflected in a change of attitude toward his Muse. Whether or not, for example, one accepts that Horace in *Ode* 1.24 was criticizing Vergil for a lament he had written on the death of Quintilius Varus, or just for excessive mourning, tact is very much an essential factor in that ode. And in spite of the fact that he is here writing a different type of poetry, one in which he has laid aside the pontifical robes of a vates to order his Muse about, he calls upon her because of the delicacy of the matter at hand and the personality of Celsus.

This epistle has never attracted much attention, which is strange, considering its problems. The poet's challenge was this: how to tell a friend not to let success go to his head? And for Horace, who is on record as believing that minor faults should be ignored (“ac pater ut gnati, sic nos
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debemus amici / si quod sit vitium non fastidire” Satire 1.3.43), the question becomes even more delicate. Consider also the fact that the poet was composing letters of advice to be published without embarrassment to the recipients.49

Horace achieves his tact by allowing opprobrium to fall back on himself. He makes himself the exemplum (3—12), delaying the actual precept until the last line. A second device of tact is the indirect manner in which advice is offered to Celsus: the Muse is employed to make the admonition oblique and palatable. The information and questions are expressed in indirect discourse, throwing the final precept (17) into strong relief. Interplay of question and answer is carefully structured with the Muse as go-between. After an introduction devoted to personal details about Horace (3—12), he launches into a clinical description of his own ailments: “Dic multa et pulchra minantem / vivere nec recte nec suaviter.” The symptoms of Horace’s mental state are important to his strategy, and need close examination. The mask is familiar from the Satires50 (“Atqui vultus erat multa et praeclara minantis,” Satire 2.3.9) where such symptoms elicited an impromptu sermon from Damasippus on desidia. The treatment here is different in two ways, for Horace is describing himself in his own persona and in more detail. His collocation of recte and suaviter (4) is significant. (Schultz saw a reference to Stoicism and Epicureanism.)51 Is Horace saying that neither of these philosophies can give him the peace of mind and motivation to compose?52 Having described his state of mind he proceeds to reject possible reasons for it (3—6): “Should he ask what I am doing, tell him that for all the promise I hold in both quantity and quality of output my life lacks both direction and enjoyment—which is not to say that the hail has beaten down my vines, or the heat bitten my olive, or that my stock are ailing in distant fields.” He should fit the description of the happy man, desiderantem quod satis est. If material losses cannot dismay him, recte vivere should result, but it does not.

In vv. 7—12 he describes other symptoms of his condition. Like the difficult patient of Satire 2.3.30, the lethargicus, he takes out his frustration on his doctors. He rejects their attempts to relieve and motivate him, and clings perversely to morbid self-pity. Mempsimoiria concludes the medical chart: “Romae Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam” (12). Horace does not diagnose his own trouble precisely, but we can infer from the symptoms he describes that it is not merely lethargy.53 He has ironically portrayed himself as a melancholic artist. Cicero (Tusc. 1.33.80) gives omnes ingeniosos melancholicos as a paraphrase of an interesting passage of Aristotle (Prob. 30.1): Διὰ τὶ πάντες ὄσοι περιττοί γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ πολιτικὴν ἡ ποιήσιν ἡ τέχνας φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες, καὶ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ὡστε καὶ λαμβάνεσθαι τοῖς
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ἀπὸ μελαίνης χολῆς ἀρρωστήμασιν ... ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν ποίησιν οὐ πλείοντοι. The Tusculans (3.5.11) supply further evidence for this:

quem nos furorem, μελαγχολίαν illi vocant (Graeci)... furorem autem rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem. Quod cum maius esse videatur quam insania, tamen eius modi est, ut furor in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania.

Furor is the ailment of poets, Horace himself assures us: "qui minus argutos vexat furor iste poetas?" (Epistle 2.2.90). Only the assumption that Horace knew the Tusculans is required to conclude that this is the real nature of his ailment. What else can one expect from one who is ingeniosus? In ironic reversal of the solemn positions of Odes 1.26, 3.4, etc., being a vates makes him miserable. He is not beyond spoofing his own myths (Odes 1.22; 3.4) and his posture as Musarum sacerdos (3.1), the man who is unice securus (1.26). Cicero’s statement could be interpreted, “All artists are temperamental.”

But what is the point of this ironic reversal (vates melancholicus)? Horace is speaking qua poet no less in this epistle than in Ode 1.24. Why this self-confessed and melancholic resistance to attempts to cure him? Post haec (13)—and only then—is the Muse to ask Celsus how his health is, how successful he is, and how he is getting along with the prince and his staff. Horace carefully anticipates an answer from his correspondent: “Recte—!” But the Muse will interrupt him, first with congratulations, then a warning put in pointedly direct speech, not passed along via the Muse: “ut tu fortunam, sic nos te, Celse, feremus” (17). Recte here has a double significance. It is the only word that Celsus is allowed in his reply to Horace’s long-winded question and advice. Second, it is antithetical to the poet’s first use of the word (4) in referring to extremes of his own behaviour: nec recte nec suaviter. If Horace’s condition is that of the melancholy artist, then it is in the opposite extreme of rash overconfidence that Celsus blurts out, “Recte—!”

Here alone in the Epistle does Horace approach the problem of composing a letter of advice to a friend by resorting to his Muse. It is difficult to resent a friend who is so openly and engagingly aware of his own shortcomings, even when these are highly conventionalized and imaginary. Epistle 1.8 shows how free Horace now is to adapt his mask to the occasion. Here the irritable and temperamental poet is the antithesis of himself as portrayed in Epistle 1.4. There Albius is the melancholy poet unable to write or be consoled (non tu corpus eras sine pectore). And Horace there assumes the role of the sleek and contented Epicurean, pointing out his many blessings:
me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum. (15—16)

Other epistles besides 1.4 give perspective to 1.8. We have already met this Celsus in 1.3, where he was pilloried for plagiarism; Horace had there recalled previous attempts to persuade him to be original in his writings and not to raid the Palatine Library (15—20a). His being a poet would further explain the introduction of the Muse here. We know in advance where he is and with whom, although the full picture is not presented until the next epistle (1.9), where Horace presents a tactful letter of recommendation of Septimius to Tiberius. The juxtaposition suggests that Celsus likewise had been recommended to Tiberius. The poet's friendly relations with iuvenis and cohors are at stake too (14). Horace knows Celsus very well—enough perhaps to be concerned about a lack of tact on his part. He and the Muse will rejoice in the young man's success, but will also caution him to be careful. Celsus may owe his fortuna to Horace; if he does not use it with good sense, his friend will not be pleased.

This interpretation would fit the tactics of the poem: the Muse (poet-to-poet), the indirect address, the highly ironic self-diagnosis, the delayed precept, the concern about sensibilities and about good fortune. There is a Ciceronian parallel to this type of note in Ad Familiares (7.6) where Cicero scolds Trebatius (ineptiae istae . . . desideria urbis et urbanitatis) while the latter is in Gaul with Caesar, to whom Cicero had warmly recommended him. He again warns him (Fam. 7.7) to cultivate pudor and labor, so that his commendatio singularis may be justified in the eyes of the imperator liberalissimus: “ne ipse tibi defuisse videare” (2). Trebatius was dissatisfied in Gaul, and to Cicero this smacked of ingratitude: “moleste ferebam antea te invitum istic esse” (7.15.1). He was already acquiring a reputation for superbia (7.16.3). Cicero urged upon him the need to take advantage of his opportunities: “Pluribus te hortari non debeo; tantum moneo, neque amicitiae confirmandae clarissimi ac liberalissimi viri neque uberioris provinciae neque aetatis magis idoneum tempus, si hoc amiseris, te esse ullum umquam repeturum” (7.7.3). Cicero’s message to Trebatius parallels Horace’s to Celsus.

Epistles 1.3, 1.8, and 1.9 represent a range of correspondence involving Horace, Tiberius, and their mutual friends. Celsus is the comic figure, and like Trebatius (whom Horace used as such in later years) he is not fulfilling the expectations of his older friend. He had better stop complaining to his comrades and C.O.

As Cicero had taken Trebatius’ measure with humorous allusions to law, so Horace admonishes Celsus as poet to poet, showing that anti-social, unappreciative, and melancholy behaviour can alienate friends and make one appear perverse and ridiculous.
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Epistle 1.9: To Tiberius Claudius Nero

(Septimius, Claudi, nimirum intellegit unus)

Claudius:

(1) Septimius has the most exaggerated notion of your regard for me! In fact he has repeatedly urged me to write a laudatory introduction of him to you as one who attract everything virtuous, (5) urging this as my duty as a close friend. (7) I tried to get out of it, but was afraid he might misinterpret my reluctance. (10) This apparent forwardness of mine is really an obligation of friendship. (He is a fine fellow, though, and worthy of your flock!)

This letter reveals its links with Horace's other poetry. It is addressed to the young Tiberius Claudius Nero (born 42 B.C.), who has been mentioned twice already in the collection (Epistle 3 and 8). Whether the dux referred to in Epistle 1.18 is Augustus or his stepson, the success of the expedition which the latter led against the Parthians (20 B.C.) contributed to his renown. It was he who officially received the standards of Crassus from the Parthians, as is portrayed on the breastplate of the Prima Porta Augustus. His interests in literature are suggested by his choice of comites (Epistles 1.3) and by the fact that he himself composed lyric poetry, including a lament on the death of his brother Drusus and imitations of Euphorion, Rhianus, and Parthenius. Even Tacitus, who denigrates him as emperor, admits that until Augustus' death he was "egregius vita famaque." His victory over the Raeti (15 B.C.) was to be commemorated in Ode 4.14. Septimius we have probably met already in Ode 2.6 (Septimius adit mecum), where the poet's warm feelings for Tibur and Tarentum blend with those for Septimius. He is presumably the mutual friend warmly mentioned in a letter from Augustus to Horace quoted by Suetonius.

The thirteenth book of Cicero's Ad Familiares is composed of letters of introduction, including ones written to provincial governors on behalf of younger friends. These shed considerable light upon the conventions observed in the composition of such letters. Of particular interest is Ad Familiares 13.64, in which Tiberius Claudius Nero, the father of the future emperor and here the person addressed, is recommended to P. Silius Nerva. He is described by Cicero as adulescens nobilis, ingeniosus, abstinentis (Fam. 13.64.2), one whom he would welcome as a son-in-law. That letter would have been of considerable interest to the younger Tiberius, and Horace may well have been familiar with it. It is also worth noting affinities between this commendatio and the admonitions given by Horace to Lollius (Epistle 1.18.76–85) concerning prudence in making introductions, especially to potentem amicum (another's peccata may bring pericula to the introducer), and a similar connection with Epistle 1.12,
an introduction to Iccius of Pompeius Grosphus. Are we to infer that Julius Florus and his estranged friend, Munatius, and Titius and Celsus (Epistles 1.3 and 1.8) also came to Tiberius as Horace’s protégés?

One of the first impressions made by this letter is of respectful but light-hearted humour. The affectionate irony with which Horace puts aside Septimius’ flattery and the “embarrassment” it causes him are pointed by the use of the three particles nimirum (1), scilicet (3), and quidem (7). This epistle, which is also the shortest (13 vv.) of the whole collection, is the only one to contain all three particles. Horace is trying to recreate the liveliness and expressivity of spoken discourse, and for this purpose Latin possesses less extensive resources than does Greek. Cicero’s letter written on behalf of Gaius Trebatius Testa to Julius Caesar (Fam. 7.5) is similar in this respect.66

Epistle 1.9 fits the collection because it is concerned with two aspects of amicitia. Horace is “giving in” to the urging of a friend to bestow a beneficium, a letter of introduction to a potens amicus. It represents the middle step between Epistle 1.17 (a kind of exhortation to amicitia with the great and the virtues of character and effort that enrich it) and Epistle 1.18 (a follow-up to the initiation of such a friendship). In disclaiming any regular tendency to indulge in frons urbana67 Horace reminds us that he is still spiritually in the country.

Septimius is a close and dear friend; the impression left by Ode 2.6 is confirmed here by the simple sincere compliment when it finally arrives (13) and by the delicate care68 expended in his interest. He is younger (by about twenty-three years) than the writer, but socially above him.69 While the eagerness and virtues of the aspirant (2—5) must be expressed, the reticence and dignified circumspection of the desired patronus is also important 10—12. The catalyst that compounds the two is the modesty of the writer. Horace insists that Septimius’ estimate of his influence is greatly exaggerated:70 “nimirum intelligit unus (1) . . . munere cum fungi propriis censet amici, / quid possim videt ac novit me valdius ipso”(5—6). Horace actually revels in the fama pressed upon him and the opportunity to report it.71 At the same time, a dilemma is created by the need to live up to the two bonds of fides existing between himself and Septimius and himself and Tiberius, while forging a similar bond between the two younger men. He is concerned not to importune his young and noble friend too much (“multa quidem dixi, cur excusatus abirem,”7); yet he does not want to hurt his friendship with Septimius either (“sed timui, mea ne finxisse minora putarem, / dissimulator opis propriae, mihi commodus uni,” 8—9), or be thought infidus and self-serving.72 Horace succeeds in showing Tiberius how he is forced by the demands of fides to avoid the greater opprobrium, even if it means sacrificing his own pudor in the
service of a friend and accepting the risk of incurring the reputation he most wishes to avoid (10—12):

sic ego maioris fugiens opprobria culpae
frontis ad urbanae descendi praemia.

So far Horace has been fishing for the sympathy of Tiberius with a graphic account of his own dilemma. He has made as yet no direct appeal on behalf of Septimius, although it is clear what he wants him to do. Before he does, he invites Tiberius to concur with the principle by which he has made his choice, that a true friend will sacrifice even his shame ("quodsi / depositum laudas ob amici iussa pudorem," 11b—12). The actual commendatio which concludes the poem is conventional, yet in its very simplicity sincere and true (13): "scribe tui gregis hunc et fortem crede bonumque." Horace does not ask for specific favours for Septimius, only that Tiberius "make a note" of this addition to his flock and accept the opinion offered of him. The poet's moral dilemma and choice, the modest scope of the request, and the character of Septimius so sincerely and affectionately portrayed make such acceptance agreeable. The two clear purposes of the epistle are a demonstration of an essential function of amicitia (the sharing of friends cum fide) and a compliment to the virtus of Tiberius, a young man with a princely capacity for friendship.

Horace might expect us to conclude from the order of the "Tiberius-epistles" (1.3, 1.8, 1.9) that Tiberius is still in the east. Celsus is secretary (comes scribaque) to Tiberius (1.8.2), so would be abroad with him. Allusion is made in Epistle 1.18 to the diplomatic victory over the Parthians in 20 B.C. (the publication year of the Epistles), in which Tiberius had played a great part. Five epistles (3, 8, 9, 13, 19) give us a series of glimpses, appropriate to a collection of letters, of the progress of events in the east from the point of view of one who knows the principals in the drama well but is remaining at home on his Sabine farm, carefully tending by mail the personal relationships of young friends in active service. In these poems the warp of great public events offers a background to muted tones of friendship, philosophy, and rural life.

**Epistle 1.17: To Scaeva**

(Quamvis, Scaeva, satis per te consulis et scis)

Scaeva:

(1) You don't need advice, of course, on cultivating men of higher rank. However, an older friend's views may be of some use.
(6) Happiness and the quiet life don’t cost much, and are easy to secure. Still, if you want to assist your family and enjoy some of the finer things, by all means move to a rich table. (13) Aristippus, for instance, refuted Diogenes’ criticism of his associations with the rich by protesting that he played the parasite for himself, not the gallery, and maintained his self-respect and independence.

(33) Great glory belongs only to a few distinguished men. But to be liked by them is no mean thing. The question is, how manfully is the goal reached? (43) A patron is always more generous to a modest and patient client, who doesn’t complain and beg. (50) Compare the fable of the crow, for example, or the typical response to a whining whore or the tearful beggar who feigns lameness on the street to get a ride. (He gets neither credibility nor sympathy there, for the trick will work but once.)

Epistle 1.17 discusses friendship between patron and client and the behaviour of the protegés of the great. Horace should be able to discuss this with assurance, since his relationship with Maecenas was of some twenty years’ standing by the time the first book of Epistles appeared. Yet responses to this poem from the scholiasts on have been strikingly varied. A dislike of Scaeva on Horace’s part has been inferred, and a strongly ironic tone. Others see a defence of Horace’s own career, materialism, selfishness, and an offensive and incomplete conclusion to the poem. 76 A close relationship has been generally assumed between this epistle and the one following. 77

Porphyrio’s help is not needed to see that Horace begins with a captatio benevolentiae (“protherapeusis”), praising Scaeva’s powers of perception and reasoning and belittling his own. The use of the diminutive amicus (3) supports this self-depreciation, positing a close friendship as the justification for the advice. Tandem (2) makes the question an earnest one: “How, exactly, is one to relate to greater men?” And the emphasis placed upon knowing, learning, and teaching in this context (per te tibi consulis, scis, discere, docendus, censet, monstrare, aspice, cures proprium fecisse) invites Scaeva to consider the implications philosophically. The significance of decaet (2) (and its derivatives decus, decorus, decens) is fundamental in the Epistles, for Horace’s main interest is now verum et decens (1.1). Cicero’s use of the term incorporates the values implied in modestus, verecundus, iustus, virilis, rectus, honestus, pulcher, and natura. It recurs frequently here: decuit (23), decebit (26), decus (et pretium) recte petit experiens vir (42), as do the closely related terms, rectus (19), splendidius (20), viriliter (37), virtus (41), pudenter (44). 78 Apparently Scaeva has asked Horace for advice on maioribus uti: at least Horace senses his need for it. Two options are open to Scaeva: a life of obscure otium away from the annoyance of early rising and the discomforts of travel 79—one which accepts genteel poverty (the rich do not have a monopoly on happiness)—or a life through which he can modestly advance both his family’s interests and
his own. The former is an Epicurean ideal repeated in the following epistle as well (1.18.103). But Horace does not argue for this alternative. On the other side lies the opportunity to advance not just his own interests but also those of his friends and relatives, a goal which Cicero sees as philosophically in accord with both natura and ratio: (Off. 1.5.7) “ad cultum et victum, nec sibi soli sed coniugi liberis ceterisque quos caros habeat tuerique debeat: quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit.” The appeal of a better life personally for Scaeva is played down: paulo benignius (11). The point of this advice, accedes siccus ad unctum (12), is not immediately clear. Although Ps.-Acro explains the words siccus and unctum as “pauper” and “locupletem,” the imagery belongs to the table; siccus recalls hunger, unctum plenty. But is unctum masculine or neuter? Compare Petronius (43): “Frater eius fortis fuit, amicus amico, manu plena, uncta mensa.” If uncta mensa carries the notion of “generous,” (the advice to Scaeva following concerns dealings with wealthy patrons) such a stipulation is important. Having presented two alternatives for Scaeva’s propositum vitae (unproductive otium or strenuous amicitia) Horace develops his point with a lively dialogue between Aristippus the hedonist and Diogenes the Cynic (13—32). This anecdote is also found in Diogenes Laertius (2.8.68). There Diogenes was washing his greens for supper when Aristippus happened by. In the Greek tyrannon corresponds to regibus (13—14), but lacks the double sense of “kings” or “patrons.” The dour outlook of Diogenes is reinforced by patienter (13), mordacem (18), vilia (21), duplici panno (25), patientia (25), morietur frigore (31). The most telling point against Diogenes is his inability to cope “decently” with rising fortunes because of his pathological fear of prosperity! (He can only be regarded as a fool.) If, on the other hand, the ways of Aristippus can be regarded as rectius (19) and splendidius (20) and as “becoming” (decuit, decebit—23, 26), and if he can live his life non inconcinnus (29), then he offers a model for Scaeva of how to enjoy the benefits of an amicitia without losing self-respect or independence. The exemplum anticipates objections to such a role and begins a reply to the original question (2), “Quo tandem pacto deceat maioribus uti?” The reply moves away from the Greek exemplum of Aristippus to define decent behaviour for clients of great men in a contemporary context (33—42). In Rome the rôle of the patronus-amicus was traditionally honorable and Horace’s allusions to his relationship to Maecenas always reflect this. The viri principes of Rome have goals and obligations conforming to honestas and nobilitas, and other viri honesti find their laudes by those standards: principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est (35).

The following line (36) presents an anticipated objection: “non cuivis hominii contingit adire Corinthum.” This complements v. 35: principibus placuisse is as difficult as adire Corinthum, and only special individuals can hope to achieve it. The objection is, sedit qui timuit ne non succederet
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(Perhaps Scaeva’s attitude): a man cannot be expected to attempt to interest a noble patron if he is worried about failure. Horace grants that (esto), but only in order to move the discussion towards the positive: *quid qui pervenit?* By what criterion does one judge the success of the man who does reach Corinth?” His answer is: “*fecitne viriliter?*” Cicero defines the fourth cardinal virtue (variously called *verecundia, modestia, decorum, honestum*) as follows “*quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit, id decorum viro*” (Off. 1.27.94). To Horace, *virtus* is the sole criterion (*aut hic aut nusquam, 39*) One man hangs back *parvis animis*, while the *experiens vir*66 pursues *decus et pretium,*87 and demonstrates his *virtus* (41).

The epistle concludes with a pointed discussion of how *pretium* and *decus* are related in this whole context (43—62). The expression *coram rege suo* (43) assumes that *virtus* has won a place. A patron and friend will naturally bestow gifts upon a worthy client. The rationale behind this was found in the *De Amicitia* and *De Officiis,* and in *Satire 2.* and *Epistle 1.* Cicero and Horace illustrate the delicate relationship binding together the giver, the recipient, and the gift.88 Here the emphasis is upon the discretion of the receiver: “*distat sumasne pudenter an rapias—*: atqui rerum caput hoc erat, hic fons” (44—45). The point made earlier about striving to win a place *coram rege suo* is reinforced: “*fecitne viriliter—*: atqui hic est aut nusquam quod quaerimus” (44—45). Clients who plead poverty, and clamour for favours for themselves and family (46—48) are contrasted with those who receive (*sumere pudenter,* 44) spontaneous gifts discreetly. Discretion has material advantages too, as the fable of the noisy crow illustrates. Resources are divided among fewer and with less envy and hard-feeling (49—50).89

A client’s lack of *pudicitia* and *verecundia* is shown by begging, a behaviour which is *indecorum* or *turpe* as well as counter-productive. A second example illustrates unseemly behaviour on the part of a *comes:* accompanying his *rex* on a journey he complains ceaselessly about the road and the weather and pilfering of his travel money (52—54). He is compared to a whore who wails so often at pretended losses that no-one will believe her (55—57). The force of this simile is suggested by Cicero (Off. 1.35.129): “*duo maxima sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit.*” Such complaining is *effeminatum* and *indecorum* in the basest way. There follows a final base comparison, this time with a malingerer (*planus*) who fakes lameness to hitch a ride in passing wagons.90 No-one who has been fooled once will believe him again, even with a broken leg, tears, and oaths. The dramatic relationship between this discourse and the situation and character of Scaeva needs definition. There is no clue to the historical identity of Scaeva, but it might be that his name has a point, implying awkwardness, perverseness, or stupidity.91 That interpretation of the choice of correspondent seems at
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odds with the idea of decorum running through the poem. We are told ironically that Scaeva is not one to ask advice (per te tibi consulis, 1) and that he fancies he knows (scis, 1) all about cultivating the great. So when Horace proceeds to impart some of his wisdom to the young man he begins with tact and modesty: He is himself docendus adhuc, and caecus, but motivated to write as an amicus maior natu (3). His admonitions (disce...aspice) refer to something offered for Scaeva’s consideration should be chosen to listen.

The first alternative suggested is quiet seclusion at Ferentinum: no early rising, or rattle and squeal of wagons, or roadside hotels. That kind of Epicurean existence can bring happiness without distinction or riches (10). But it yields to the middle way. Recourse to the discreet generosity of great men will bring honorable benefits to the individual and his family: “si prodesse tuis patuloque benignius ipsum / te tractare velles, accedes siccus ad unctum” (11–12). Horace does not hold out great riches as an incentive to find a patron. The gains of Aristippus are an exaggerated model: a horse to ride and a friendly table (20). Diogenes thought he knew how to handle patrons (si sciret regibus uti, 13), as Scaeva mistakenly believes he does (1–2). The first forty-two lines of Epistle 1.17 are a defence of honorable clientela. The importance of virtus to friendship (constantly stressed as essential to such a relationship) is a Ciceronian ideal.

Scaeva has seemingly won his amicus already or is considering an attempt, for he claims to know all about it (1–2). But Horace has heard his views and, anxious to change them, tactfully brings up the subject of how to win an amicus maior and how to foster the relationship once won. His two criteria of success are decus and virtus, the qualities which made his own amicitia with Maecenas exemplary.

The epistle concludes with a lively scene in which the malingerer is mocked by the neighbourhood crowd, the last of a series of four exempla: greedy parasites, foolish crow, whining whore, and faker. Their behaviour provides the antithesis to Horace’s decere.

It has been suggested by J. Perret that (like Satire 2.5) this epistle is close to pure satire, and ironically its caput rerum is “plus ferre,” a field where reserve and independence mark the coward and weakling. But in the light of Cicero’s discussions, the related value terms shows the pursuit of amicitia with great men as a test of virtue and modesty; material advantage flows naturally from such relationships and ought to be accepted in the same spirit. Decus and pretium do not conflict. Decus brings pretium, without being sacrificed to it:

Virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea
constantia . . . ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando. Amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita. Quae tamen ipsa eclosione ex amicitia, etiam si tu eam minus secutus sis (Am. 27.100).

What then are Scaeva’s views? One dramatic reconstruction reveals a man who has just rejected maiorum amicitia as degrading, unattainable, or at the very least difficult.99 Horace first proposes complete withdrawal from society in favour of Epicurean tranquility (8). The annoyances of such an amicitia he mentions (6—7) are echoed by the shameless client (52—54). Is it worth all the trouble? Horace’s reply begins with an appeal to pietas (responsibility to his family) and then raises the issue of modest personal benefits. Diogenes argues against regibus uti (13) but is amusingly rebutted by Aristippus. If the character and achievements of principes viri make them worth cultivating it is because of their virtue. Only by virtue may they be approached or such an attempt be judged (38—42). Victory must be maintained by virtue, or amicitia will decline with all its benefits.

The epistle exhorts a younger friend endowed with some fine instincts (and a capacity for virtus) to understand better the real meaning of amicitia maiorum and to make a manly effort to achieve it.100 Horace may rightly claim all the qualifications to be such a counsellor. Sometime prior to 30 B.C., when Horace was still very active in the circle of Maecenas he composed a satire (1.9) in which he was accosted on the street by a nonentity who was clearly intent upon doing more or less what he is now coaching Scaeva to try: regibus uti. This “bore” saw friendship with Maecenas as the gateway to personal gain, and urged Horace to join him in clearing the field by bribes and constant flattery and attention (45—48). Horace’s protestations that there was no rivalry or spite among his friends (48—52) aroused in the bore a frantic desire to exploit that vulnerability (53—54). Horace’s reply was sarcastic (54—56):

“velis tantummodo: quae tua virtus expugnabis: et est qui vinci possit eoque difficilis aditus primos habet.”

That man clearly had no concept of the real and essential relationship between amicitia and virtus. He was lacking in fides, pudor, decus, virtus—all the qualities of character which Maecenas would require. In decent company he would be utterly inconcinnus. Pudor makes Scaeva a worthy candidate for amicitia, but he still requires the direction and encouragement of an older friend to make the attempt.
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EPISTLE 1.18: to Lollius Maximus (II)
(Si bene te novi, metues, liberrime Lolli)

Lollius:
(1) Being as frank as you are, you’ll shy away from playing the scurra with a friend. But frankness can itself be carried to extremes, and “virtue” become mere rudeness. (9) Real virtue is the mean, and is removed from both sycophancy and bluntness.
(21) The wealthy friend will despise a greedy client, inspite of all his own many vices, (26) or else treat him like a domineering mother, urging him to excel him in virtue and knowledge (but not wealth). (31b) Eutrapelus actually used to give expensive clothes to a client to raise his expectations and ruin him.
(37) Don’t pry, or betray his confidences. (39) Don’t praise your own pursuit or condemn another’s. Don’t, say, stay home alone writing verse when he wants to hunt: (49) hunting is an honourable and friendly pastime, and you are fit, and a skilled veteran in the use of arms. (59) Nor are you above frivolous recreations: look at those elaborate war games you play at your country place. Share his pastimes, and he’ll approve of yours.
(66) Some more advice (if you need it). Be careful what you say, and about whom, for the curious will gossip. (72) Don’t get enamoured of some good-looking slave of his (of either sex): gratified or not, you’ll be sorry you did! (76) Be particularly careful whom you introduce to him. If your judgement proves wrong, admit it. Then you’ll retain the trust you’ll need to defend someone else who does deserve it. (Your own position could also be at stake.) (86) Once you’ve tried it, you’ll find cultivating a powerful friend requires a lot of caution. Be agreeable and ready for reasonable compromise. Dourness may be misinterpreted.
(86) But you must also cultivate life’s enjoyment through moral philosophy, too. Read (and ask wise men) about such things as greed, hope, fear, “indifferent things,” sources of virtue and equanimity, and the public life vs. the quiet life.
(104) For me happiness is found by the cool Digentia. There I pray only for what I have—or less: for independence, books, this year’s crop, calm. Jove may give me life and a living. Peace of mind I will find for myself.

Two epistles both dealing with the subject of amicitia and placed consecutively in the book invite comparison. Epistle 17 and 18 are both addressed to younger men by a tactful correspondent to advise them about amicitiae with patrons. We should look for ways in which 1.17 sheds light
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upon 1.18, as do the earlier epistles (and satires) that deal with formal amicitia. The first epistle to Lollius (1.2) discussed self-control and the effects of anger upon character, with Achilles and Ulysses as contrasting models. The usual assumption that Lollius was a nobilis is corroborated in 1.18. Scaeva appeared concerned about maintaining himself and his family with dignity; Lollius seems financially independent (59–64), and closer socially to his potens amicus. Scaeva had not yet established any such relationship. A careful reading suggests that Lollius’ impulsive nature has made this amicitia a difficult one, and Horace feels the need and natural obligation (amicus natu maior) to admonish him.

The opening reminds Lollius of his friendship with the poet (Si bene te novi), and prepares for the advice to follow. His epithet liberrime presents the first problem of interpretation. What is Lollius supposed to make of it? The liber amicus (Satire 1.4.132) is one of the essentials of life, as he can be counted upon to tell the truth. Lollius will have an instinctive abhorrence, however, to appearing as a scurra to someone to whom he has offered amicitia. What Horace means by scurra here is clarified in vv. 3–4: "ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque / discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus." The cautionary image of the meretrix is one link with Epistle 1.17 (55), and is antithetical to the genuine amicus; her affection and complaints cannot be taken seriously, for those are her tactics for getting what she wants. The matrona can be distinguished from her as easily as the amicus from the infidus scurra. Horace uses scurra to describe two familiar types. The first is the infidus, described more fully in vv. 10–14:

alter in obsequium plus aequo pronus et imi
derisor lecti sic nutum divitis horret,
sic iterat voces et verba cadentia tollit,
ut puerum saevo credas dictata magistro
reddie vel partis minum tractare secundas.

This is a professional ridiculus reclining next to the host, a parasitic dependant whose performance determines future invitations. He is fearful and sycophantic, a “yes-man” who is the opposite to a friend truly liber and fidus. Lollius would avoid such a role like the plague.

Horace assures “liberrimus Lollius” that he does not expect him ever to descend to the level of the “infidus scurra.” But every vice has its opposite extreme (as Horace frequently reminds us). The converse to obsequiousness is a course frankness which ignores tact and consideration for the feelings of others (6–8):

asperitas agrestis et inconcinna gravisque,
quae se commendat tonsa cute, dentibus atri,
dum volt libertas dici mera veraque virtus.
Such *asperitas* is unsophisticated (*agrestis*), gauche (*inconcinna*), and offensive (*gravis*), as illustrated by the cynic who offends by his appearance and manners, insisting that *virtus* is simply *libertas*. The example of the sycophant might suggest to Lollius that his own behaviour was a model—but the picture changes. *Asper* and *liber* together carry an additional impact; in context, *liber* appears to have a stronger force than *asper* and even *ferus* (Cic. *Planc. 14.33*). Horace equates *truculentus* with *plus aequo liber* (Satire 1.3.52). The point is reinforced by the doctrine of the mean ("*virtus* est medium vitiorum et utrimque reductum," 9), and two examples (*alter...alter, 10—20*) of extreme behaviour in *scurrae*. The second example (15—20) is that of the traditional *scurra* (not the professional parasite) who quarrels savagely over trifles and resents the thought that his word (*fides*) would be impugned or his freedom of invective curtailed. The *scurra asper* is familiar to us from Plautus, Cicero, and Quintilian. In Plautus he is usually a young man of good family (the *scurra assiduus*, or *locuples*) but sometimes an auctioneer or of other lower station in life who abuses his freeborn status (Trin. 199—202). The estimate of a *scurra* seems to depend upon the prejudice of the speaker; he may be described as *stultus*, *stolidus*, *mendaciloquus*, *argutus*, *confidentioloquus*, *dicax*, *improbus*, *petulans*. His lack of dignity (a significant defect by traditional Roman *mores*) is shown by Cicero’s adage (*Quinct. 17.55*): "vetus est, ‘de scurra multo facilius divitem quam patrem familias fieri posse.’" What distinguishes the *orator* from the *scurra* is "temporis ratio, ipsius dicacitatis moderatio et temperantia, et raritas dictorum" (de Or. 2.247). The characteristics of *scurrae locupletes* seem to be *libidines* and *intemperantia*. *Libido* can be harmless (*quacumque libido est incedo solus, Satire 1.6.111*) or reprehensible (*non rectus impetus animi*, Cic. *Part. Or. 22.76*). It is an excess of *voluntas*, needing control by the *animus* and by *temperantia*. Important for Lollius is the close connection between *libido* and *ira* (*ipsa iracundia libidinis est pars*, Cic. Tusc. 3.5.11), for *ira* was also the flaw Horace had warned against in *Epistle 1.2*.

*Libido* and *intemperantia* are the links with the next passage (21—36), as they directly affect *amicitia*. Lust, gambling, vanity, greed, and the fear of poverty earn the contempt of a wealthy friend (21—25), even when (an otherwise telling objection) the *dives amicus* may himself be a hill of vices. But the character of the *dives amicus* will react badly to such *intemperantia*: if he is good, he will demand greater moderation of his client (26—31a). The *exemplum* illustrates the vulnerability of the *homo intemperans* to a sudden increase in fortune. Eutrapelus changes his whole way of life (32—36) and becomes lazy, vain, and sensual. He loses his self-respect and has no regard for his obligations (*honestum officium*) or his solvency, even descending to become a gladiator or greengrocer! No *amicitia* could tolerate such behaviour. Though cruel, Eutrapelus is no worse than his foolish client. A worthy one would have been proof (in *virtute involutus*)
against the scheme. *Temperantia* is further discussed with respect to the central Roman social virtue: *fides*. No one else’s secrets should be probed; when revealed they should be kept (“commissumque teges et vino tortus et ira,” 38). *Temperantia* is essential, as proof against excessive curiosity, and against overindulgence and anger, both aspects of *libido*.

Next Horace touches upon the importance to friendship of a community of interests. Cicero had insisted that dissimilar interests (indicating dissimilar characters) precluded real friendship: “disparis enim more disparia studia secuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias” (Am. 21.74). Horace’s advice implies Lollius’ own preference for composing verse and a critical attitude toward the predilection of his *potens amicus*: hunting (39—40):

\[\text{nec tua laudabis studia aut aliena reprendes,} \\
\text{nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.}\]

Horace does not give an estimate of Lollius’ poetic talents, but this is not the issue, as the *exemplum* of Amphion and Zethus shows (41—44a). Amphion had abandoned his lyre because his brother resented it; he felt that their unanimity was important in avenging Antiope. This *exemplum* is clever since it encourages Lollius to concur with Amphion’s defence of the *vita contemplativa* while conceding the importance of the *vita activa*. Horace urges Lollius to give up some of his *otium* to join his *amicus* in hunting, while conceding in principle that poetry is worthwhile. He praises hunting in two ways so as to make it more attractive and enable his friend to accept without losing face. A heroic camaraderie (*Aetolis plagis*, 46) contrasts with the unsocial activity of writing. Lollius is reminded that hunting is a time-honoured Roman pastime, beneficial to health and reputation (49—50a). Cicero had spoken of *studia venandi* (Off. 1.29.104) also, along with exercise on *campus noster*, as *honesta exempla ludendi*. To this argument Horace adds the fact that Lollius is good at hunting, healthy, and expert (and admired) at handling weapons (53—54). It is an easy step to Lollius’ splendid military career (55—57). In short, his very accomplishments urge his joining the hunt. Then another objection is anticipated: “ac ne te retrahas et inexcusabilis absis” (58). That objection is based upon a sense of fitness or decorum: “quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque” (59). And in case Lollius should claim that hunting is not consistent with his intellectual pursuits, Horace reminds him of his fun at his family estate (60—66): “interdum nugaris rure paterno.”

Horace then acknowledges that he has digressed (*protinus ut moneam*, 67) from his own advice, tactfully conceding that it may all be superfluous (*siquid monitoris eges*) and picks up the theme of *fides* regarding indiscretion (*libertas*) in speech. Lollius must watch particularly what he says to whom about whom (68). He must shun prying individuals, for one who
asks too many questions will gossip and a single idle word is irrevocable (71).

As for beneficia, one must not utter an idle wish for a gift (72) for if your whim is granted the potens amicus will believe he has outdone himself; if it is not, you will be hurt. An implied third reason is that asking for trivial favours strains friendship.

The catalogue of "don'ts" proceeds with the further matter of recommending other friends in manum. The "client" friend will be expected to introduce worthy acquaintances to the patron (as Vergil and Varius had introduced Horace to Maecenas) and fend off others (as Horace had in Satire 1.9). It would be a disgrace if such a friend later turned out to be unworthy of the trust (75—77). On the other hand, once a mistake is made, the client should either admit it or, if he believes his friend to be free of blame, defend him vigorously and live up to the fides claimed from him. He may be the next victim of slander; so strong measures are needed (81b—85) to extinguish the threatening blaze. In the matter of introduction self-control and discretion are always necessary.

It appears that Lollius has embarked upon his cultura potenti amici already (86). Horace implies that he risks spoiling things for himself (86—88). Men resent others whose attitude appears to be a criticism of themselves (89—93). Lollius' intemperate behaviour must be offending his potens amicus. The key is self-control. The truly free man is the sapiens sibi qui imperiosus (Satire 2.7.83) . . . responsare cupidinibus fortis (85). The source of such wisdom for Lollius is books and philosophers ("inter cuncta leges et percontabere doctos," 86) as it had been in Epistle 1.2 ("nunc adbibe puro / pectore verba puer, nunc te melioribus offer," 67—68). That wisdom (Stoic, Epicurean, or other) is the answer to the distress of desire (98) jealousy and envy (99) of material things, the acquisition of virtue (100), and peace of mind (101—102).

The epistle concludes with a final exemplum: Horace himself. It comes as a pleasant relief to be given a landscape, and change of personal subject (me, 104), and even some humour. Simple pleasures are distilled from the cool waters of the Digentia of the Sabine farm. Lollius is forced to smile at Horace's reverie of the whole town of Mandela puckered with the coldness. Never is Horace so conscious of his blessings as when he thinks of his farm, and here too he drifts into a prayer of thanksgiving (107—110):

\[
\text{sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, ut mihi vivam}
\]
\[
\text{quod superest aevi, siquid superesse volunt di;}
\]
\[
\text{sit bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum}
\]
\[
\text{copia neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae.}
\]

The similarities between this prayer and those found in Satire 2.6 and Ode 1.31 (15—20), petitions for no more than his present wealth, life, and
health, and for poetry and books, give proof of years of a contentment related to the Sabine farm and Maecenas. When Horace defines the ideal amicitia he must always think of his own. If Lollius has missed the exact point of his friends' reminiscence it is brought out in the last lines (111–112):

sed satis est orare lovem quae ponit et aufert:
det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo.

For life and wealth one may pray; but the gods do not give peace of mind, whether as ataraxia, apatheia, or (as here) aequus animus (112). When won, however, it protects against the irrational urges, the libidines. Horace in two epistles has tried to show Lollius the need and the means to master it. The message had been expressed earlier with typical Horatian point and urgency (1.2.62–63):

Ira furor brevis est: animum rege, qui nisi paret
imperat; hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena.

In Epistle 1.18 the situation is more specific, but the diagnosis more general. Ira is one manifestation of libido, but only one. Lollius is wilful and unreasonable, not willing to exercise tactful compromise or respond aequo animo to the modest demands his amicitia makes.

Further inference of the dramatic situation of this epistle is possible. It is consistently implied that Lollius' amicus is reasonable (if occasionally demanding, particularly in urging him to join the hunt). But Lollius tends to reject compromise, is too outspoken (liber), and too much swayed by his own inclinations, lacking the restraint (temperantia) that sapientia can bring. Horace is concerned for the friendship Lollius is spoiling. If we may venture more, the potens amicus is likely to be a mutual friend who has accepted Lollius on Horace's recommendation. Certainly Horace is concerned that a commendator remain responsible for the health of the relationship (75–85). His epistle to Tiberius (1.9) proves his interest in such formalities. We may also compare Cicero's concern for Trebatius' relationship with Caesar, then threatened by his own intemperantia (ineptiae and desideria urbis et urbanitatis; Att. 7.6.1). Cicero was likewise concerned that his young friend should use sapientia to improve himself, citing a line from Medea: "Qui ipse sibi sapiens prodesse non quid nequiquam sapit." Cicero was doubtless thinking of his own role in the commendatio of Trebatius. Had the mutual friend brought Lollius' behaviour to Horace's attention?

This reading of Epistle 1.18 shares some of the view of Fraenkel, Maurach, McGann, and Macleod especially in stressing the "reciprocity of
friendship," the firm rejection of the excess of libertas, "the tactful consideration based in strength of animus and the Virtus it produces," and the admonition not to "pamper self-indulgence." But it resists the inference that Horace is concerned with a struggle between freedom and the needs of the individual that would require Lollius to submerge his own personality to fulfil those needs. Nor is this epistle a reaction to 1.17. This situation is different, as are Lollius' personality and needs: Horace's whole approach is different, though complementary. Lollius is an irritable young man who refuses to compromise his melancholy to build friendship. His excess of libertas is touched upon from the very start (liberrime Lolli) in an initially ambiguous context; after being first commended, he is gradually made to see that his attitude savours of intemperantia. He must learn to control that if his amicitia is to thrive. This advice is carefully tailored to Lollius' character, and an outline of him emerges; but Horace concludes the epistle with a short sketch of himself. The humorous allusion to the Sabine farm recalls his own amicitia as well as the summa bona distilled from his whole life: vivere naturae convenienter and aequo animo. The two are inseparably related for Horace, yet are possible for him only in his country retreat. Lollius has a good distance to travel. He can start right away to apply Horace's precepts to his friendship, but must in the long run devote much time and effort to self-examination and philosophical enquiry before he can hope to achieve, like his correspondent, vita beata.

This epistle, then, is actually a sequel to Epistle 1.2, and a restatement of his exhortation to Lollius to study philosophy. The stress in the earlier poem was upon the need to form the character while young (1.2.64—70). The separation of the two poems, plus the allusions to Lollius' career in the later one, imply that the recipient has still not made the serious attempt upon self-improvement through philosophy.

Thus the framing of the Epistles, already observed in the epistles to Maccenas (1.1, 1.7, 1.19) and Augustus (13), is enhanced by the inner structure of the two letters to Lollius, developing the themes of friendship and of cultura animi by giving us a deeper insight into one character and a sense of the passage of time. All the while we remain spiritually at the Sabine farm. The result is a combined effect of naturalism and structure: natura and ars.
THE NINE Epistles considered in this chapter outnumber both those addressed to patrons (four) and those to younger friends (six). These recipients include an eminent lawyer, Torquatus (of an old senatorial family), and a slave, Horace’s farm bailiff. Whereas those other two groups included men at or near the centre of power in Rome, and reminded us of the poet’s connections with both of them and the ambitious younger men of his time, this group is removed from that circle by choice or circumstance. A poet, a lawyer, materialists, an exile, a slave, frustrated amateur philosophers, and the rest represent Horace’s own generation. To such intimate friends he can unburden himself with a degree of ease not quite possible with either Maecenas, for whom a feeling of reverence is always to be felt, or his younger acquaintances, to whom (with the exception of Tiberius Nero) he tends to speak in an avuncular way. His tact here is of a rather different order, as is the mellow kind of amicitia he celebrates.

EPISTLE 1.4: To Albius

Albius, sincere critic of my sermones:

(1) What are you up to around Pedum? Outdoing Cassius of Parma in verse? Contemplating wisdom and goodness as you walk in your health woods? (6) You seem to have become a body without a soul, although
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the gods have surely given you everything: looks, riches, and the sense to use them all well. (8) What more could one ask? (13) You shouldn’t let your anxieties and irritations make you forget to enjoy each hour as if it were your last. (15) Whenever you want to enjoy a laugh, I’ll be here—as content as a hog from Epicurus’ herd.

This epistle to Albius is one of the most familiar.2 “The short letter to Tibullus, 1.4, shows some of the most characteristic and most engaging qualities of Horace’s epistles. It is graceful, warm-hearted, and rich in stylistic shades, and, though brief, full of mellow wisdom.”3 Whether or not Albius is the poet Tibullus, Horace tells us a good deal about him, under the dramatic pretext of giving him a frank view of himself through the eyes of one who respects and genuinely cares for him. (He in turn seems used to speaking frankly to Horace about his poetry.4) Horace has not heard from him for a while, and others are concerned about him, too.5 What does such solitariness mean?6 Even the reference to Cassius of Parma is obscure.7

The solitary nature of Albius’ pursuits exposes him to Horace’s charge of being corpus sine pectore. The reference to Cassius of Parma will have made sense to Albius; perhaps we are to suppose that Horace and Albius had previously discussed Cassius’ verse.8 Since scribere (3) is suggested as a reasonable alternative to reading philosophy in a quiet and healthful environment (a pastime of which Horace would entirely approve) it must be a worthwhile pursuit in itself.9 The captatio benevolentiae establishes the relationship between the two men as one of mutual respect and affection.10

After these reminiscences and compliments, Horace moves to the heart of his letter: his friend has been in seclusion at his country place too long, missing opportunities to enjoy his real advantages (6—7). The antithesis between corpus and pectus is a common enough one in Latin; pectus (like “soul” or “heart”) is something required for wholeness. Ovid’s Ajax (in Ulysses’ view) lacks sufficient pectus to appreciate Vulcan’s artistry on the arms of Achilles (M. 13.290). Quintilian relates pectus (quod disertos facit) to vis mentis (10.7.15): Ps. -Acro glosses, “non cares bono ingenio.” But the failure of pectus here seems not to lead to an inability to write poetry or read philosophy. In two passages Cicero had related pectus to amicitia: “in qua (amicitia) nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas...” (Am. 26.97); “ubi illa sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus se amaturo totum pectore, ut dicitur” (Leg. 1.49). Compare also Ovid’s line (Pont. 4.14.43): “tam felix utinam quam pectore candidus essem,” which shows how pectus is related to candidus (1).11

Poetry and philosophy are not being neglected during Albius’ seclusion, then, but amicitia; for candidi iudices require pectora aperta et candida. Albius’ forma, divitiae, and ars fruendi (6—7) are elaborated by the topos of
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the nurse's prayer. The affectionate tone is enhanced by the expressive use of the colloquial words nutricula and crumina (cf. reptare, 4): sapere, fari, gratia, fama, valetudo, mundus victus. (This last qualifies his divitiae as the means to live elegantly but not ostentatiously.) His amicitia would be much sought after.

This tactful and complimentary prelude is followed by advice which, although well-worn in sentiment, tells Albius that Horace understands his reasons for anxiety (12). (The admonition is familiar from the more Epicurean Horace of the Odes.) It is probable that in spite of the friendly enquiries with which the epistle began, Horace already knows why Albius has lost a proper perspective on his life and endowments, and become an anxious recluse. Horace respects his friend's solitary pursuits and the reasons for them, but asserts the need to recover pectus. Friendship, which has motivated the letter, constitutes the most practical remedy for anxieties (15-16).

With the informal invitation to come over to his villa for a friendly visit, the serious tone of the epistle (harmonizing with Albius' own mood) lifts and Albius is left to laugh at Horace's expense. With a similar joke at the expense of Epicurus and his flock, Cicero had called Piso, "Epicure noster ex hara producte, non ex schola," and made fun of the sumptuousness of Piso's entourage as proconsular governor in contrast to his own. The hyperbole calls Albius back to the ars fruendi, especially sperata voluptas suavis amicitiae, an Epicurean guide to a happy life. Like a typical follower of that school he caps his point ironically by donning the vanity and self-indulgence of Homer's Phaeacians.

But Epistle 1.4 is not a call to doctrinaire Epicureanism any more than a serious reproof of Albius' poetic tastes. The specific remedy for his friend's melancholy will not be an ascetic devotion to poetry or philosophy, but simply voluptas amicitiae. The Epicureanism of this prescription is treated with humourous detachment—as a tactful and gentle way of allowing Albius to come to terms with Horace's advice.

If Epistle 1.4 is an appeal for a therapeutic renewal of friendship, we may consider how Horace expects a reader to identify this Albius. Although much disputed, his identification with the poet Tibullus is supported by Horace's manuscripts, the scholia, the Suetonian vita, and the grammarian Diomedes. It is further supported by Ode 1.33, where Horace consoles Albius for unrequited love of a certain Glycera (1-4):

Albi, ne doleas plus nimio memor
immitis Glycera, neu miserabilis
decantes elegos, cur tibi iunior
laesa praeniteat fide.
TO OTHER FRIENDS

The consolation is conventional (*non tibi hoc soli*), and it concludes with his own case, *ipsum me* (13). His own amours too have been tossed upon stormy seas (13–15):

*ipsum me melior cum pector Venus
grata detinuit compede Myrtale
libertina, fretis acrior Hadriae
curvantis Calabros sinus.*

That hyperbole pries a smile from the morose lover. 22

Albius is revealed as a man of sophisticated literary and philosophical interests. The warm compliments Horace pays to Albius for his intelligence, eloquence, popularity, health, and judicious use of his wealth (in contrast to his present avoidance of his friends) serve as a preamble to the exhortation (12–14),

*inter spem curamque, timores inter et iras
omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum:
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora,*

which seems an odd piece of advice to a friend who has everything to bring him happiness. A second cure follows for his anxieties—laughter and friendship (15–16):

*me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum.*

Horace’s own curae are few; his self-portrait suggests a hedonist more than a serious philosophical Epicurean! 23 The undermining of his own seriousness recalls the end of *Epistle 1.1*, where the *vir sapiens* is put in his place. 24

M. von Albrecht has made a thorough metrical analysis of this epistle. ("Welches musikalisches-rhythmisches ‘Akkompagnement’ Horaz seinen Gedanken gibt." 25) An impressive degree of metrical variety and expressivity emerges. Ten (of sixteen) possible combinations of the first four syllables of a hexameter appear, including the two least common (sddd, ssdd). Vv. 1–5 are heavily spondaic, reinforcing expressively a mood of peace and calm, which prepares for the earnestness to follow (6–11), expressed in dactyls. Spondaic movement in vv. 12–16 accompanies a return to the mood of calm, underscoring the "philosophical" message and the gentle humour of the ending. 26 Avoidance of the common penthemimeral caesura (2x only) adds elegance to the verse; while the varying of the number of
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coincidences per line of accent and ictus supports rhythmically an alternation from the poetic to prosaic. In metrical terms the most poetic lines are 4, 5, 9 and 15 (3 noncoincidences); the most prosaic are 1, 3, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16 (1 noncoincidence) plus 12 (zero noncoincidence). On the one hand Horace’s two-line statement of the *carpe diem* principle (12—13) is couched in almost-prose, while the picture of Albius as *il penseroso* (4—5) is deliberately expressive, as is his self-portrait of an epicure (15).

In short, besides the personal compliment (*nostrorum sermonum candide iudex*, 1) and the references to Albius’ own poetic skill (3, 9), the careful crafting (“die akustische Infrastruktur”) implies a sincere poetic tribute to a friend.

What are the *curae* which have drawn Albius away from his usual pursuits and friends to write solitary verse or read philosophy? Deficiencies in intelligence, expression, popularity, reputation, health, elegance of living, or wealth (9—11) are excluded. Is it possible after all that Albius’ emotional turmoil is erotic here too, as in *Ode* 1.33? *Spes* (12) is a Tibullan theme, for example:

*Spes* facillem Nemesim spondet mihi, sed negat illa
(Tib. 2.6.27).

*Curae* appear again and again in elegy as inseparable from *amor*.

saepe ego temptavi *curas* depellere vino (1.5.37)—
tunc morior *curis*, tunc mens mihi perdita fingit (2.6.51).

Lovers’ fears are Tibullan:

*tu quoque ne timide custodes, Delia, falle* (1.2.15)—
haec mihi te adducit tenebris multoque *timore*
coniungit nostras clam taciturna manus (1.6.59—60),
as is anger:

*sed tua mater*

me movet atque *iras* aurea vincit anus (1.6.57—58)—
*Amor.../ inter... iratum lentus utrumque sedet* (1.10.57—58)—
quater ille beatus *quo* tenera *irato* flere puella potest (1.10.63—64).

All of this suggests that the problem driving Albius to melancholy solitude is a love affair. Horace does address the same individual in both an *Ode* and an *Epistle*. The internal signals that Albius in *Epistle* 1.4 is a poet (and that unrequited love is his problem) is supported by *Ode* 1.33, where he is referred to as lamenting his fate in mournful elegies. Horace
there reproved his excesses of lamentation (1-4), concluding with a refe-
rence to his own experiences with Myrtale (13-16). The mock solemn
*tu . . . ego* antithesis there is echoed in the epistle (*Albi . . . me*) as a light-
hearted means of diverting his friend by an Epicurean appeal to return to
laughter, friendship, and the enjoyment of life.

*Epistle 1.4* is a letter of consolation to an elegist-friend exploiting the
topos of the *miser amator* and offering true *amicitia* as a cure.

**Epistle 1.5: To Torquatus**

Torquatus:

(1) If you don't mind Archian couches and simple fare (with a special
wine, though), come over at sundown. (If you have something better,
summon it or accept my judgement.) Everything is spick-and-span
here.

(8) Postpone all your striving for wealth and success, along with the
case for Moschus. Caesar's birthday is tomorrow; so we can enjoy
friendly conversation till all hours and sleep in with impunity. (12) Why
should I not make use of what I have? It's insanity to worry about some
heir's expectations. I don't mind being thought ill-advised. (16)
Inebriation offers the panacea for hopes and fears, just the way she
bestows eloquence and solvency. (21) I am enjoined to oversee the
cleanliness and security of my place and the congeniality of my guests.
I'll invite some of our special friends—but not too many. (32) Write an
opinion on numbers. Forget your worries, and give your client the slip
by the back door.

The relationship between this epistle and the preceding (1.4) is clear.
Each is an invitation to a friend (one a poet, the other a lawyer) to visit
him. The invitation to Albiius (1.4) was left vague, however: he was to
come whenever he wanted a good laugh. *Epistle 1.5* is explicit. The
invitation is for the very same day. Both Horace and Torquatus seem to
be in Rome: Torquatus in court, perhaps, and Horace at his house (*domi,*
3). The unnamed mutual friends of *Epistle 1.4.2* now become specific
individuals (1.5.26-28). A general invitation to visit, made tactfully and
without pressure, gives way to a breezy insistence in which Horace does not
contemplate a refusal. We can securely date Torquatus' letter to the exact
day and month: September 22. Although invitations are usually sent well
in advance, this one is not. Horace sets about inviting Torquatus (and
others) on the spur of the moment, asking him to write back even what size
party he wants! (And all this in the face of Torquatus' inability to relax,
something observable some seven years later.) These details seem to
constitute what Heinze calls *eine Kühnheit*: inviting a celebrated and
wealthy friend to enjoy a spartan meal. The epistle appears to be a reply to a hasty note from Torquatus suggesting that, as they have not talked for some time, the two friends should meet on the holiday. With the messenger waiting for a reply, Horace composes a note, perhaps on the same *pugillares*. He clearly expects to receive a confirmation: *tu quotus esse velis rescribe*.

From the beginning Horace works in a series of clever allusions to literature, law, and politics, appropriate to a cultivated and active lawyer. His introductory formula of invitation (“Si potes Archiacis conviva recumbere lectis”) is not unusual. In Plautus we find *si arte poteris accubare* (Stich. 619), and *si potes esse te pati in lepido loco, in lecto lepide strato* (Poem. 696). The *Archiaci lecti* may be either enticing or inhibiting, depending upon the allusion. (Porphyrio insists that Archias was a furniture maker who made short couches; Ps.-Acro that he himself was short and made cheap couches!) A. Bourgery has offered another attractive explanation. In Nepos’ *Life of Pelopidas* (3.2), a certain Theban magistrate by the name of Archias received an urgent letter from a friend in Athens indicating that Theban exiles were on their way to overthrow the regime. Archias refused to open it because it arrived at dinner-time: “quae cum iam accubanti in convivio esset data sicut erat signata sub pulvinum subiciens, ‘in crastinum,’ inquit, ‘differo res severas.’” At nightfall he was murdered. (Horace may be warning Torquatus that shop-talk is out!) But why should Torquatus fear *holus omne*? Horace praised a vegetable diet, and Torquatus might be afraid this was all there was. Cicero had once recalled an all-vegetable dinner served by Lentulus. The sauces were so delicious that he ate too much beet and mallow and was seized by an attack of diarrhea (*Fam.* 7.26.2). (Horace praises mallow twice for its special properties.) It would be hard to eat sparingly of the *holera* if that is the entire menu.

Conventional provisos out of the way, the actual invitation for dinner now follows (2): “supremo te sole domi, Torquate, manebo.” Does this have special significance for Torquatus? Noon ordinarily would be too early for a dinner; but besides, Torquatus is not the sort to take time off *de solido die*, and Horace chooses (or agrees to) an hour when legal business by law had to end. The party then will start at dusk (*supremo sole*) and go on till morning.

A third caution relates to the wine (4—5). Horace likes to announce the wine when he issues an invitation, choosing a vintage appropriate to the guest or himself. Maecenas (*Ode* 1.20) will be served a simple Sabine vintage, bottled the year he was acclaimed at the theatre. Messalla (*Ode* 3.21) had requested a jar put away in Horace’s birth-year (*consule Manlio, 1*) like the guest speaking in *Epode* 13. R. G. M. Nisbet has given a palmary explanation of Horace’s choice of vintage in *Epistle* 1.5. In 340 B.C. T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus had defeated the Latins in a battle
fought between Sinuessa and Minturnae. 43 (Torquatus was proud of his family tree and his professional competence: Ode 4. 7. 23). The wine can be at the most six years old, and is of undistinguished origin, but has a pleasant connotation. 44 Nisbet has also suggested that fer imperium (6: the equivalent of mihi domino convivii pare) is an allusion to the proverbial imperia Manliana. 47 Later on the notion of imperium is reintroduced (21—25). Horace here adopts the language of an aedile, the magistrate whose original function was the superintending (procuratio) of public buildings and celebrations. 48 As well as the general maintenance and cleaning (munditiae), 49 the aedile was responsible for regulating admission to buildings and restricting access to senatorial areas. 50 The magisterial tone is reinforced by the anaphoric ne . . . ne . . . ne . . . ne ( . . . ut), lending humorous amplificatio to the host’s duties. (Even the passive form imperor may be a relic of legal usage.) So in v. 7 he is claiming to have done his superintending too: “iamdudum splendet focus et tibi munda supellex.” 51 At this point Horace cautions his friend against too much concern for material things (9): “mitte levis spes et certamina divitiarum,” 52 then adds another allusion to the situation in which Torquatus finds himself (10): et Moschi causam. Evidently a celebrated (and sordid) case, it must have taken a good deal of his time. 53 (Since he could not have received a fee, the certamina divitiarum must allude to investments not related to the trial.) The leves spes are echoed in Ode 4. 7, also addressed to Torquatus: “immortalia ne speres monet annus et almum / quae rapit hora diem” (3—4). Immortality is the vainest of hopes. 54 The topos of the greedy heir waiting to squander what has been so frugally saved also appears in both Torquatus poems, and is particularly apposite in a letter to a lawyer:

quod mihi fortunam, si non conceditur uti?
parcus ob heredis curam nimirumque severus
adsidet insano. (Epistle 1. 5. 12—14a)

cuncta manus avidas fugient heredis, amico
quae dederis animo. (Ode 4. 7. 19—20)

The alternative to all this anxiety is, of course, fellowship and wine with the forgetfulness they bring (9b—15).

The appeal to Torquatus to take time off is made persuasive in a number of ways. The moral support of Caesar himself is implied by reference to his birthday as an excuse for sleeping in (9). But Horace has also couched his appeal in quasi-legal phrases (underlined by the reference to Torquatus’ celebrated case): dat veniam (10) festus dies (9) impune licebit (10), conceditur uti (12) inconsultus (15), dissignat (16), esse ratas (17), which seem to give this colouring to much of the rest of the poem. 56 The praise of wine is incorporated as a further means of persuasion.
Stinginess and dourness are tantamount to madness (adsidet insano, 14) and would call for intervention by the courts. So why not run the risk of a reputation for simple indiscretion? That has the flavour of a nice legal distinction! The paean of praise to Ebrietas is typical (16—20). The suggestion that Ebrietas is personified here is attractive, and paralleled by the details of the hymn of praise to the wine jar in Ode 3.21.13—24:

\[
\begin{align*}
&tu\ sapientium/curas\ et\ arcanum\ iocos\ consilium\ retegis\ Lyaeo \\
&(14—16) \\
&tu\ spe\ re\ mentibus\ anxiis\ (17) \\
&virisque\ et\ addis\ cornua\ pauperi\ (18) \\
&post\ te\ neque\ iratos\ trementi/\ regum\ apices\ neque\ militum\ arma \\
&(19—20).
\end{align*}
\]

Messalla was clearly a man of philosophical interests (quamquam Socraticis madet/sermonibus, 9—10), while Torquatus is characterized as orator and patronus. Intoxication “arranges” (dissignat), “discloses” (recludit), “ratifies” (iubet esse ratas), “exonerates” (onus eximit), “teaches eloquence” (addocet artem—fecere disertum), and “renders solvent” (contracta paupertate solutum); in short, it has everything to commend it to him.

Horace's formal assurance that he has done his part to make a simple setting attractive is made persuasive and witty by the implied comparison to an aedile's duties (21—26). But perhaps most persuasive is the prospect of seeing old and congenial friends: Butra, Septicius, and Sabinus. ("We know Sabinus of old, Torquatus. It will be hard to pry him away!") He is invited to bring some other friends—with some typically earthy Roman humour ("sed nimis arta premunt olidae convivia caprae," 29), reminiscent of Catullus and undoubtedly a pointed reminiscence of other shared occasions.

The light preaching and emphasis in the epistle upon ego—what I will do, what I think—is relieved at the end by the request for a “legal opinion” (30):

\[
\begin{align*}
&tu\ quotus\ esse\ velis\ rescribe\ et\ rebus\ omissis \\
&atria\ servantem\ postico\ falle\ clientem.
\end{align*}
\]

It resumes with a final plea to give up his practice for the moment, and an allusion to the very symbol of his oppression: the client laying siege to his waiting room.

Like a dramatic speech, this epistle presents the relationship between two fast friends with different goals in life. Horace seizes upon the situation to design a letter calculated to persuade Torquatus to come to a party that
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evening, and forgetting everything else to sit up drinking with his friends, perhaps even “dum rediens fugat astra Phoebus.” 63

EPISTLE 1.6: To Numicius
(Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici)

Numicius:

(1) Avoid obsession with worldly things and you'll be a happy man. (3) It is possible to view even the stars in their courses without awe: (5b) apply that to such immature desires as eastern wealth, applause, and gifts. Desire for them (or fear of their loss) can destroy your peace of mind. (15) To make my point clear about the pursuit of extremes: even the sage would be called “mad” if he pursued Virtue herself beyond proper limits. (17) Go on then, pursue obsessions with antique art, fabrics, jewels, crops, metals, and celebrity! But the grave awaits.

(28) If your kidneys trouble you, find a specific. If it’s “right living” you have trouble with, and virtue is the cure, then devote yourself to virtue. But you can’t tell the forest from the trees! (32b) Keep constantly ahead of your rivals, then; accumulate influence and money! (Lucullus is an example of excessive wealth. Remember the story of his cloaks?) (46b) If gain is the cure, then devote yourself to it. (4) Prestige? Then aim for that. (56) Food? Then follow your appetite! (Hunt like Gargilius; go bloated to the baths, contrary to all propriety, and suffer like the crew of Ulysses!) (65) Mimnermus advocates “love and mirth.” If he’s right, then he’s the one to follow.

(67) Life and health to you. (If you do know something better, share it with your friend. If not, try this with me.)

Epistles 4 and 5 (like Epistle 3) conveyed invitations to friends to come and enjoy life with Horace. At first glance, however, Epistle 6 concerns only philosophy, and not friendship. But a closer examination reveals its unity of theme with them. The Epistle is unusual: 64 at once the least epistolary and most philosophical of the collection. 65 Numicius sometimes seems only a peg, with the poem’s epistolary close (67—68) offering little assurance that it belongs. 66 And yet Numicius actually shows a depth of character, relating clearly to the situation, structure, and tone of the epistle. 67

If nil admirari (1) is the central theme, it should bear dramatically upon Numicius, whatever situation prompted the epistle. Nil admirari is well-tempered precept, presenting Numicius with no extreme view (1—2). We need only suppose a previous discussion of the vita beata with Horace. The precept is consistent with Horace’s general views, and common to the
major schools of philosophy, offered without presumption or overseriousness. Philosophic calm is the key to happiness (3—8):

hunc solem et stellas et decedentia certis
tempora momentis sunt qui formidine nulla
inbuti spectent: quid censes munera terrae,
quid maris extrems Arabas ditantis et Indos?
ludicra? quid plausus et amici dona Quiritis,
quo spectanda modo, quo sensu credis et ore?

From an appreciation of the Epicurean’s peace of mind Horace moves to a more mundane and material sphere of human concern, asking for Numicius’ own opinions in a sequence of anaphoric rhetorical questions (5b—8). A new term, pavor, is introduced to identify the two extremes of admiratio, hope and fear (9—14). From there Horace’s thought progression is a little surprising, considering the careful opposition established between philosophical calm (3—14) and destructive hopes and fears. But paradoxically excess is possible even in pursuing virtus (15—16):

insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.

By the end of this first section (1—16), then, a general application of nil admirari has been established, and it is in this light that the futility of actual material pursuits is expressed (17—27). Here nil admirari is reinforced by suspice, mirare (18), gaude (19), and mirabilis (23); and by apricum (24), nitentia, bene notum (25) and conspexerit (26). I nunc (17) has a generalizing effect reminiscent of the diatribe. This section must be read in the light of the pointed appeal for moderation in vv. 15—16, where it is noted that even the Stoic sage must avoid obsession in the pursuit of virtus. Men are captivated by gems and expensive clothing (17—18), by celebrity (19), career (20), enterprises (21), and class prestige (22)—in short by the yearning to be mirabiles themselves.

After the cynic warning against obsession with the rewards of this world (citing the chill prospects of the next) Horace changes his approach from general to specific, and from negative to positive (28—29). The idiom now becomes medical: when you have a physical ailment, find a “specific” to cure it. Unoriginal advice, but the shift to the positive takes us to the heart of Horace’s real message to Numicius (29b—31a):

vis recte vivere—quis non?
si virtus hoc una potest dare, fortis omissis
hoc age deliciis.
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Vis recte vivere has a Platonic parallel, τις γὰρ οὖ βούλεται εὖ πράττειν;75 but also a physical equivalent recte valere (implied in vv. 28—29), which the unwell person would desire. Its ethical force is proven by the hope that virtus might secure it (31b—32a). The allegation, “virtutem verba putas et lucum ligna,” seems personal. Had Numicius tried Stoic virtus as the cure for his malaise, and decided it was beyond him? Horace’s comment is frank (et lucum ligna),76 but already tactfully prepared for. Virtus itself is liable to become an obsession, like any other pursuit in life. The rejection of the stern idea of an uncompromising Stoic virtus leads to an exhortation to quite opposite bona (32—38). The irony in urging materialism is unmistakeable, for money has already been discredited (5—27). Horace uses two specific exempla of “rich” men (the Cappadocian king and Lucullus, 38—46), and makes clear how this section on wealth relates to the theme of nil admirari and his advice to Numicius to seek a “specific” remedy (47—48):

si res sola potest facere et servare beatum,
hoc primus repetas opus, hoc postremus omittas.

Even if the irony were not clear, we would still recognize the echo of the opening lines of the epistle. The obsessions with gain, popularity (49—55, and the sycophancy it requires), gourmandizing (56—64), and finally (amore iocisque) hedonism are ironically proposed as means to a full life.

Each of these three approaches to living is unsatisfactory and (when carried to excess) unseemly. “Love and mirth” also bear a bitter taste in the context of Mimnermus’ poem: the transitory joys of life are its theme, one echoed by Horace in the next epistle (1.7.27):

reddes dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum et
inter vina fugam Cinarae maerere protervae.

Each way of life fails as a specific for Numicius’ malaise, as virtus had done. Obsessive devotion to any one is contrary to nil admirari and against the principles of decorum, for it leads to excess.

The positive advice to Numicius is appropriately brief, almost passing for a simple epistolary close (67—68). The *Pregnanz* Heinze suspected in vive vale77 would supply the positive advice he needs: vis recte vivere?78 Positive advice is urgently needed to close the letter. “This is my rule for living. There may be a better one (and I’d like to hear it). In the meantime try mine with me.” That is completely at one with Horace’s other prayers for himself:

Frui paratis et valido mihi,
Latoe, dones at precor integra
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cum mente nec turpe senectam
   degere nec cithara carentem. (Ode 1.31.17—20)

and

"sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, et mihi vivam
quod superest aevi, si quid superesse volunt di;
sit bona librorum et provisa frugis in annum
coopia neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae."

sed satis est orare lovem qui ponit et aufert,
det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo.

(Epistle 1.18.107—112)

There is also an echo of this epistle in Ode 4.7, where the coming of spring brings thoughts of warmth but chill fears of passing time and the finality of death (14—16):

nos ubi decidimus
   quo pius Aeneas, quo dives Tullus et ancus
   pulvis et umbra sumus.

Horace's general intentions in Epistle 1.6 can be seen in the first line and the last two:

Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, (1)

* * *

vive vale. si quid novisti rectius, istis (67)
candidus imperti; si nil his utere mecum.

The best commentary on the structure and meaning of the poem is offered in the eulogy of friendship by Laelius (Am. 6.22):

Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportune sunt singulae
rebus fere singulis: divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis: amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo
te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempes-
tiva, numquam molesta est.

Just as amicitia subsumes other bona, plain virtue also has a special part to play at an uncomplicated human level (20—21):

Divitias alii proponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii
honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum,
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illa autem superiours caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis quam in fortunaes temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponit, praecclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus, Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos—his communis vita contenta est—eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

Laelius’ virtus is ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque: an accepted standard of living and speaking, not the product of philosophers’ fertile imaginations or mere verborum magnificentia. The “virtue” of virtus is that it produces and maintains friendship—the one thing that makes life worth living: vita vitalis (Am. 22). Horace had forcefully rejected (Satire 1.3) the kind of virtue that erodes human relations. He has already spoken to Numicius here about virtus:

insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,  
ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. (15—16)

* * *

vis recte vivere? Quis non?  
si virtus hoc una potest dare, fortis omissis  
hoc age deliciis. virtutem verba putas et  
lucum ligna. (29b—32a)

Contrary to the accepted paradox (15—16) even the sage is mad if obsessed with the quest for virtue. The syllogism in vv. 29b—32a is ironic. We have been prepared to accept that virtus una (30) implies its admiratio. The injunction fortis omissis/hoc age deliciis (30—31) is intended to remind us of the inverted paradox, sapiens insanus et iniquus. But Numicius seems to see virtus in terms of verba (31). One inference is that his experience with virtus has been scholastic only, and measured according to verborum magnificentia (Cic. Am. 6.21), not ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque, the true Roman standard.

In the first section (1—27) Horace states the principle of moderation by taking a moderate position (prope res est una) and applies this to those sources of pavor a Stoic would be likely to reject: formido, divitiae, honores, fama (3—14). The futility of such hopes and fears is summed up in the phrase animo et corpore torpere (14): they diminished our prospects of bene vivere or valere. If Numicius has Stoic leanings the inclusion of the pursuit of virtue among the causes of pavor will not be rejected out by hand by him but seen within a logical framework. The diatribe sermon “i nunc. . . . / ire tamen restat Numa quo devenit et Ancus,” (17—27) is a further applica-
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tion of nil admirari to worldly ambitions. Rhetorically the first section (3—27) is a negative, and this tone is achieved through rhetorical questions (3—14) and ironic injunctions (17—23) plus the melancholy reminder of how ephemeral our lives are (24—27). The first comment on virtue comes at the sectional axis (15—16), where it provides the important, if paradoxical, application of the principle of modus (1—2).

The second section of the poem is rhetorically positive, but also ironic. The standard philosophical choices of bona are offered in consecutive syllogisms in search of a specific medicine to induce recte vivere (28—66). Virtue is proposed as the specific (30—31a); but it must be rejected, since Numicius regards it in terms of “words” (not of social reality), like those zealots Laelius had described. Res and pecuniae (32b—48) are the bona which lead to obsession, as the exempla of Archelaus (39) and Lucullus (40b—41b) show. Fama, gratia, and honores are then put forward (49—55) but passed over in favour of gourmandizing (56—64), as represented by Gargilius, the Caerites, and Ulysses’ crew who perished from indulgence in interdicta voluptas. That and the topos of going to the baths on a full stomach reveal a note of caution beneath all the irony.80

The final specific suggested by Mimnermus, amor iocique has been taken as at least partly serious. But that too assumes an extreme position: si NIL est iucundum.81 It fits too closely into the category of voluptas, but is also inconsistent with the sense of decorum Horace presents in the Epistles. It must be rejected as a specific:

\[
\text{vive, vale, siquid novisti rectius istis,} \\
\text{candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum. (67—68)}
\]

Horace’s final suggestion is offered only as a partial answer, then, one that Numicius may be able to improve upon: vive vale (67). The others have been rejected in their extreme forms, even orthodox Stoic virtus (apparently not the answer for him). If we compare Laelius’ comments on the relationship between friendship and real Roman virtus (Am. 6. 20—21) it is clear that Horace is qualifying the term, not rejecting it.

We must not overlook the contribution to the tact of the epistle in the final mecum. The three epistles which precede (3, 4, 5) have presented invitations to visit. His utere mecum may imply the same.82 Numicius has probably failed to find the key to vita vitalis because he has not yet found the middle way safe from extremes. Horace appeals to his sense of proportion in finding a principle to fill the vacuum: somewhere in between those of the sage, the materialist, and the bon-vivant—one remarkably like his friend’s.

This concludes the first triad of epistles to Horace’s contemporaries (4, 5, 6). Each is an invitation to a friend to join with him in the pursuit of
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customment, at his home or at his Sabine farm. To each he offers a solution to the anxieties and frustrations of love or business: philosophy. Here concludes also the first of three major sections of the book (1—6): a dedication to Maecenas, two epistles to young friends (2, 3), and three to contemporaries. The thematic unity of the section is carefully developed: philosophy (1, 2, 6), friendship (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), and formal invitations (3, 4, 5, 6). The theme which is least distinct in this section, but will be amplified in the next (7—12) is that of the country: rus.

**Epistle 1.10: To Fuscus**

(Urbis amatorem Fuscum salvere iubemus)

Fuscus, old city-lover:

(1) We country-lovers send your greetings. Other than this, you know, we are twins in our likes and dislikes; (5b) but even an affectionate pair of doves can feel differently about city and country. I am happiest when I leave the luxuries of the city you love, and live on simple fare.

(12) If one ought to live "in harmony with nature" then, where better to build a house than in the country? The weather is milder there, sleep is sounder, and grass and water are greener and purer. (22) After all, don’t we try to create forests and vistas in our city houses? Nature will defeat all our efforts to exclude her. (26) Reject false values and obsessions, then, especially bigness. A moderate house is enough for a happy life. (34) The horse in the fable yielded his liberty in order to drive the stag from the turf they grazed in common. Men too will give up their precious freedom rather than live on a little. (44) You should live wisely, content with your lot. (See that I do the same!) Money should follow, and not pull, its painter.

(49) I am dictating this behind Vacuna’s crumbling shrine. Nothing could increase my happiness except to have you with me.

Epistles 10—12 conclude the second six-poem section (7—12). The themes of amicitia and rus have been firmly established in this section by the Epistle to Maecenas (7), where Horace tactfully defines the relationship existing between Maecenas and himself. Epistles 8—9 resume his correspondence regarding ambitious young friends, written like Epistles 2 and 3 from the country. Epistles 10—12 return to his old friends Fuscus, Bullatius, and Iccius, explaining to each of them how friendship is closely related to life in the country far from the bustle of the city.

This is the most charming epistle of the collection. It is addressed to one of Horace’s oldest and dearest friends, M. Aristius Fuscus, mentioned affectionately in Satire 1.9 (61) as a practical joker, and in
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1.10 (83) as a respected friend; he is addressed with some irony in one of the best-known Odes (1.22), Integer vitae. The poem draws together with great affection the main themes of the book: friendship, love of the country, and sincere moral advice about peace of mind. It also serves to remind us that in his Epistles Horace is writing (with the clear exception of 1.14) from the country to the city to friends of various ages and persuasions. It forms the axis of the collection, preceded by nine poems (1–9) and followed by nine (11–19: exclusive of the epilogue), giving the recipient a distinction surpassed only by Maecenas (1.1, 1.7, 1.19) and Lollius (1.2, 1.18) whose epistles frame the whole.

The epistolary close of this epistle has been aptly described by Gordon Williams: "This structure, where traditional moralizing is enclosed between personal intimacies. . . . The form of the composition is thus signalled more obviously than in any other Epistle as a letter from one man to another, by the most explicit of epistolary conventions." The whole setting is redolent of rural ease. Courbaud suggests that the letter is being sent under the protection of Vacuna, goddess of leisure (an appropriate patroness for the whole collection).

The introductory formula salvere iubemus (1), and the epithets exchanged by Horace (Urbis amator . . . run's amatores) represent formalities of correspondence. The shift to the plural is usually designated as "modest," but Horace may also imply that Fuscus is outnumbered in his views by those who agree with him, as in the conclusion of Satire 1.4 (140–143):

\[
\begin{align*}
cui si concedere nolis, \\
multa poetarum veniat manus, auxilio quae \\
sit mihi—nam multo plures sumus—, ac veluti te \\
ludaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam.
\end{align*}
\]

A long-standing dispute begins to emerge in the debate over the right place for a man to live, the one blemish on a perfect friendship (2–5). A portrait of two doves affectionately cooing is developed by allusion to the two varieties to be found together in a dove-cote: the domestic bird, gentler, all white, and content to feed on crumbs at its doorstep; and the wild bird, which flies to the dove-cote when it wishes but even then shyly prefers high peaks, turrets, and gables. This latter is not white, but nondescript (varium). But as Varro points out, the two types live together happily and interbreed.

This landscape introduces a new dimension to the argument: a city dove-cote in the foreground, open countryside off in the distance; two birds, one elegant and staying at home, the other plain and flying free to the country.

The background landscape is then further developed (6–7). Amoenum
sets the tone, the idealization reinforced by images of streams, mossy rocks, and grove. (Rus is conventionally set apart for poets.) The implied contrast with Fuscus' "coop" in the city is now developed by the image of a slave fleeing from a diet of rich food (hiba, mellitae placentae) to plain bread (pane ego), a taste which now guides the writer's attitudes toward worldly things (11–12). Relief from the control exercised by the cloying city is expressed in vivo et regno (8). He is now free and in control, having fully achieved his earlier wishes (Satire 2.6.60–62):

O rus, quando ego te aspiciam? quandoque licebit
nunc veterum libris, nunc somno et inertibus horis
ducere sollicitae incunda oblivia vitae?

The subject of vv. 12–25 appears to be Natura. Horace glides from the abstraction (12) vivere convenienter naturae (the individual's inner nature) to the application of Nature's criteria to life's practical problems. Williams recognizes the "equivalent of a remarkable syllogism" in vv. 12–14,

vivere naturae si convenienter oportet,
ponendaque domo quaerenda est area primum,
novistine locum potiorem rure beato?

in which Horace takes an "unfair advantage" of Fuscus by marshalling Hesiod and the Stoics to his side, and straining natura beyond its proper ethical sense: "Horace has taken philosophical commonplaces and warped them into a new meaning of his own, with wit and imagination."

This syllogism is perhaps not so startling, though, seen in the dramatic context. The philosophical commonplace (vivere naturae convenienter) should already be familiar to us (from the Epistles) and to Fuscus the professor. The best reason for discussing house-building here at all would be that Fuscus has proposed to build a domus in the city.

Horace's highly idealized eulogy of life in the country presents a paradox. Mild winters, gentle breezes, untroubled sleep, green grass, sunshine, rocks, streams all far outdo the ars humana of the city. Likewise the divina natura of the country retains its hold on even the most confirmed urbanite; Nature's trees are cultivated within peristyles (22) and a townhouse with commanding view of distant fields (23) is a most valuable property. Fork nature out and back she rushes (24), subtly breaking down our unnatural distaste; for there is a country boy in every man, a side of human nature which cannot be denied for long by columns of exotic marble.

The following passage (26–33) pursues the argument using another
criterion, moderation. The choice of the merchant or broker as an exemplum of the failure to make reasoned choices is appropriate, as it picks up the motif of African mosaics and mottled columns as emblems of urban wealth. Just as failure in judgement can bring ruin to the businessman, moral failure can bankrupt happiness. The man lacking moderation will fall hard when his fortunes collapse. Compare *Ode* 2.10.13—15:

sperat infestis, metuit secundis  
altem sortem bene praeparatum  
pectus.

The proper criterion for moderation in building is confirmed for Fuscus at v. 32: “fuge magna: licet sub paupere tecto / reges et regum vita praecurrere amicos.” Horace’s advice on choosing a site is now extended to the type of house. The pauper tectum is another familiar motif of Horace, invariably implying a country setting, for there it is easier to compete with the rich in the race for vita beata. At this point Horace brings in one of his animal fables, its object to show the moral dangers present in luxury (34—38). The fable is known from Stesichorus, who used it to warn the Himeraeans against giving Phalaris a bodyguard. In Stesichorus the stag was a violent intruder into the sole domain of the horse (*ho hippos kateiche leimôna monos*), and was ruining the pasture; hence the horse’s appeal to a man to help punish the stag (*timôresasthai*). Although the motives and provocations of Horace’s horse are not given, his two beasts held the pasture in common (*communibus herbis*, 34). Another difference is that in Horace the man actually did help the horse (a detail Stesichorus excludes). To judge from Horace’s clear moral (*sic qui pauperiem veritus*: 39) the horse was not faced with losing everything, but just living on less grass than he was accustomed to. When Horace describes the victorious horse as *violens*, he is alluding to immoderate desires foolishly satisfied which also fits Horace’s earlier statement (30—31):

quam res plus nimio delectavere secundae,  
mutatae quatient. siquid mirabere, pones  
invitus.

The moral then lies in distinguishing between *satis* and *plus nimio*. Acceptance of *pauperies* (e.g., *pauper tectum*) relieves the fear of loss and produces *aequus animus*, whereas some will sacrifice their real liberty to selfish ambitions. Desire for ostentatious wealth is a hard and persistent master (39—41):
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sic, qui pauperiem veritus potiore metallis
libertate caret, dominum vehet improbus atque
serviet aeternum, quia parvo nesciet uti.

The final section opens and closes with the word laetus (44–50). Fuscus will be happy if..., whereas Horace is happy except for one thing. The advice is carefully intellectualized for his professor friend: sapienter (44) is philosophical, and incastigatum (45) suggests correction by a teacher or critic. Horace tactfully invites Fuscus to reprove him when he too acts irrationally in amassing wealth (magna et plura, 45–46). Although even he may be unable always to live by moderation, the advice is still cogent. Slavish behaviour threatens one's control over his destiny and freedom of action (47–48):

imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique,
tortum digna sequi potius quam ducere funem.

"A good climax to a sparkling letter" is Williams's assessment. He sees it as a "copybook" close, offering a commonplace for Fuscus to use on him in turn if needed. Williams here sees the metaphor of a well-rope. There is yet another possibility, though. Horace may be comparing pecunia to a scapha (dinghy) towed behind a larger vessel. In Ode 3.29 (62) he imagines himself caught in a storm at sea but still able to row ashore with everything he needs (me biremis praesidio scaphae tutum). Cicero (Inv. 2.154) speaks of a captain who gets into the scapha to control his navis (heading it into the wind like a sea-anchor) by means of its painter (funiculus). In short, wealth ought to be a proper (digna) lifeboat—towed behind, and not pulling the ship astern. Money has its place, and it would have been tactless and foolish to condemn it outright to Fuscus.

Having now pointed his moral in a positive direction, Horace concludes the epistle on a warm and personal note. Whereas the rus had earlier symbolized the one area of difference between the two old friends (3), he now uses it to attempt to settle it. The opening landscape of rus amoenum (6–7) is recalled by this final scene—the poet relaxing in the restful shade of Vacuna's temple high above the stream of the Digentia. (The most precise postmark in any of the Epistles, this temple has been located at Rocca Giovane, a hill town about one kilometre from Horace's villa.) The evocation of view and solitude is meant to entice Fuscus as much as it does Horace. Varro associated Vacuna with "vacare," with special reference to leisure for philosophy. If Fuscus has visited the spot with Horace, the total affect on him of those associations must be great.

The final step in Horace's friendly advice to Fuscus is a reprise of the
beginning. His building a house in the city would be a hurdle to their friendship, making their separation more profound. Fuscus has two benefits to gain from choosing the country: peace of mind, and the satisfactions of an old and mellow friendship. Horace has secured the first for himself and Fuscus can do likewise. Friendship requires two.106

**EPISTLE 1.11: To Bullatius**

(Quid tibi visa Chios, Bullati, notaque Lesb)

Bullatius:

(1) How do you feel about Chios, Lesbos, and Samos? Or Sardis, Smyrna, and Colophon? (4) Do you prefer Rome to them? What of Pergamum? (6) Do you favour Lebedus as a refuge from the boredom of travel (a lonely deserted place worse than Gabii or Fidenae)? Lebedus might have appealed to me when I wanted to forget everything and be forgotten, in lonely isolation from those storms at sea; (11) but temporary havens from the weather like inns and ovens don’t offer a fully happy existence. Rhodes and Mytilene are all right, but don’t sell your ship there because of a stormy crossing. Your peril is over; so they are the wrong places to be. (2) Since a benign fortune allows it, give your praises to Samos, Chios, and Rhodes at a distance: at Rome.

(22) Be grateful for your blessings, and enjoy them now while you may. Reason and sense dispel cares, not a lonely view of the sea; so by flying across the sea you change only your sky, not your heart. (28) Persistent dullness does preoccupy us, and we look for happiness in shops and chariots. But what you are looking for is here, even at Ulubrae, if peace of mind is yours.

Where is Bullatius staying as Horace writes? Why does Horace reveal a yearning to isolate himself at the very place where he seems to be discouraging Bullatius from settling?107 The Bullatius of this epistle is apparently not an important figure, and the name is not common.108 Since Horace is asking for his opinion of Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Zmyrna, Colophon, and Lebedus, Bullatius may have visited there in the past, wherever he may now be.109 The mention of them, and the desire to find complete isolation (9—10) brings Horace to the futility of attempting to escape curae (25) by running away (26—30). An aequus animus is the only hope. Compare Ode 3.1.37—40:

sed Timor et Minae
scandunt eodem quo dominus, neque
decedit aerata triremi et
post equitem sedet atra cura.
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Since we know nothing of Bullatius, much less whether this epistle incorporates an actual situation, we can only be sure that it is the kind a philosophical poet might write to a friend. Horace opens with a series of questions. The first is neutral: “What did you think of . . . ?” Bullatius is then invited to express an unfavourable view of the places he has seen in comparison with Rome (4), then to express a strong preference for one of the cities of Pergamum (5). Finally praise for Lebedus is anticipated as a haven from the loathesomeness of travel, “Odio maris atque viarum” (6). This brings us to the poem’s first problem (7—10):

scis Lebedus quid sit: Gabiis desertior atque
Fidenis vicus; tamen illic vivere vellem
oblitusque meorum, oblivescendus et illis,
Neptunum procul e terra spectare furentem.

Some assign these lines to Bullatius, while others leave them within the context of Horace’s own remarks. It does seem inconsistent for Horace (preaching contentment at home instead of travel abroad) to say that he too would like to live at Lebedus, where distance, seclusion, and melancholy associations could suit a person of only the blackest humours. Lejay saw Horace speaking here “dans un accès d’humeur noire et de misanthropie.” Use of dialogue might be paralleled in the Epistles, but here something points conclusively to Horace as the speaker in v. 8. Tamen illic vivere vellem is a potential expression with the imperfect subjunctive. Forms such as vellem, nollem, mallem, and curarem in the first person singular are the commonest; for example, “cuperem vultum videre tuum, cum haec legere” (Cic. Att. 4.16.7) or “ego te vivom salvomque vellem. eho! an iam mortuost?” (Pl. Pseud. 309). V. 8 should mean, “I could have wished to live there just the same,” which is different from, “I should like . . . .” Horace asks about a number of far-off places and finally hits precisely upon Lebedus (6): “or do you favour Lebedus because you are sick of travelling?” The expression odio maris atque viarum is the first suggestion of Bullatius’ attitude toward his present life. In order to advise friends with problems it helps first to convince them that you understand how they feel—ideally because you have even gone through it yourself. For this purpose Lebedus offers a point of intersection of the thoughts of the two men. (“Take Lebedus, for example—a godforsaken place if there ever was one! But there was a time in my life when I should have liked to live there, to get away from everything.”) Horace’s recollection of his military service in Asia Minor, of pondering the future (after Philippi) and recalling how much Lebedus appealed to his more melancholy moods, are suggested in the portrait of a solitary man watching the sea raging far away. If there is an allusion here to the beginning of Book Two of Lucretius it is an apt and evocative one.
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So before preaching to Bullatius, Horace shares in his feelings. He too had felt the pull toward withdrawal from the world when others had plunged rashly back into the strife (Ode 2.7.15—16):

\[ \text{te rursus in bellum resorbens} \]
\[ \text{unda fretis tulit aestuosis.} \]

Now that he has established empathy he goes on to make his point without stating the obvious (that he had changed his mind and had come home and come to terms with the world). Rather Horace presents arguments which might lead a man to make such a choice independently. He begins with some analogies which support the fact that haven from a storm is not a place to stay forever, as its advantages are fleeting (11—14):

\[ \text{sed neque qui Capuam petit, imbre lutoque} \]
\[ \text{adpersus volet in caupona vivere; nec qui} \]
\[ \text{frigus collegit, furnos aet balnea laudat} \]
\[ \text{ut fortunatam plene praestantia vitam.} \]

This passage puts Lebedus into perspective. *Lebedum laudas?* (6) is meant in the same sense as *furnos et balnea laudat* (13), and represents for Horace and Bullatius a temporary expedient at best. But living in an inn, bakehouse, or bath is ridiculous.\(^ {118} \)

The image of the storm at sea is renewed in vv. 15—16:

\[ \text{nec si te validus iactaverit Auster in alto,} \]
\[ \text{idcirco navem trans Aegaeum mare vendas,} \]

and in more direct personal terms (*te . . . vendas*), as Bullatius finds himself caught up in the analogy. But the analogy may represent the true situation, if we imagine Bullatius somewhere *trans Aegaeum* where he has encountered his own *validus Auster*.

The succession of analogies is rapidly concluded by a series of four, still reflecting weather and seasons (17—19):

\[ \text{incolumi Rhodes et Mitylene pulchra facit quod} \]
\[ \text{paenula solstitio, campestre nivalibus auris,} \]
\[ \text{per brumam Tiberis, Sextili mense caminus.} \]

Each of the items mentioned (cloak, swimsuit, Tiber, stove) is suitable on occasion but not all the year round, and they do not therefore offer a permanent way of life. Neither do Rhodes and Mitylene.
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The message now becomes more and more direct as the main point approaches (20-21):

*dum licet ac voltum servat Fortuna benignum,
Romae laudetur Samos et Chios et Rhodos absens.*

Even here the second person is still avoided, and *dum licet* is not a proviso. The attitude toward place implied in *laudare* is different too. One need not undervalue these foreign places, but whenever possible justice should be done them at home: in Italy.

Then comes the main precept, at last in the second person (22—25). “Seize the opportunity which god gives you gratefully,” he urges, “and don’t delay, so that wherever you’ve been you can say that you’ve had the most out of life.” Horace then backs off a little and follows with a general proposition (25—27):

*nam si ratio et prudentia curas
non locus effusi late maris arbiter aufert,
caelum, non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt.*

The felicity of this philosophical *topos* is justly famous. Horace is advocating *ratio* and *prudentia* to relieve *curae*. The alternative to be rejected by Bullatius is *locus effusi late maris arbiter*, the very spot where Bullatius presently must be, and the imaginary address of the epistle. Horace has already named one such place and dwelt upon it at some length as a spot from which the melancholy exile might contemplate the boiling sea of civil discord: “Neptunum procul e terra spectare furentem” (10). If Bullatius is at Lebedus, it is the kind of place he knows or is expected to visit and Horace lingers over his description of it for five lines, by far the most extensive of such descriptions in the poem; moreover, it matches the kind of place he expressly warns against (26). The topography of the real Lebedus confirms this as well: “Lebedus lived quietly on her peninsula, and played no significant part in history.”* Ringing the rounded headland (about 200 metres in diameter) there remains an ancient ashlar wall about two metres thick, with “four towers and three gates opening directly on the sea.”* Is Horace recalling two young officers of the republican army early in 42 B.C., gazing together out to sea from the top of these walls, and talking about their future lives (28—30)?

*strenua nos exercet inertia: navibus atque quadrigis petimus bene vivere. Quod petis hic est, est Ulubris, animus site non deficit aequa.*
Horace’s final appeal is explicit. *Quod petis hic est* may refer to Italy or to Ulubrae (30). Ulubrae may have a specific connection with Bullatius, or it may be simply a “type” of lonely godforsaken spot in Italy.\(^\text{122}\) (Cicero refers to the croaking of the frogs in the Pomptine marshes there in a letter to Trebatius.)\(^\text{122}\) It recalls the references to lonely Gabii and Fidenae (7—8) and to Lebedus. In other words, Bullatius could achieve happiness anywhere, provided he had *aequus animus*.

The argument of the epistle seems to run: If you have a notion to stay at some lonely faraway spot, remember that temporary solutions to problems are never the final answer. Since you may return to Italy, take the opportunity and do so. Cares exist in the mind, and cannot be escaped by wandering and seclusion, no matter how we try. A man with his mind at rest can be content even at Ulubrae.

A dramatic setting for this epistle was suggested more than a century ago by Baron Walckenaer.\(^\text{124}\) His explanation (which Courbaud mentions only to dismiss out of hand) was that Bullatius was a republican exile to whom Horace was communicating Augustus’ permission to return home. I believe that there are substantial grounds for supporting Walckenaer. I have already suggested that vv. 7—10 could refer to the period of despondency between Philippi and Octavian’s amnesty. At that time the youthful Horace had seen his own world collapse. Emotion might have then pulled him toward an extreme Epicurean solution to his dilemma: withdrawal. Horace had suffered from the same doubts and uncertainties that seem to be plaguing Bullatius.
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A second point worth noting is that Horace had already published at least one ode on the same theme—return from political exile—but from the other end of the process. In *Ode* 2.7 he welcomes home Pompeius Varus, who had fought with him in Brutus’ army at Philippi. Recalling their experiences together, Horace alludes briefly to their divergent careers after Philippi (13–16):

*sed me per hostis Mercurius celer*
*denso paventem sustulit aere,*
te rursus in bellum resorbens
*unda fretis tulit acstuosis.*

Pompeius’ return is to be attributed to Jupiter (18), who is the answer to the very question with which the poem begins: “quis te redonavit Quiritem / dis patriis Italoque caelo?” (3–4). Bullatius’ return is likewise a gift from God: “tu quamcumque deus tibi fortun averit horam grata sume manu” (22–23). The identification of the *luppiter/deus* with Octavian in each case is attractive.

Both the ode and the epistle may deal with a similar situation, the return of a republican exile (such as Horace himself had been). There are parallels for this type of *epistula suasoria* among Cicero’s correspondence with Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Claudius Marcellus (*Fam.* 4.1–12). Sulpicius had gone into self-exile after Pharsalus, but was pardoned by Caesar and sent to Achaea as governor. Cicero’s letters first find him there in 49 B.C., chafing to come home. They convey Caesar’s sentiments about Sulpicius’ return to Italy (4.3.30, 4.4.3). Cicero’s advice to Marcellus is even more akin to that of Horace to Bullatius. We know that Caesar was still very suspicious of Marcellus (4.4.3) but had finally agreed to his recall. Cicero’s letters are motivated by feelings of long-standing friendship and consideration of Marcellus’ *salus* and *dignitas* (4.7.1). He carefully reminds Marcellus that neither of them had wanted the civil war and both had stood aloof as much as possible (4.7.2); those who did otherwise are still in Africa or have gone over to Caesar. Marcellus is generally regarded as a man of *medium . . . sapiens consilium.* To gain his desires all that is lacking is *voluntas.* But in case Marcellus is contemplating a permanent exile, Cicero disallows his only valid motive:

*Sed tamen, si iam ita constituisse, ut abesse perpetuo malles quam ea quae nolles, videre, tamen id cogitare deberes, ubicumque esses, te fore in eius ipsius, quem fugeres, potestate. Qui si facile passurus esset te carentem patria et fortunis tuis quiete et libere vivere, cogitandum tibi tamen esset Romaene et domi tuae cuicuimodi res esset, an Mitylenis aut Rhodi malles vivere* (4.7.4).
The clear echo of Caesar's views on the matter suggests that the dictator would just as soon have Marcellus in Rome where he can be watched:

\[\text{Sed cum ita late pateat eius potestas, quem veremur, ut terrarum orbe amplexa sit, nonne mavis sine periculo tuae domi esse quam cum periculo alienae?}\]

There appears to be a play on \textit{periculum} here, perhaps based in the first instance on the legal sense of \textit{periculor}, referring to the status of an involuntary exile, something Marcellus is not.

A similar letter was written after Pharsalus by Cornelius Dolabella to Cicero, his father-in-law, in June of 48 B.C. from Caesar's camp. The letter was intended to persuade Cicero either to join Caesar or retire from active politics: "ut te aut cum Caesare nobiscumque coniungeres aut certe in otium referres" (9.9.1). He reminds him of the utter hopelessness of Pompey's cause and calls upon him to make a decision "pro tua prudentia" (9.9.2). Cicero should avoid any future confrontations between Caesar and Pompey by moving "vel Athenas vel quamvis quietam civitatem" (9.9.3). That Caesar approves of the letter is clear: "facillimum erit ab eo tibi ipse impetrare, et meas tamen preces apud eum non minimum auctoritatis habituras puto" (9.9.3).

These are letters written to voluntary exiles, urging them to return since it is their \textit{voluntas} alone that keeps them from home and kin: \textit{prudentia} would see them come home. The wishes of Caesar in each case are presented, and yet they are composed with a delicacy and tact that conveys a feeling of intimacy with the recipients and a friendly concern for their welfare.

Although some twenty-eight years have passed between Dolabella's letters to Cicero and the publication of Horace's to Bullatius, the problems of healing the wounds of civil war are still acute. The joy of return and reconciliation was evident three years earlier in the Ode to Pompeius. Horace does not refer to his own return except in the vaguest terms (\textit{Epistle} 2.2.49–52). But we are familiar from \textit{Ad Familiares} with letters written to the losers by friends on the winning side.

Although it has been asserted that there is no way of estimating the character of Bullatius, that is not completely true. His state of mind can be inferred from the approach Horace uses to try to change it. He does not go right to the point but begins instead with a wider issue, a comparison of the charms of certain famous places with those of Rome (1–4). Then he discusses and invites an opinion about one of the loneliest spots on the coast of Asia, Lebedus, and anticipates a reason why Bullatius might like such a place. But rather than disputing the sense of such a choice, Horace first expresses much sympathy. The landscape has a kind of melancholy
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appeal to that side of us that wants to shut out the rest of the world and its troubles. Having established his sympathy with Bullatius, Horace then goes on to prove such feelings irrational. To the traveller by road who is drenched and soaked with mud an inn has compelling charms (11—12). The man with a chill finds the baths a delightful spot (12). But neither would accept his place of refuge as permanent. Similarly, the sailor who is glad to see the shores of Asia after a stormy crossing would not sell his boat and give up his chances of returning home. So far the examples are clear and easily related to Bullatius' case. It has been remarked that Rhodes and Mitylene were frequently places of political exile for Romans, and Cicero refers to them as such to Marcellus (Fam. 4.7.4). Waltz has suggested that *incolumi* (7) should mean "intact, indemne": i.e., not subject to exile.126 The legal sense of *incolumi* is picked up by *dum licet* (20) and the exhortation: "Romae laudetur Samos et Chios et Rhodos absens" (21).

Horace’s counsel to friends in exile, like Cicero’s, calls for *ratio* and *prudentia* and also for *aequus animus*. Qualities of mind, not physical distance from life’s realities, produce *bene vivere*. In the *Tusculans* (5.108), Pacuvius’ Teucer was quoted approvingly: *Patria est ubicumque est bene*.127 For Bullatius, *bene vivere* could mean living in Italy. He should once and for all forgo melancholy resentments and fears, leave Lebedus behind, and come home to his friends.

**EPISTLE 1.12: To Iccius**

(Fructibus Agrippae Siculis, quos colligis, Icci)

Iccius:

(1) If you're enjoying the fruits of Agrippa's property in Sicily, how could even Jove give you more? Don’t grumble: *usus* is a far cry from poverty! (5) You have your health. If you are able to live moderately on salad in the midst of such plenty you’ll continue to do so even with the wealth of kings, (10) whether it’s just your nature or whether virtue takes precedence with you.

(12) It’s no surprise that Democritus’ flock ate up his earthly crops while his mind soared abroad. Here you are, pondering all the riddles of natural philosophy in the midst of all such temptation of riches: the motion of the sea, weather, astronomy, universal harmony-in-discord, and the rival claims of Empedocles and Stertinus!

(21) Whether you are mangling fish or leeks and onions, make use of Pompeius Grosphus. Any requests of his will be honorable, and when good men are in need there’s a buyer’s market in friends!

(25) But here’s some news. Agrippa and Claudius Nero are triumphant in their campaigns abroad. Phraates has meekly come to terms. Golden Plenty pours grain on Italy with a brimming horn.
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*Epistle 1.12* is in some ways one of the most complex of the whole collection. Horace rings the changes on agriculture, land law, ethics, natural philosophy, friendship, literature, and current events in the empire. The epistle begins with a reference to Agrippa as the owner of Icchius’ farm and concludes with his military successes (along with those of Tiberius and Augustus); so its dramatic date is clear. It begins with Icchius’ situation (farming Agrippa’s land in Sicily) and concludes with the news of a bumper harvest in Italy. Horace writes with a mixture of irony, friendly humour, and gentle earnestness, imparting some advice about living happily in the country far from Rome. Unlike Fuscus (*Epistle 1.10*), however, Icchius is already in the country but has found the work unrewarding.

Icchius appeared once before in Horace’s poetry: *Ode 1.29.* The way in which Horace addressed him there is important since that ode is very similar in theme and tone. There Horace twits his friend for his fickleness as a student of philosophy: after amassing a library on Stoicism he has thrown it all up in favour of adventure and booty in Arabia (10–16):

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quis neget arduis
pronos relabi posse rivos
montibus et Tiberim reverti,
cum tu coemptos undique nobilis
libros Panaeti Socraticam et domum
mutare loricis Hiberis
pollicitus meliora tendis?
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It would seem he has not changed much since then.

Horace implies a good deal about Icchius’ legal situation. Agrippa owns the property in Sicily and has the *proprietas* over it, while Icchius has somehow acquired the right of its *usus* or *ususfructus*. How did Icchius come by the use of the land? Why might he consider his status less than satisfactory? The legal implications seem to be clear enough on the first point. Agrippa may have granted the land to him (by *pactio et stipulatio* since property in a province is involved), or it may be his right by legacy; i.e., a testator has willed the *proprietas* to Agrippa as heir and the *ususfructus* or *usus* to Icchius as *legatarius*. Another possibility is that Icchius is leasing the land from Agrippa.

*Usus* and *ususfructus* had, along with leasing and in contrast to outright ownership, certain disadvantages. One could not develop the property, use it for anything but its present purpose, or deliver the *ius* over to anyone but the owner. Although the normal term of such servitudes was for life, the enjoyment of these rights could not raise one’s official status to *eques* or *nobilis*; moreover, the capital would be credited to Agrippa. Icchius probably could not sell his produce.
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Since Iccius wants something he does not have, his aspirations could be for the tangible social advantages that ownership would offer, plus the title to liquidate capital.

Whatever Iccius has previously written to Horace is described by the poet as querellae. This is the only occurrence of the word in Horace's Sermones, and it has a melodramatic ring. Horace's words of comfort are quite frank: he has more than enough if he uses it recte (5–6). Divitiae regales could imply outright ownership (which Iccius does not have) and boundless wealth, neither of which can really give well-being. That would seem to be the significance of si recte frueris. The three conditional sentences are (vv. 2, 5, 7) preceptual: recte frui, bene esse, and abstemius vivere make up the same prescription for happiness the poet had considered in his prayer to Apollo (Ode 1.30). There was not wealth in land (non opimae / Sardiniae segetes feracis, 3–4) or cattle (5-6): just simple food (15–16), enjoyment of what is at hand (17), health (17–19), and music (20).

me pascunt olivae
   me cichorea levesque malvae.
frui paratis et valide mihi,
Latoe, dones et precor integra
   cum mente nec turpem senectam
degere nec cithara carentem.

In a similar vein Cicero had quoted a Stoic precept (Fam. 7.16.3) to Trebatius: "Id utrum Romano more locutus sit (Balbus), bene nummatum te futurum, aut quo modo Stoici dicunt, omnes esse divites qui caelo et terra frui possint, postea videbo." That is the happy state of mind, whether one naturally enjoys it (10) or has arrived at it through studying moral philosophy (11).

The reference to moral philosophy (and therefore Iccius' need for it) introduces another theme, the source of which may be presumed to be a letter from him. We may infer that Iccius has not referred to his nobilis libros Panaeti during his venture in Sicilian husbandry, but is now wrestling with natural philosophy like a certain other farmer-philosopher, Democritus (12–20).

Horace's reaction to Iccius' scientific pursuits is intriguing. He first shows by the Democritus' example that farming and philosophical speculation are incompatible. The comparison of his mental flights with the cogitations of Iccius is deliberate magnificatio. Horace is sceptical about the outcome. The hyperbole in scabiem tantam and contagia lucri is also meant to remind Iccius that he is pretty comfortable after all. The last five lines in this section (16–20) recreate the exalted mood of
such a flight, which is then ironically brought to earth in a polemical tone. The reference to Empedocles, the mad poet-philosopher who leaped into the crater of Mt. Etna returns us to Sicily and the frustrations of Iccius.138

The tone of Horace’s allusions to Iccius’ physical speculations may be further recovered through some remarks in the De Officiis (1.6.18). We are all drawn by the desire for knowledge, Cicero affirms; excellence in that pursuit is pulcrum and default is malum et turpe. He warns of two serious errors. One is rash judgement and overconfidence; the other is the wasting of time in unprofitable studies (19): “alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras at difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias.” This does not mean the practical application of such pursuits as astrologia, geometria, dialectica, or ius civile should be ignored, or that the desire for knowledge should be stifled; only that officia are the main goal in the good life: “virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit, a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reeditus. . . . Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beatique vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cogitationis versabitur.” Iccius seems to be ignoring opportunities ad bene beatique vivendum and spending his time on thorny but profitless speculation. The gentle criticism applied, Horace moves tactfully to his own advice.

The link with the first part of the epistle is contrived to surprise Iccius with ironic ingenuity, and disarm him for the real exhortation (21—24). All the while Horace has been anticipating his constant theme in the Epistles, friendship—here as a cure for Iccius’ anxieties. The “leeks and onions” echo the earlier reference to the “greens and nettles” (7—8), and further blunt the serious edge to the allusion to Empedocles (another believer in metempsychosis). The point of all these humorous allusions is that natural philosophy cannot dispel the curae lying behind his querellae—it may even aggravate them. Suppose Pythagoras and Empedocles were right, after all: eating vegetables would be manslaughter!

Horace has already given some advice to his friend: recte frui (2). After poking fun at his interest in natural philosophy and reminding him how well off he actually is, he makes a second suggestion: utere Pompeio Grospho. A balance is intended between the right relationship of a person to this world’s goods and that of one person to another: friendship. It has often been pointed out that v. 24 (“vilis amicorum est annona bonis ubi quid deest”) is reminiscent of a passage of Xenophon.139 That an amateur philosopher might recognize this echo is supported by Horace’s reference to Iccius’ Socratica domus (Ode 1.29.14). In Xenophon’s dialogue, Socrates urges Diodorus to cultivate devoted friends with more care than he looks after his servants: “But good managers maintain that the time to start
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buying is when one can buy something of much value for little. The times being as trying as they are, one can acquire good friends very reasonably.” The individual specified is Hermogenes; Diodorus goes off to visit him, with happy results: Hermogenes becomes a true friend in word and deed. We do not know what Grosphus’ needs are (he seems to have been wealthy), but an allusion to Xenophon might suggest legal or political matters. His requests will be verum and aequum, adds Horace: that is, they will come from a man who is verecundus and understands what friendship is all about. The return on his investment is assured. What he needs at this time (so far from home, too) is a friend whose concerns he can share.

Having reached his main point (21—24), Horace allows its brevity and Socratic reminiscence to make it. The conclusion (25—29) is formal and elevated in style, suggesting a triumphal arch portraying a barbarian on bended knee before Augustus. (The motif of Copia with her horn is also one typically found on reliefs.) The events referred to here were actually celebrated by the Senate in 19 B.C. with the decree of an arch. The return of peace and stability to Italy must have been the cause of immense relief and joy to the entire nation. Augustus himself had relieved the nation of the threat of calamity “at his own expense.” Then in the autumn of 22 B.C. Augustus went to Sicily, leaving M. Lollius as sole consul in Rome. Because of unrest there, Agrippa was recalled from the east to keep order and was married at that time to the emperor’s daughter. In 20 B.C. he went to Gaul and Spain where he brought eight years of rebellion to a bloody end. His work in Asia Minor was successfully concluded by Tiberius.

It is the reflection of a national mood of elation and relief with echoes of the praise for Augustus’ economic and military successes (in conjunction with those of his stepson and son-in-law) that end the epistle. The Epistles appeared at a time of public joy and optimism. In this one we are reminded of these events in a joyous but unobtrusive way—as a postscript in the middle of the book. Dramatically, this postscript is for Icicius’ benefit. After all, he shares an estate with the emperor’s vice-regent and son-in-law, who has just added more laurels to his name. Bumper harvests are now the prospect too: his fructus will be rich and his grounds for complaint few.

Epistle 1.12 develops a dramatic situation in which an individual is discontented in spite of great plenty and prosperity in his personal fortunes, and aggravating this mempsimoiria by withdrawing into vain speculation. What he needs is a friend close at hand, one whose ideals and virtus he can respect. Helping such a friend will take him out of himself and allow him to assess (and use) his good fortunes for the greatest possible return. Horace proceeds from general precepts about using what he has (1—11) and gentle ridicule of natural philosophy (12—20) to his basic (but simple) point, appealing in all likelihood to Icicius’ familiarity with Xenophon. The poem
concludes with a postscript of five lines. By diverting Iccius from the subject of Grosphus and his needs, Horace can make his appeal more subtle still, and allow the epistle to close on a note of patriotic pride centred partly on Agrippa, whose title to Iccius’ farm was the original source of discontent.

There is one further piece of evidence that bears upon this interpretation. In the *De Amicitia*, Laelius begins a eulogy of friendship (5.17—24) by identifying it as the chief concern of mankind: “nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas” (17). It can exist only among virtuous *( nisi in bonis: 18).* Second to *sapientia* friendship is the gods’ greatest gift (20). The most abundant *fructus* of prosperity is to be had from sharing joys with a friend. Misfortunes are more easily born with a friend to condole with them: “nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviorem” (22). What is more, if the bond of friendship were removed from the universe, human society, even agriculture, would be impossible: “quod si exemeris ex *rerum natura* benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit *ne agri quidem cultus* permanebit” (23). True friends will rejoice *aequitate iustitiaque*, says Cicero later (82), and will ask and receive the one from the other only what is *honestum et rectum*, the essence of *verecondia*. (Something like this may lie behind Horace’s remark: “nil Grosphus nisi verum orabit et aequum.”) Cicero continues:

> Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quae moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intelligunt et re probant.

The complementary forces of *amicitia* and *discordia* are condensed by Horace into a famous oxymoron: *rerum concordia discors.* His final injunction (22—23),

> utere Pompeio Grospho et si quid petet, ultro defer; nil Grosphus nisi verum orabit et aequum,

is reminiscent of Laelius’s own precept (44): “haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut *ab amicis honesta petamus*, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne quidem exepectemur dum rogemur.”

Xenophon and Cicero were certainly in Horace’s mind. Among the *nobles libri Panaeti* Iccius planned to abandon in his *Socratica domus* for fame and fortune in 27 B.C. may have been a scroll of the *Laelius*.
Bailiff:

(1) There you are looking after my beloved farm, although it bores you to do it. Which of us weeds out his spiritual thorns better? (6) Devotion and concern keep me in Rome with my friend Lamia in his bereavement, although I long to be there where you are. You blame the farm unfairly for your unhappiness, for your mind is at fault. (14) You used to pray for escape from the drudgery of the city, but now you just want its sordid games and baths back again. (31) Let me explain this discord of ours. Once I relished the sophisticated life and my dalliance with the grasping Cinara; but older now, I prefer rest and moderation. (36) Frivolity itself is no shame—but not recognising when to cut it short is. (37) My love of farming amuses the neighbours. You long for city rations, but don't see how enviable your privileges seem to the stable boy. Compare how the ox with his plough and the horse with his harness envy each other. (44) My vote will be to let each of them ply his own trade.

Horace's vilicus, like the centurion Vinnius in the epistle preceding, is an obvious social inferior. But here for the first time is a recipient who also remains anonymous. (Not just because he is a slave, for Horace names his slave in Satire 2.7). Except for the probable exception of Epistle 1.5, only here does Horace reverse the setting and write from the city to someone in the country. The vilicus had shared some of his master's experiences and Horace for the most part reasons with him from an intimate and affectionate understanding of his character. The situation recalls Aristotle's view that friendship with a slave (qua human being) is possible, though he is otherwise a live tool. At any rate, that relationship allows Horace the perspective to explore the liberated animus in contrast with the servile.

Whether or not Horace's vilicus is drawn from life, he very much resembles Davus in Satire 2.7 who uses the Saturnalia to pillory Horace's failings. Davus describes himself there as "amicum" mancipium domino and frugi (2—3). Horace poked fun at his own inconsistency (28—29): "Romae rus optas; absentem rusticus urbem tollis ad astra levis," and proneness to licentious pleasures. He was accused of being a weakling, an idler, and a tippler (39), not to mention a hypocrite-moralist, over-sexed adulterer (46—82), and glutton (102—111)! (Davus admits to similar vices, but insists he is no more slavish than his master.) The satire concludes with a threat to send Davus to the farm to join the eight slaves there—an
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unlucky junior man (117–118): “ocius hinc te ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino!”

Such contrasts between the town and the country slave are a frequent theme in Roman comedy. In *Casina* (98ff.), Chalinus upbraids Olympio for being in town and absent from his duties: “Quid in urbe reptas, vilice haud magni preti?” In *Mostellaria*, Grumio, the *servus rusticus* come-to-town, returns Tranio’s abuse (15ff.), linking life in the city with debauchery:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tu urbanus vero scurra, deliciae popli} \\
\text{rus mihi obiectas? sane hoc credo, Tranio,} \\
\text{quod te in pistrinum scis actum tradier.} \\
\text{cis hercle paucas tempestates, Tranio,} \\
\text{augebis ruri numerum, genus ferratile.} \\
\text{nunc dum tibi lubet, licetque, pota, perde rem} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\* \* \* 

dies noctisque bibite, pergraecamini.

On the other hand, a fragment of Pomponius’ *Ergastulum* presents the other side of the picture:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{longe ab urbe villicari, quo erus rarenter venit} \\
\text{non villicari sed dominari est mea sententia.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

This is the sort of view Horace is promoting, although his bailiff clearly sees a great deal of his master at the Sabine farm.

It seems clear that the situation of the epistle would call to mind such harangues from comedy, and invite the reader to anticipate a familiar debate upon the subject. The *metu* antithesis is established at the very beginning and thereafter sustained. For Horace, the farm, with its woods and fields, is everything he needs or wants; for the *vilicus*, it is a bore in spite of its impressive size. His discontent is clearly implied by the *agon* Horace proposes (4–5) in order to see, in effect, which is the best way to true happiness. The metaphor of the *spinae* (i.e., *curae*) is familiar from *Epistle 2.2.212*, but here it is particularly apposite. The question of happiness is one of *animus*, of the mind and its emotions, and how it is best cared for: *cultura animi*.

In this passage, briefly evocative of Catullus, are hints as to the setting. Horace is in Rome, fulfilling the offices of a friend on the occasion of Lamia’s bereavement while with heart and soul he longs to burst out and rush to his beloved *rus*. Each individual is where he does not wish to be. The reasons of each seem diametrically opposed: one is the free choice of a liberated mind, the other the granted wish of a servile one (10–13). Davus
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(Satire 2.7.102–103) had ridiculed his master's *ingens virtus atque animus* (given the lie by his own *obsequium ventris*), but here the tables are turned. The position of Epistle 1.14 allows us to recall the end of Epistle 1.11 and the relation defined there between discontent with one’s place of abode and with one’s state of *animus* (25ff.):

> nam si ratio et prudentia curas
> non locus effusi late maris arbiter aufert,
> caelum *non animum* mutant qui trans mare currunt.

In short, one’s *animus* requires *cultura* (the business of *ratio* and *prudentia*) to dispel its cares or “root out its thorns.” But this *aequus animus* is independent of where you are. It must come from within: *se non effugit umquam* (14.13).

So far Horace has not pressed any claim to moral superiority. The balance in v. 10 and the expression *stultus uterque* (12) seem tactfully to admit his own flaws; but the differences already apparent in the two situations undercut his admission and anticipate the statement to follow. In v. 10, Horace had set the positions of the steward and himself on an equal footing, with a minor difference of opinion, and that relationship appears to extend through vv. 11–13. Horace’s *negotia* in the city are *invisa* to him, but the issue at stake is really that of resentment: *sua odio sors* (11).

Envy and discontent are products of the *iniquus animus*.

When Horace goes on to detail the reactions of the steward and himself, he begins with what appears to be a straight *tu:ego* antithesis like that of v. 10. The *vilicus* has changed his view of things since coming to the farm. Horace too once prayed for the chance to live in the country (Satire 2.6.1) but remained true to his desires: his resentment is directed consistently against whoever or whatever forces him to leave there. The greater part of this passage is devoted to an analysis of the slave’s desires and dislikes, which emerge as sensual and lazy (29) in their motivation—in short, slavish (31–42).

Horace has been maintaining a gentle tone with the steward: he refers to their views as potentially “harmonious,” even if they now disagree. But the real point of discord is inconsistency. This point becomes meaningful with the verb *scis* (33). The slave has been with Horace for many years, and must have been his “Leporello” in youthful amours. (The poet had not always been the advocate of simple pleasures and abstemious habits.) Yet the recollection of Cinara has less of the wistfulness of Epistle 1.7 than it has of a Sophoclean serenity. What once was seemly (*decuere*) is no longer so, for either servant or master. Where the *vilicus* is now (*istic*, 37) he may find peace and freedom. The images of the city evoke enduring physical pain: the rasp on the skin (*limat*) and the serpent’s fang in the flesh.
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(morsuque venenat, 38). Even a simple-minded slave can understand that. At the farm, Horace's vicini laugh good-naturedly at his attempts to play the yeoman farmer, the same neighbours whose unsophisticated company and tales he enjoys. There is no malignancy there.

By now Horace has made his case: the vilicus is inconsistent and wrong in his wish to return to the city, nor (like his master) is he as young as he once was. In vv. 40–42 the language evokes the hard realities of the slave's life in the city: *cum servis urbana diaria rodere mavis.* Antithesis shifts now from *vilicus:dominus* to *vilicus:calo.* A shrewd stable boy in town is most envious of the steward's amenities at the farm, such as blazing fire, fresh meat, and fresh vegetables (41–42), being bright enough to want escape from the dreariness of the town. Horace is not implying that the calo has a superior set of values: he merely sees city life for a slave from the same perspective as the vilicus once did: *tu mediastinus tacita prece rura petebas* (14). Life in town is not just one of fornices and unctae popinae (21); it demands hard work and discipline, and offers few privileges. Since his prayers were answered before, what if the same thing were to happen again? The possibility is coupled with the threat that his place could be quickly filled, leaving him no means of return.

The application of the concluding proverb is subtle. The vilicus is certainly the *bos piger,* the calo is the envious *caballus.* The horse sees the easy-going life of the country ox with its ready supply of fodder as the obvious escape from constant labour and coarse rations in the city stable. The ox has eyes only for the horse's elegant blanket and harness with no conception of life in the city. Horace sees very clearly that both slaves are wrong in their picture of the other's life and amenities. Both would be unhappy trading worlds and would soon want their old lives back. Allowing them to have what they want would be unkind as well as futile. The proverb appears in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1431) and in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (1.18.41). In the *Wasps,* Philocheon is warning against involvement in litigation if that is not one's forte (1427–1432):

> ἀνήρ Συβαρίτης ἐξέπεσεν ἐξ ἀρματος,
> καὶ ποις κατεάγη τῆς κεφαλῆς μέγα σφόδρα.
> ἐτύγχανεν γὰρ οὗ τρίβων ὃν ἵππικης.
> καὶ πειτὶ ἐπιστάει ἐπὶ ἀνήρ αὐτῷ φίλος.
> ἑρδόν τις ἣν ἐκαστος ἐδείχῃ τέχνην.’
> οὗτῳ δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεξ’ ἐς τὰ Πιττάλον.

The context of the epistle, with its reference to the calo and *ephippia* make this allusion most apposite. It suggests that the fate of the vilicus could be as violent as that of Aristophanes' Sybarite if he perseveres in his prayers and gets what he wants. Whether or not we might expect the vilicus to catch such an allusion, the proverb itself could be familiar. A fine dramatic
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irony may be intended, and although Horace alters the Greek pronoun (tis) to uterque (Cicero renders quisque), the emphasis is clearly upon the vilicus alone. How far has the calo argutus in Rome been successful in persuading his master to let him swap places with the vilicus?

In Horace's version of this proverb there is an ethical force to libens. It is not enough to have the "cobbler stick to his last": he must accept the fact of his situation with equanimity. This is what Horace means in referring to the thorns that must be uprooted from the mind (4—5). To be doing what you desire is not the key to happiness, but to enjoy what you are doing—or must do. Horace claims to have adjusted himself to the limitations imposed by advancing years and the changing standards of decorum they bring, and to have accepted youth's frivolities for what they were worth without clinging to them irrationally and absurdly.

His addition is also significant. Censebo alters the neutral tone of the proverb by inviting the cooperation of the "disciple." If the two malcontents cannot resolve their problems of laziness and envy equably, then it must be done for them. We are reminded of something obscured by the epistle's assumed egalitarian tone: the friend addressed is a slave and in the end must do what he is told. The master, who is free, must himself make the right choice of ethical standards. The slave cannot count upon the granting of his wishes; so he must not hope for happiness anywhere else, but simply do libens what he must.

The epistle's dramatic occasion is the request of his old retainer and confidant in youthful sprees (whose dreams of a transfer to the farm Horace had been glad to fulfill as they agreed so closely with his own) to be reassigned to the house in Rome. Horace identifies two motivations for the request: one is the hard work the farm demands (26b—30), the other is his longing for the sensual amenities the city offers (21—26a). He uses his own case as an object lesson. Horace is temporarily in Rome but longs to escape. He is there only for reasons of friendship (6—9), and when he has fulfilled his officia to Lamia he will rush back. For the time being he accepts equably the demands of pietas and amicitia.

Horace is saying to the bailiff that he ought to (as he shall) remain in the country. One reason is the difference between the servile amicus and one who is truly ingenuus.

EPISTLE 1.15: To Vala
(Quae sit hiems Veliae, quod caelum, Vala, Salerni)

Vala:
(1) I must know about the weather, roads, and people at Velia and Salernum. Antonius Musa has convinced me to stay away from Baiae (which really annoys them—and my horse—but it's not my fault), and I
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want the change. (14) And what about the water there, and the food and wine, and the seafood? (I'm not a fussy eater at my farm, but at the seaside I want to live in style and fatten myself up.) (25) Please tell me everything. I trust your taste.

(26) Compare Maenius. He went through both his inheritances, and then became a parasite famous for caustic wit and appetite. (37b) Yet he could manage on simple fare (lots) if necessary, and then preach frugality with the passion of a Bestius—then revert to hedonism again.

(42) I'm all for moderation when pickings are slim. (44) But when something tastier comes my way I'm the first to praise the wisdom in the conspicuous consumption of those whose assets are invested in glistening villas.

Following Epistle 1.14, with its gentle message about true friendship and the joys of simple life in the country, the fifteenth strikes a reader with its humorous audacity. In previous epistles Horace developed the theme of his unshakeable devotion to rural simplicity proof against temptations of luxury. Allusions to his own fickleness in this regard were made humourously in Epistle 1.8, but as part of his strategy to deflate Albinovanus Celsus as gently as possible (12): "Romae Tibur amem, ventosus Tibure Romam." Similarly in Epistle 1.4, since fun is prescribed for the melancholy Albius, he ironically portrays himself as the very hedonist (15—16) to provide it:

me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum.

In Epistle 1.15 the fickle Horace is going to the seaside again for his health, fortified with an epicure's note book, and he wants his prosperous friend Vala to supplement it. Excitement at the prospect is conveyed in convoluted chatter (1—25).

This rapid change of tone from Epistle 1.14 would not have surprised the vilicus if he knew Horace as intimately as the Davus of Satire 2.7. The list of requests for information shows great excitement about gourmet delights in store at new spas. Vala, the expert, cannot be identified. He is portrayed as a contemporary of the poet rather than his junior; the epistle offers him no overt advice, serious or otherwise. The humour is provided by assumed hypochondria (with a reference to the society-docot Antonius Musa), by a concern over how his desertion of Baiae and his old haunts and spas will affect the local populations, and how he will get his horse past a familiar turn in the road, and finally by his chatter about wine and food and the prospects of success with a local wench. One thinks of the
sort of letter Cicero often wrote to Atticus, in which he babbled on about his own petty foibles, and also of Horace's own Satires with their mocking of infatuated epicures. His new hope for rejuvenation reminds us ironically of his disappointment by a girl at Trivicium and of his pathetic valeat to Cinara. A surprising deprecation of his local Sabine wine as "better than nothing" comes in the wake of a number of poetic invitations to share a jar, and the sudden interest in rich foods hardly chimes with his modest diet on the farm, where "olive, chicory and mallow" satisfy him, or with the food he commends to Icctius.

In spite of his ironically high hopes for good dining at either Velia or Salernum, Horace's prescribed change of scene is really a very modest one. After all, he is by-passing luxury spots such as Baiae in favour of a comparatively deserted and less fashionable district. Strabo tells us that in his day there was an unbroken succession of houses and villas along the shore from Misenum to Surrentum. Velia, on the other hand, had a reputation as a quiet retreat, probably characteristic of the Greek atmosphere of the coast of Lucania. It is clear from the final two lines that Vala is one of the few wealthy ones (like Trebatius) who owned expensive villas in the area, probably near Paestum which lies midway between Salernum and Velia. We are invited to see in Horace's horse an amused reflection of his own reaction to the change from Baiae to Lucania and from the myrtle-clad sulphur springs to icy plunges. He must search out what advantages he can!

These inconsistencies are meant to be noted, just as Horace does not allow it to go unnoticed (17–18) when he praises the virtues of the rich vintages he looks forward to enjoying. This apparent self-contradiction then reminds him of a character from Lucilius, named Maenius, whom he had earlier used as a model of inconsistency: he condemned others but forgave the same vices in himself. In this epistle the exemplum of Maenius again illustrates inconsistency (26–41). The tone of this passage is satirical, in both its Lucilian names (Maenius and Bestius) and hyperbole. The extremes to which Maenius' change of fortunes takes him are enormous, from his assault on the market when rich to his moralist stance when poor. This is funnier still when we see why Horace tells the tale: to compare Maenius to himself and his slightly guilty account of his own "excesses" (42–46).

The humour of this epistle (its main purpose in the collection is to provide comic relief) is ironic: the discrepancy between Horace's previous attitude towards luxury and wealth, and his attempts to reconcile it in his own mind and in Vala's. We are invited to suppose a friendship in which Horace has previously chided Vala for his expensive tastes in building and eating. Horace had already made fun of himself for this when he put such a charge into the mouth of Damasippus. And he has spoken earnestly to
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Fuscus on the subject (Epistle 1.10). It is clearly a charge that could be made in fun. (Imagine Vala's reaction to this letter!) The humour is enhanced by echoes of earlier epistles in Book I. The reference to winter at the seaside (which recalls Epistle 1.7) further undercuts any pathetic element there. The invitation to friend Vala to join him in some inexpensive local wine, the use of the Phaeacians as models of vanity and sloth to be avoided, and the attention to detail in his bill of fare expose him to his own past criticism and standards. But in comparison with Maenius, Horace's foibles of inconsistency are minor. Similarly he could say that in the light of the behaviour of Tigellius his faults were immo alia et fortasse minora. His forthcoming visit to the Lucanian coast is not his choice at all, but "doctor's orders": a kind of windfall (ubi quid melius contingit et unctius, 44) in itself. He is capable of living content on little (and usually does), in contrast to Vala and his peers with their sumptuous villas.

Horace has placed this humorous piece between two rather serious ones (1.14, 1.16). It dispels suspicions that the writer is capable of taking himself or his work too seriously or that his views about the truly happy life are fanatical, particularly his praise of the simple life on the farm. The poem is of a kind with Epistles 1.8 and 1.13 in its self-persiflage. It reminds us of the hints given in Epistles 1.1 and 1.20 that give laughter to friends is a vital component of life and of art.

**EPISTLE 1.16: To Quinctius**

(Ne perconteris, fundus meus, optime Quincti)

Noble Quinctius:

(1) In case you want to know all about my farm and the wealth of its crops, here's a full account. (5) It lies in a mild shady valley that breaks a chain of hills. (8b) It produces cornel berries and plums, and its oak trees give mast and shade. (12) There's a spring with cool pure water that helps keep me healthy there, especially in September. It's truly lovely. (15) Your own well-being depends on your living up to your reputation for being a truly happy man. But I wonder whether you have not been hiding an untreated fever or sores too long out of some kind of shame.

(25) When Augustus is praised, his epithets suit him. What of "wise" and "perfect," as applied to you? If such terms do delight you, don't forget that they can be taken back again—to your chagrin. False honour and slanderous lies affect only the morally sick. (40b) How does one tell the good man then? Is he law-abiding? A judge? Respected at the bank and in court? But the skin of respectability conceals something foul within. (46) The good man does not avoid wrong-doing because of fear.
of pain (like the slave or beast), but because he loves virtue. But if you had the chance you'd do anything for gain. A crime is no less serious just because its gain is small. (57) The good man will not pray that his fraud go undetected. (63) Greed is a form of slavery, for it entails fear. The man who lives with such fear cannot be free, for he would desert the ranks of Virtue to add to his wealth. Taken in plight he should be a useful slave, for he already has the skills and attitude to make his master rich.

(73) The good and wise man would stand up to the threats of a Pentheus to take away his goods or even to chain him under a cruel jailer, replying that God would release him whenever he himself willed it. In other words, death marks the end of life's race.

We are now brought back for the last time to the Sabine farm. The previous poem (Epistle 1.15) has provided a complete change of mood, reminding us that Horace's love for the country is far from fanatical. Here again, as in the one to his steward (1.14), another's thoughts about that farm set him to writing.

The structure of this epistle has often been criticised. Morris regarded it as a sermo with epistolary machinery added, and generally not well constructed.195 The transition between vv. 1—16 and 17-end has bothered critics too. Courbaud, however, calls it "La pièce maîtresse du recueil."196 There is little humour in it, the tone being one of gravitas. This is quickly established by the epithet optime (1) used of Quinctius,197 for instance, and the discussion of Stoic virtus which culminates with the mythical exemplum of heroic death.

The opening of the epistle dramatically presupposes an earlier communication with Quinctius about farms, and meus (1) is emphatic: my farm.198 One subject of that discussion is implied by the following indirect question (2—3); that is, the wealth crops bring. Opulentare is a rare and somewhat pompous word.199 There is clearly a distinction between the returns from cultivated fields (i.e., grain) and the rest of the produce mentioned: olives, fruit, pasturage, and vines. That distinction is clarified in Cato's book, which places grain production only sixth in importance since in his day it was no longer profitable.200 At the top of Cato's list came vineyards, gardens, osier beds, olive groves, and meadows (pratum). Then after grain fields he mentions wood lots, orchards, and mast groves (glandaria silica). When Horace resumes his own inventory (8—10), he lists his crop of cornel berries and plums, and his stands of oak and holm-oak for feed and shade.201

Horace's crops, as listed here (he mentions a watered garden in Satire 2.6.2 and he could serve Sabine wine), are well down on Cato's inventory. His property looked at the foot of a mountain to the south, however, was
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well-watered, and near a town. It was the place geared not for a large
operation such as Cato's, but for quiet comfort, subsistence, natural beauty
and the owner's well-being. The comparison with Tarentum could have a
special point for Quinctius.202

The tone of Horace's remarks to Quinctius about his farm is further
suggested by *amoena* (15). This quality of visual pleasure attracted wealthy
Romans to the sites of their villas.203 Servius defines: "amoena sunt loca
voluptatis plena . . . unde nulli fructus excoluntur."204 Even Horace
is careful to qualify his use of the word to describe his farm (*si credis*). With
such a weighted description, Horace makes it clear that his farm's profits
are of little concern to him. Such a notion may be strange to his friend.

Beginning the paragraph with v. 15 (*hae latebrae . . .*) rather than v. 17
(*tu recte vivis . . .*) makes the transition from the subject of Horace's envi-
ronment and state of health to that of Quinctius' attitude more natural.205
Horace's style of living produces health and piece of mind free from ex-
tremes. Quinctius, Horace fears, is more concerned with seeming to be
what people say of him, rather than following his own standards and his
perceptions of an independent nature.206 The antithesis extends to *Roma:
rus*, in familiar terms of unhealthy Septembers in town207 and the
morally corrupting sirens of the *populus*. "Tu recte vivis" (17) is ambiva-
lent. Horace has in effect been saying, "Ego in fundo meo recte natura mea
vivo." *Recte* (he might have said *decore* or *decenter*) describes the good life
well lived. But *esse* is the significant term. Quinctius has limited his efforts
to keeping up appearances (*videri*);208 such an attitude could prove danger-
ous to physical health. To be *beatus* really means something deeper: to be
*vir bonus et sapiens*. The theme of bodily health gives way to moral health
(25—40). Horace has described himself as *incolumis* (16) for reasons that
might surprise Quinctius: his life on an unpretentious farm and seclusion
from the excitement of the city. Just as Quinctius might have false criteria
for his own physical health, the same is true of his moral well-being:
external approval guides him when it comes to prestige, or right and
wrong. Accepting public approval when it is unearned acknowledges the
public's right to take back what was bestowed; whereas only the guilty man
worries about slander and false accusation. The point of this discussion of
*falsus honor* and *mendax infamia* is heightened in v. 35 ("pone, meum est!"
*inquit*: *pone tristisque recedo*) by an allusion to a passage of Lucretius
(3.978—1023). There the Epicurean argues that the anguish of pain and
frustration depicted in tales about Hades represents what is actually here on
earth. Tityos (992—999) is a man rent by *angor*, *cuppedo*, and *curaes.*
Sisyphus is pictured with his stone (995—1002):

Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est
*qui petere a populo fascis saevasque securis*
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imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit.
nam petere imperium quod inanest nec datur umquam,
atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem,
hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte
saxum quod tamen e summo iam vertice rursum
volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 209

Horace had already used the image of the lictor’s rods himself. They are
the gift of the fickle mob (Ode 3.2.17–20):

Virtus repulsae nescia sordidae
intaminatis fulget honoribus,
nec sumit aut ponit securis
arbitrio popularis aurae.

Virtus is free, secure, and immune to such humiliation. 210

The flaws in the man who is not bonus et prudens are easily recognized.
So Horace reverts suddenly to the positive (“Who is the good man?”) and
offers an adversary reply (41–45). The common criteria refer to civic
responsibility; otherwise they are inadequate. What of honesty as a test?
(46–55). We seem in this scene to be back on a Sabine farm where a mime
is in progress. A slave is laying claim to special consideration for doing no
more than is minimally expected of him and only because he fears
punishment; a slavish state of mind. Horace approaches as close to humour
here as anywhere in this epistle. (It concludes, after all, with a scene from
high tragedy.) We might identify the Sabellus with Horace (a nice touch),
or simply with one of his neighbours, like the Ofellus of Satire 2.2 who was
himself a sapiens of sorts and judge of human nature. 211 The slave’s be-
haviour is determined by an external force (fear); likewise the man of civic
standing behaved as he did in public to maintain his reputation and pres-
tige. He has nobilitas without honestas. 212 The slave’s theft of one bean is
criminal because he would take the lot, given the chance. Transgressions
are to be measured not by results but by the nature of the vice in question;
so the number of people inconvenienced is secondary in importance. (This
is an extreme Stoic view 213 but not as paradoxical in theory as it might
seem, since a slave is involved.) Conversely, those who are truly boni avoid
wrong because they care passionately for virtue.

Horace is still in search of a positive definition of the vir bonus for his
friend. The vir magna auctoritate (57–62) also has a secret longing to
steal, but is afraid of losing his false reputation. (He is as guilty as if his
fondest wishes had been granted and is just as much a moral slave.) The
greed found beneath the seemly exterior of civic virtue makes a man a
miser (avarus). Horace sometimes uses the children at play to expose the
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vices of their elders. Here it is the spectacle of the miser falling for their trick, and covered with mud for his pains. The symptoms of the avarus are the hope of gain and the fear of loss, passions which have caused him to desert his post (virtus) and throw down his weapons. Virtus and avaritia are incompatible.

The military metaphor of surrender prompts a quick episode where the captor is advised to sell his prisoner, not put him to death: he is servile by nature, and therefore useful. The feelings underlying these images of servility can be further sensed in the fifth “Roman Ode.” That vision of the survivors of Crassus’ army tamely serving Parthian masters contrasts with advice of Regulus (29–30):

\[
\text{nec vera virtus, cum semel excidit,}
\]
\[
\text{curat reponi deterioribus.} \tag{215}
\]

The epistle’s conclusion is a scene from tragedy modelled closely on Euripides’ Bacchae (492–498). Its connection with the preceding parts of the epistle now needs to be reexamined. The moral issue introduced at v. 17 has been the nature of the vir bonus, and from the beginning it has gained in force and clarity. The first call for definition (40), vir bonus est quis? is repeated at v. 57. But the candidates shown unworthy are all slaves to the passions. A real definition is given in the parable of Dionysus and Pentheus (73–79).

Horace is now careful to qualify bonus with sapiens (73). The truly good man will be trained in philosophy ad bene beateque vivendum. The scene from the Bacchae is freely allegorized (Horace probably borrowed this too from Stoic writers) in the same way he had adapted his portrait of the Phaeacians in Epistle 1.2. We need not fully identify the prisoner with the god himself; this is a man subject to real danger. A vir bonus et sapiens will have fortitudo (audebit, 73) to confront a tyrant, like the one in the third “Roman Ode” (3.3.3–4):

\[
\text{Iustum et tenacem propositi virum}
\]
\[
\text{non civium ardur prava iubentium}
\]
\[
\text{non vultus instantis tyranni}
\]
\[
\text{mente quatit solida . . . .} \tag{218}
\]

The opening speech is dignified and grave, with its formal address and hendiadys and conviction of personal blamelessness: indignum (75). The tyrant in turn is self-assured and arrogant adimam bona (75), confident this penalty will destroy his captive. (In this context, irony must be felt in bona too.) The exchange is clarified by the first Stoic Paradox: quod honestum sit id solum bonum est. Cicero’s discussion contains a number of
themes which Horace works into this epistle, the most striking and illuminating of which is this: "neque ego umquam bona perdidisse dicam si qui pecus ant supellectilem amiserit." The vir bonus calmly gives up pecus and lecti (75—76) along with his res and argentum. 220

Since loss of possessions will not alarm the captive, Pentheus next threatens prison and torture (76—77). The final retort of the vir bonus et sapiens is more pointed than might appear. Horace intensifies the Greek (hotan thelo) with a stronger conjunction, simulatque volam ("as soon as I will"). For Cicero libertas was the potestas vivendi ut velis:

Quis igitur vivit ut vult nisi qui recta sequitur, qui gaudet officio, cui vivendi via considerata atque provisa est, qui ne legibus quidem propter metum paret sed eas sequitur atque colit quia id salutare maxime esse indicat, qui nihil dicit nihil facit nihil cogitat denique nisi libenter ac libere, cuius omnia consilia resque omnes quas gerit ab ipso proficiscuntur eodemque referuntur, nec est ulla res quae plus apud eum polleat quam ipsius voluntas atque iudicium? cui quidem etiam quae vim habere maximam dicitur fortuna ipsa cedit, si, ut sapiens poeta dicit, suis ea cuique fingitur moribus. Soli igitur hoc contingit sapienti ut nihil faciat invitus, nihil dolens, nihil coactus. 221

The truly free man has a will free of all servitude to the passions and the body.

It is interesting that Horace does not allow the epistle to conclude with this exemplum, but points his tale (78—79): "opinor hoc sentit 'moriar: mors ultima linea rerum est.'" 222 He explains it without dogmatic claims for its absolute truth: "I think by this he means, 'I shall die. Death is the finish line in the race of life.'" 2 Horace does not mean that suicide is the answer to a threat to one's personal liberty, but rather that approaching death is not something to destroy the sage's tranquillity. The saevus custos implies death by torture, something which does not frighten the vir bonus et sapiens any more than it did Regulus ("atqui sciebat quae sibi barbarus tortor pararet"). 223 Moriar does not mean "I will kill myself," for he is facing death, not a life of bondage and disgrace. He accepts it in the true Stoic fashion, with obedience to God, in whose will his own is merged. 224 The linea rerum (79) is the telos of life, something to be welcomed because it is "natural." 225 Nothing stands in the way of the sage's vision of this truth.

The coherence of this epistle is clear. A final assessment ought to consider the question of unity within its form. This brings us back to Horace's friend, Quinctius. At the beginning of the epistle Horace anticipated Quinctius' interest in his farm—from the point of view, on the evidence of
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Cato, of its profits. He gives a loving description of his property, its modest crops, its natural beauty, its serenity and seclusion, and its gift of health. The rhapsody is clearly aimed at Quinctius, but expresses a way of life and attitude to wealth he does not share. Mine is a proper life for me, says Horace in effect; you too are living properly if you consciously try to be what people say of you (17). Quinctius is beatus, but tends to adopt standards foreign to his own natura (19), and assumes that someone not bonus et sapiens can be beatus (20). Cicero makes this idea clear (Parad. 2.16): “In quo virtus sit ei nihil deesse ad vivendum.” The danger to health from such self-deception is clear (21—24). And no one should imagine he merits renown meant for a greater (25—29), or a reputation for moral goodness (30—33), for these are ephemeral gifts which can be taken back as easily as they were given. The same is true of accusations of vice (36—38). Anyone who is vulnerable to praise needs correction, being mendosus (40) right where he fancied himself emendatus (30). Unlike politicians and slaves, good men loathe sin because they love virtue (52) and have found true beatitudo. It is what is in the soul that counts. External evidence is false—witness the hypocrite praying in the temple to disguise his greed (53—62). There is no difference between him and the slave; both wish to sin undetected and are slaves of desire and fear (63—68). The captive is already a slave to his fears and will turn a profit with a little coaching (69—72). Imagine the vir bonus et sapiens in such circumstances as, for instance, the prisoner of Pentheus. He knows his freedom from guilt (indignum, 75) and is indifferent to the fate of his worldly goods. His will cannot but be free even in prison and under torture. God has ordained death and the liberation of the soul as the final goal of this life (73-end).

The Epistle to Quinctius incorporates material to be found in the Stoic Paradoxes of Cicero, in particular the theme that virtue gives true happiness and freedom of spirit. The writer takes advantage of some remark of his friend (concerning the profits necessary to farming) to express an idealistic view of his own farm and the happiness it gives him. That leads to a discussion of Quinctius’ own well-being, which is essentially materialistic and therefore illusory.

The tone is unusually serious, all the more so since the poem follows the light-hearted and frivolous Epistle 1.15. We are meant to see Horace’s serious concern for a friend who has need of genuine cultura animi. Such aid must be given gently and tactfully, but also firmly and seriously. He wishes to be able to say (like Hamlet) of Quinctius:

Give me that man
That is not passion’s slave, and I will wear him
In my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart,
As I do thee.226
Epilogues

EPISTLE 1.20

THIS last epistle puts Horace's final seal upon the collection. It is an extra piece, or coda, that does not fit within the structure of the whole book; but as autobiography it complements Epistles 1, 7, 13, 14, and 19, leaving the reader with a final portrait of the poet in his mellow middle age, an epilogue to a full career. 1

EPISTLE 1.20: To his Book

(Vortumnun Ianumque, liber, spectare videris)

Book:

(1) I know how you long for Bookseller's Row, all smart and trim from your pumice, hating prudish locks and groaning for a public exposure you weren't reared for. Go on, then. (6) But there's no turning back! You'll be sorry when someone defiles you. Unless my augury is biased by your sin, you'll be the darling of Rome only until you show your years. (11) Then you'll be mauled and dirted and wormed, or run away to the provinces. I'll say I told you so—and laugh! (17) Old age will find you teaching boys their ABC's far away. (19) Still, when the warm sunshine brings people out to listen, say (20) that my father was a freedman but my ambitions were high, (23) that the great men of Rome liked me in peace and war, (24) that I was short, grey, fond of the sun,
quick tempered but easy to calm, and (26) that I was forty-four in the consulship of Lollius and Lepidus.

The poem’s relationship to the book is also evident in the choice of correspondent: a “friend” whose welfare is a matter of deep concern to the poet. The tone of address recalls Epistle 14, where Horace revealed that he had failed to overcome his bailiff’s servile instincts. Here the envoi is couched as a last appeal to his smart young liber (a pun on “book” and “freedman”) to stay with him where his virtue will be safe from vulgar hands. Following Epistle 19 where the fate of his Odes at the hands of the grammatici was ironically described (Horace did not care to have them used as school texts, much less give personal readings), Epistle 20 looks ahead to the fate awaiting all the Epistles. Just as Epistle 13 modified our response to 1 and to 19, the mellow confident close of 20 modifies the annoyance expressed at the outset of the poem.

Irony colours it from the beginning. An apparently solemn opening (Vortumnum lanumque) gives way to images of base and servile life in the city. Colourful allusions to forum booksellers follow with pumiced scrolls on view, and earthy double entendres (prostes, mundus, pudico, communia, languet amor, deserat actas). The dramatic apparatus here is left ambiguous. Unlike Vinnius (1.13) who was on his way, or the bailiff who wanted to go (1.14), the liber seems to be making up his mind—and does have power of choice. Accepting this choice as inevitable, Horace sends to his beloved young “client” this pained bon voyage. Emittere (“release”) supports the double entendre (6), which becomes more and more compelling as the fate of the sullied scroll is foretold by his reluctant augur (9). He will be shelved by bored admirers (7—8). He will lose his looks (10). He will become soiled with handling (11—12a) and silently feed bookworms (12), the worst fate that can befall a poet’s works! When Rome finally has no further use for him he will be sent off to the provinces to lead an ignominious old age as a primer, no longer eloquent but halting in speech, teaching grubby boys their ABC’s. The epistle concludes autobiographically, using the poetic device of the sphragis. What gives that device such charm here is the setting. The book is now an old litterator with his pupils gathered around him in restful mood in the warm sunshine, spinning yarns about his own youth in Rome and about his old patron (19). Horace wants the facts to be correct, though: his birth as a freedman’s son (a theme heard here for the first time since the Satires) and his father’s help in rising above it. The metaphor of the bird whose wings grew too large for the nest (21) is reminiscent of his ventures as soldier and poet. The topos of virtue and humble birth recalls the extended epilogue to Odes I—III. In Ode 3.29 he refers to the superiority of his virtus over Fortuna (53—56):
Horace's claim to acceptance by eminent men for what he was (23) picks up frequent earlier allusions to his life and to his illustrious friends Brutus, Messalla, Maecenas, Pollio, Agrippa, Tiberius, Vergil, and of course Augustus, and it offers a reprise to the confident conclusion of *Satire* 1.10. His physical appearance is sketched with gentle humour: short (also fat, as we know from Augustus' letter to him),16 grey, and fond of sun bathing (24). A susceptibility to losing his temper jars ironically with the recollection of the sermon to his young friend Lollius (1.2), but placability makes a virtue even of that! Cicero too had once written to his friend Atticus in a similar way:"

Nam si ita statueris, et inritabilis animos esse optimorum saepe hominem et eosdem placabilis et esse hanc agilitatem, ut ita dicam, mollitiamque naturae plerumque bonitatis et, id quod caput est, nobis inter nos nostra sive incommoda sive vitia sive inuiarias esse tolerandas, facile haec, quem ad modum spero mitigabuntur.

The epistle and book conclude with the poet's age, which was forty-four in the consulships of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus and Marcus Lollius (21 B.C.). That information complements *Epode* 13, 6, and *Ode* 3.21: Horace was born in 65 B.C., during the consulship of L. Manlius Torquatus and L. Aurelius Cotta. The reference is significant in another way as well. The consul Marcus Lollius is evidently the person addressed in *Ode* 4.9 (33), an ode which offers both autobiography and an eulogy of poetry as a source of immortality for great men. Lollius there was praised as *prudens* (34) and *rectus* (36), as the punisher of *fraus* (37), as one immune from greed for money (38), and as twice consul (39): a paradigm of *honestum* and the *utile* (40-41).18 Lollius was to have been the colleague of Augustus in 21 B.C. Mentioning him here as eponymous consul suggests a link between him and that younger Lollius of *Epistles* 1.2 and 1.18, the only individual, besides Maecenas, who is granted two dedications. Horace's admonitions to him amount to clear declarations of friendship.

Maecenas is not mentioned directly in the final epistle, nor is his gift of the farm. Horace's beloved patron and friend was so closely linked to his poetry that he is no longer necessary; three other epistles, including the nineteenth, had been addressed to him besides various *Satires*, *Epodes*, and *Odes*. This too is Maecenas' book, and is a final magnificent tribute to his dearest friend and patron.

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With Epistle 1.20 Horace closes that part of his poetic work which he had planned and produced in collected form. Its warm finality suggests that he has now accomplished what he undertook to do in Epistle 1.1 in abandoning lyrics (10–11).

quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum:
condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.

The fruits of that search for the good and the true have been garnered and arranged, and are now poured out for the benefit of his friends. The variety of philosophical viewpoints in the Epistles has been a hurdle for those scholars who have tried to pin him down as a convinced Epicurean, Stoic convert, or mild Eclectic. It was suggested in the Introduction that Horace’s blend of ethical points of view, from Epicurean voluptas to Stoic fortitudo, points to an attachment to the Academy and a familiarity with Cicero’s philosophical writings. The gentle tolerance which Cicero valued in those fellow members of the Academic school who sought to assist each other in reaching the least improbable positions on recta vivendi via would be congenial to Horace’s nature and training. The epistolary form of some of Cicero’s discourses may also have inspired the decision to devote his energies to the creation of this new poetic type as a vehicle.

Heinze minimized Ciceronian influence upon Horace’s Epistles, dismissing Th. Zielinski’s thesis, “Wie Livius als Stilkünstler, war Horaz als Philosoph ein Schüler Ciceros,” as incompatible with the facts that Cicero’s letters were not philosophical and that Cicero had not written his philosophica for the likes of Horace who would read exemplaria Graeca day and night. Horace’s own point of view was Epicurean, Heinze contends, something which could never be attributed to the influence of Cicero.

Nevertheless Cicero wrote his philosophical discourses (sermones) in Latin for Romans who knew the Greek originals, to naturalize philosophy in their own tongue and prove this could be done with proper attention to language and style. The epistolary preface to the Historia Naturalis addressed to the future Emperor Titus in A.D. 77 acknowledges his success. Pliny there refers to Cicero’s Respublica, Consolatio, and De Officiis as “books which should be learned by heart, not merely handled every day.” Horace’s debt, particularly to the De Officiis and De Amicitia, has been amply revealed in the preceding chapters.

It would not be idle to see in the Epistles a tribute to the humanitas of Cicero. Horace did not suppress his old sympathies for great causes and their leaders. Heinze’s view of Horace as a confirmed Epicurean does not receive confirmation in the Epistles any more than it does, for instance, in Ode 1.34 (Pareus deorum cultor et infrequens). In that puzzling ode Horace confesses that an earlier agnosticism was his springboard for a poetic leap
Horace, like Cicero, had close friends who were Epicureans and he had studied their doctrines well. Perhaps he was more sympathetic toward their ethical beliefs and practices than was Cicero, a man truly mersus civilibus undis. If Cicero did not give space to the doctrines of his Epicurean teachers Phaedrus and Zeno, and of some very dear friends, Horace did. It was inevitable, since the Epistles are addressed to individuals, that Epicurean specifics would sometimes be prescribed.

If the Epistles may be classified as “discourses” dealing by precept and example with the duties of friendship and drawing especially upon Cicero’s later works on ethical philosophy, we may proceed to consider briefly another question. To what extent does “self-revelation” constitute a major purpose of Horace in this work? Scholars have generally given high priority to such a “portrait of the soul” in defining Horace’s purposes in composing the Epistles. La Penna, who regards the Epistles as “unpoetic,” does see within them a “confidence” like that displayed in a sonnet sequence; and Presta calls Horace “the only autobiographical poet.” A personality does indeed emerge: the kind, devoted friend and poet who has finally given the slip to the stifling city with its frantic existence in order to satisfy the needs of his own inner nature and to communicate the result of his attempts to others. But which Horace is it? The Cicero of Ad Atticum reveals quite a different side from that of the Ad Familiares. Lucilius, Horace tells us, “entrusted his secrets to his books as to faithful friends... the entire life of the old man lay open as if written out on a votive tablet.” If that is true self-revelation, then Horace gives us much less. (But Lucilius left thirty books of sermones, and Horace four: Ars celat artem.) Nevertheless Horace does reveal a part of himself. He does so with designed ambiguity, for his intentions are different from those of his model. “One could hardly find a more elementary critical principle than the fact that the events of a literary fiction are not real but hypothetical events... not real propositions but verbal formulas which imitate real propositions.” Or to go back to an ancient critic, Demetrius: “a letter writer gives an image (eikon) of his soul.” The icon, the painting, suggests a work of art, and even as a self-portrait conveys as much of how the artist sees himself as of what he really is. Hirzel has claimed, “Der Brief ist in Prosa was das Lied in der Poesie.” Similarly in his discussion of dramatic poetry, Langbaum observed: “If the poet’s presence in the romantic lyrical poem makes it dramatic, his presence in the romantic narrative or dramatic poem makes it lyrical.” Although it is not a question here of “romantic dramatic poetry,” the Epistles are nevertheless dramatic and the poet is always present in them; and a self-portrait of sorts gradually develops through the collection. If we look for those passages most intensely lyrical in the Epistles we will find some of them where Horace discusses his Sabine farm, for this is where he seems to be most intimate and least reserved.
The Poetry of Friendship

His sermones do not maintain any one tone or level of poetry for long. Horace's identification of satura with Old Comedy is helpful: an art form entirely in verse, but permitting in its use of comic and tragic trimeter and a variety of complex lyric rhythms, a large register of poetic levels. When Turolla classifies the Epistles as "unpoetic," and Presta excludes Epistles 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 as not being poetic enough, we are made aware of the perils of such definitions.

Any attempt to define Horace's achievement in the Epistles, therefore, must take into account the elements of both ethics and poetry. It is here that McGann has made his real contribution. His final chapter, "The nature of the Epistles," begins with a resolution of the controversy over whether they are really letters, in which he points out the deficiencies in the views of Courbaud, Morris, Fraenkel, and Becker. His statement that they are "not real letters intended to have their purported effect in the real world, but poems cast in the form of letters," is on the right track. He insists that each epistle be read as a part of the whole, in conjunction with the others, so that their "reciprocal relationships" may be appreciated; and further, that the collection is, as an "aesthetic object," the result of careful reshaping of its parts by the artist. McGann also develops Heinze's idea of the relationship between the Epistles and elegy; the poet has combined Tibullus' love for the country with Propertius' fondness for the role of praeceptor amoris, while reassessing his own past treatment of the elegists' chief concern—ludicra. Like a book of elegies, the Epistles "must be viewed 'synchronically' as setting forth various facets of its main theme. . . . What Horace has created is a self-contained world of the imagination, in which ethical principles are paramount." The ethics of friendship have become poetry.

The poetry of Horace's relationship with his friends of various classes and ages (from Augustus to his bailiff) is whole-hearted, sometimes serious, sometimes humorous. But unlike the role of the praeceptor amoris of elegy, that of Horace's praeceptor amicitiae rarely approaches ludicra. True friendship is too closely dependent upon virtus for that, as Cicero insists:

Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt praecclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. (Am. 6.20)

It is now clearer what Horace had meant by that initial disclaimer: versus et cetera ludicra pono.

Perhaps the best assessment of the Epistles as poetry of friendship is still, after 2,000 years, that of Persius, who must have known and loved them well (1.116):
omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
tangit et admissus circum praecordia ludit.

A more detailed examination of “poetry” in the Epistles must wait.47 Perhaps an Horatian of an older school may be allowed for now to add the ultima manus:

If his views of life are more mature than in the Satires, his expression of them [in the Epistles] is more perfect. We feel the training of the seven years given to lyric composition. There is more ease and music in the verse—more touches of imagination in the language. He has reached the perfection of his own style and the most finished grace of which Latin writing is capable.48

The Epistles do justify Wickham’s tribute. They rest their claim to be κτῆμα εἰς ἄει upon their poetic tribute to the ideals and practice of friendship, and to Cicero and Maecenas, their teacher and paradigm.
ABBREVIATIONS

A & A  Antike und Abendland
AC    L'Antiquité Classique
ActClass Acta Classica
AJP   American Journal of Philology
ANRW  Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
Athen Athenaeum
BStdLat Bollettino di Studi Latini
CB    The Classical Bulletin
CJ    The Classical Journal
CNV/EMC Classical News & Views/Echos du Monde Classique
CP    Classical Philology
CQ    Classical Quarterly
CW    The Classical World
EM    Emerita
Er    Eratos
GIF   Giornale Italiano di Filologia
Gnom  Gnomon
G&R   Greece and Rome
Gym   Gymnasium
H     Hermes
HAR   Humanities Association Review
Hermath  Hermathena
Hist  Historia
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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Illinois Classical Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNG</td>
<td>Jahrbuch fur Numismatik und Geldgeschichte</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies</td>
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<td>Lat</td>
<td>Latomus</td>
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<td>LCM</td>
<td>Liverpool Classical Monthly</td>
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<td>LEC</td>
<td>Les Etudes Classiques</td>
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<td>MH</td>
<td>Museum Helveticum</td>
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<td>Mnem</td>
<td>Mnemosyne</td>
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<td>NJb</td>
<td>Neues Jahrbuch</td>
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<td>PCPS</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</td>
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<td>Phil</td>
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<td>PhilSupp</td>
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<td>PhUnt</td>
<td>Philologische Untersuchungen</td>
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<td>PHW</td>
<td>Philologische Wochenschrift</td>
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<td>RAAN</td>
<td>Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revues des Cours et Conférences</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rivista Classica</td>
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<td>RE</td>
<td>Pauly's Real - Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des Études Anciennes</td>
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<td>REL</td>
<td>Revue des Études Latines</td>
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<td>RhM</td>
<td>Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie</td>
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<td>RPh</td>
<td>Revue de Philologie</td>
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<td>SicGym</td>
<td>Siculorum Gymnasium</td>
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<td>SIFC</td>
<td>Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Symbolae Osloenses</td>
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<td>SPh</td>
<td>Studies in Philology</td>
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<td>TAPA</td>
<td>Transactions &amp; Proceedings of the American Philological Association</td>
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<td>UCPCP</td>
<td>University of California Publications in Classical Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Wiener Studien</td>
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<td>YCS</td>
<td>Yale Classical Studies</td>
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NOTES

N.B. a) Abbreviations of periodicals' titles generally appear as given in L'Année Philologique.
    b) The Latin text of Horace cited in this work is that of Fr. Klingner (5th ed., Leipzig, 1970). Changes to his text are minimal.

INTRODUCTION

2. E.g., Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and probably some of Cic. *Ad Familiares* (see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, ed., *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, Vol. I (Camb., 1965), pp. 59–60; H. Peter, *Der Brief in der Römischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 35–37; R. Y. Tyrrell, and L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero Arranged According to Its Chronological Order*, 7 vols. (Dublin, 1879 ff), pp. 65–71. There is no reason also why Horace could not have seen the sixteen scrolls of *ad Atticum* at the home of Pomponius Atticus himself, as Atticus had kept them and Nepos had read through them (Vit. Att. 16.2–4). (Atticus died in 32 B.C., after which the location of the letters is unknown.) Crantor the Academic was known for his letter to Hippocles (the *Peri Penthous*). Both Cicero and Horace must have been familiar with this work; Cicero used it as a model for his own *Consolatio*.


6. Juv. 12–16 might also be included. For the history and theory of epistolography in antiquity, see H. Peter, pp. 13–37. Cicero separated letters into "private" and "public" according to purpose and addressee. Private letters (*familiares*) were classified as follows: 1) *ut certiores faceremus absentes*, 2) *familiare et iocosum*, 3) *severum et grave* (*Flacc. 16.37*), and were characterized by use of *cognomina*, *plebeius sermo*, jokes, etc. Official despatches were marked by higher diction and style (*de Or. 2.12.49*). An account (peripatetic in origin) of the principles of epistolary style can be found in the treatise on style by Demetrius (*4.223–234*); see G. M. A. Grube, *Demetrius on Style* (Toronto, 1961); and D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom, eds., *Ancient Literary Criticism* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 171–215. The points made include the appropriateness of subject matter to the form (p. 230). Philosophy (other than maxims) was not admissible (p. 232). Style would normally be simple, but vary with addressee (p. 234). (The number of epistolary classifications later grew to 41!)

7. Ovid's *Heroides* are in elegiacs. *The Epistulae ex Ponto* are also elegiac epistles.

8. Lucil. 404W.


10. Theoc. 12, 28. Theoc. 11, 13, 21 are epistles in form only (see Haight, p. 530).


12. *Satt. 1.6.48, 1.7; Ode 2.7; Epist. 1.20.23.*


14. Nepos had read them (*Vit. Att. 16*).


16. Demetrius (*233=III p. 311 Sp.*). Also see Ps.-Acro: "Epistulis enim ad absentes loquimur, sermone cum praesentibus." R. Langbaum’s remark about the dramatic monologue, "one side of a dialogue, with the other side under-
NOTES


17. KHB, Briefe, pp. 368—369.
18. Fraenkel, p. 383; Epist. 2.1.4. (See Fr. Klingner, Q. Horati Flacci Opera, 5th ed. (Leipzig, 1970), p. 3 for the text of Suetonius.) The fullest discussion is by G. L. Hendrickson, “Are the letters of Horace Satires?” AJP XVIII (1897): 313—324. Suetonius also refers to passages of the Epistles as belonging to his Satirae. Hendrickson argues that Horace’s titles were “Sermones” and “Epistulae,” both belonging to the poetical form satira (p. 324). Porphyrio (on Epist. 1.1) remarks that the Epistles differ from the Sermones only in title. Epp. 2.1.4, 251 and 2.2.60 indicate that Horace felt free to designate them as such (see Hendrickson, p. 322). A full discussion of the terms used for Horace’s hexameter poetry can be found in C. A. Van Rooy, Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory (Leiden, 1966).

19. See n. 15 above.
20. KHB, Briefe, pp. 370—371.
21. See KHB, Briefe, pp. 390—391, for a summary of Turolla’s views (which appear in a number of separate publications).
25. Maurach, p. 121.
27. McGann, p. 96.
28. McGann, pp. 97—100; also KHB, Briefe, p. 380.
31. “The first thing the literary critic has to do is read literature, and make an inductive survey of his own field and let his critical principles shape themselves solely out of the knowledge of that field” (N. Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, 1957), p. 6).
33. See also KH, Briefe, pp. 374—380. For the principle of “autobiographical illustration,” see also Langbaum, p. 52.
34. E.g., Maecenas, Torquatus (Epist. 1.5, Ode 4.7), Fuscus (Ode 1.22, Epist. 1.10, Sat. 1.9.60—74), Iccius (Ode 1.29, Epist. 1.12), slave? (Sat. 2.7, Epist. 1.14), book? (Ode 3.27, Epist. 1.20; see Chapter IV, Note 12).
35. See also McGann, Studies, pp. 91—94.
36. Cf. Langbaum, pp. 57, 189, 201, 202, on the lyrical element in dramatic poetry.

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38. See Cic. Att. 11.12.2. Perhaps on a higher plane, J. S. Mill’s comment is relevant: “The artist is not heard but overheard” (cited by Frye, p. 5).

39. E.g., Book XIII of ad Familiares, which may be the collection referred to in Att. 16.5.5, is composed of recommendations. A catalogue of such parallels between Cicero and Horace will be found in Allen et al., “Horace’s first book,” pp. 125—133.

40. Cic. Orat. 3.12: “fatores me oratorem... non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatii estitisse. illa enim sunt curricula multiplicitum variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum sunt impressa vestigia.” Cf. Fin. 5.1—2.

41. Tusc. 2.3.9, 2.5.11—12.

42. Acad. 2.38.121. See also Reid’s note on Acad. 2.8 (nec... necessitate uilla cogimur) in J. S. Reid, M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica (London, 1885).

43. Reid, p. 11. The New Academy appears distinct as a school only in matters of dialectic (i.e. its criteria for truth: its logic).


45. Acad. 2.34.108.

46. Cf. Cic. Acad. 2.11.33.

47. R. Hirzel argued that Horace was an Academic (Der Dialog, Vol. II (Leipsig, 1897), pp. 15—18). He points out also that Octavius’ tutor, Arcios Didymus, was an Academic (p. 17). A. S. Wilkins, The Epistles of Horace (London, 1892), on 2.2.45 sees no special attachment to Academic doctrine. Wili, p. 31, sees Horace as an Academic till after Philippi. Campbell, p. 262, regards Horace’s drift to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics as a conscious “relapse.” The most recent supporter for Horace as an Academic is K. Cantar, “Horaz zwischen Akademie und Epikur,” Ziva Antika XX (1972): 5—24.

48. Haight, p. 533, sees this as “avowed swaying.” For Cicero’s use of addictus, see also Tusc. 2.2.5.

49. E.g., Epp. 1.1.108, 1.2.70—71, 1.6.67—68, 1.7.98, 1.16.78. For some other views of Horace’s philosophic allegiance see McGann, Studies, p. 9, n. 2.

50. Cic. Parad. Praef. Just as Cicero had used Theophrastus’ work on Friendship as a source for his de Amicitia, for the de Officiis he used the Peri tou Kathêkontos of the Stoic Panaetius, head of the school in 109 B.C. after a sojourn in Rome as a friend of Scipio Aemilianus. He was a “heretic” in some of his views, and an admirer of Plato and Aristotle. His chief contribution from our point of view was his adaptation of Stoic ethics to the active and positive practical virtues recognized by the Roman upper class: magnanimity, benevolence, and liberality (Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed. [OCD]). It is easy to see how Cicero, an Academic and very conservative Roman,
would have been attracted by such views, introduced to him perhaps by Diodotus, his own Stoic teacher. See also H. A. Holden's introduction to the de Officiis in M. Tulli Ciceronis De Officiis Libri Tres (Cambridge, 1899), pp. xxiii–xxvi.

51. Antiochus did accept Stoic dialectic, well away from the “sceptical” views of his predecessors such as Philo. For a thorough study of Antiochus’ fragments see G. Luck, Der Akademiker Antiochus (Bonn und Stuttgart, 1953).

52. See Reid, p. 19. C. Trebatius Testa and C. Cassius Longinus were two Epicurean friends of Cicero (both of whom Horace later knew). For prominent Epicureans of Cicero’s day, see A. Momigliano, Review of B. Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World, in JRS XXXI (1941): 149ff. N. W. de Witt, “Epicurean doctrine in Horace,” CP XXXIV (1939): 127–134, is convinced that Horace was an Epicurean. Wili, p. 31, sees a switch to Epicureanism after Philippi. Gantar’s article is an important comment on this whole question.

53. E.g. Maecenas, Vergil, Cassius, Philodemus(?), Trebatius. On the relationship between Philodemus with Horace and Vergil, see Wili, p. 31.

54. Div. 1.1.

55. Fam. 9.8.


57. Epist. 1.7.11.

58. For this metaphor cf. Cic. de Senec. 5.14. For the theme of rus in Horace generally see H. Martens, Vita Rustica bei Horaz, Dissertation, (Kiel, 1948); a discussion of the Epistles will be found on pp. 58–113.


65. Cic. N.D. 1.44.121.

66. Sen. V ita B. 20.3.5.


69. Sat. 2.1.71–74. See Fraisse, pp. 388–413.

70. Cic. Am. 6.20. For a full discussion of Cicero and sapientia, see M.
CHAPTER 1

1. The dates suggested for the appearance of Epp. I as a published collection hover between the years 21 and 19 B.C. (see McGann, p. 87). Epist. 1.1 contains no dateable references (except the retirement of Veianius). As an introduction to the book it ought to be the last composed. E. Courbaud, Horace. Sa Vie et sa Pensée à l’Epoque des Epitres (Paris, 1914) p. 346, thinks it is early material reworked.

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3. See McGann, Studies, pp. 10-12, for the significance and origins of the principle of decens (decorum, to prepon, to Kathékon), especially the debt to Panaetius. (Seneca, in referring to Vergil’s style (Epist. 86.15) says he wrote decentissime, but not verissime.)


6. This is an important point, and one which has produced some disagreement. Williams, TORP, p. 4, observes rightly that H. is not giving his explanation in prose, which is part of an “opening full of playful irony.” (Cf. W. S. Anderson, “Autobiography and art in Horace,” in Perspectives of Roman Poetry: A Classics Symposium, edited by G. K. Galinski (Austin, 1975), pp. 33-56.) Does versus et ludicra pono imply all poetry or just lyrics? E. Turolla, “Unità ideologica e tematica nel primo libro delle Epistle oraziane,” GIP IV (1951): 290-292, sees the book of Epistles as “antipoetico.” E. P. Morris, “The form of the Epistle in Horace,” YCS II (1931): p. 83, sees Horace as expressing better reasons for giving up lyrics. Heinze is not specific: “das Versemachen sei nichts mehr für ihn.” But Horace simply says he is giving up verses in general (which he now regards as a kind of ludica). The word versus itself is not a poetic word to Horace, occurring only once outside his hexameter works (Carm. Saec. 5), and even then concerning Sibylline oracles. Lyric is the least likely form to be designated by versus. His statement must be taken as a piece of obvious irony within the context of a generally ironic poem. We should also remember that Horace draws a clear distinction between his sermones and true poetry (Sat. 1.4.39-44). See also Macleod, “Poetry of ethics,” pp. 21-22, who also discusses the play on condo et compono.

7. Cf. Horace’s own characters, Catius (Sat. 2.4), Damasippus (Sat. 2.3). See Macleod, “Poetry of ethics,” pp. 16, 23, on the topos of conversion: “The ethics which Horace sketches in this programmatic epistle combines a strong desire to live better with a shrewd sense of his own and everyone’s fallibility.”


11. I see no compelling reason to obelize v. 56. As an echo of his description of his own school days (Sat. 1.6.74) it is a telling way of pointing out the ethical naïveté of the senes severiores at the exchange. But see W. Clausen, “Silva coniecturarum,” AJP LXXVI (1955): 47-49. L. Herrmann’s schema (Introduction, n. 89) requires the retention of the line on mathematical grounds.
13. It is important to remember that pauper/paupertas refers to the possession of modest means (possessio parvi (Sen. Epist. 87.40) not to "want" (egestas).
14. At this point H. reverts abruptly from the general tu of the diatribe to Maccenas (cf. Sat. 1.1.117).
15. Reading occurri with Klingner (Mss. ΞΨ Pph.). Two good MSS (a1 A) give occurrit, which would have to refer to the pauper (p. 91). E. Wickham, The Works of Horace, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1896) (supporting Cruquius), felt "the omission of the pronoun and any emphatic mark of a change of subject or person addressed" at this point; unless Maccenas' laughter is scornful, it jars with his anger (p. 104).
16. Morris, "The form of the Epistle," p. 83, compares the structures of Sat. 1.10 and Ep. 1.1: the body of the poem enclosed between two lighter more personal parts. Here, in his view, is the purpose to be sought.
17. There are two possible meanings for pituita. It may signify nasal catarrh, as in Epictetus 1.630, 2.16.13 (a context very similar to this) or stomach acid in indigestion (Sat. 2.2.76), caused by eating unwisely mixed foods. This indigestion has its philosophical side effects: "Quin corpus onustum / histernis vitii animum quoque praegravat una / atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae" (77—79). It seems wise to let Horace provide his own gloss. (Hippocrates mentions catarrh as an ailment of cities exposed to hot winds (Aer. 3.).)
18. Cicero (Acad. 2.8) is cited as a parallel for the image. But hospes is not so well explained (e.g., KHB, Briefe: "der bald seine Wanderung weiter fortsetzt."). It should be understood in the sense of "stranger"; i.e., "lacking familiarity." Cf. Acad. 1.8 (and Reid's note).
19. See Cic. Acad. 2.44.135 (and Reid's note); also Tusc. 3.11, 22, 74.
24. This is exactly the problem that has obscured much of the scholarship on the Epistles. See E. Burck in KHB, Briefe, pp. 388—391, 433. The more recent views are more balanced: e.g., McGann, Studies, pp. 89—100, and Williams, TORP, p. 577.
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27. K. Büchner, "Der siebente" p. 66, sees these three lines as the key to the epistle as a whole. They are interestingly ambiguous in some specifics, but their general thrust is clear. The farmer has shown himself to be ignorant of the essence of real benefactions. He claims to have something worth having, but then reveals how he really feels. And he does not care about the person to whom he offers the pears. His antithesis is the *vir bonus et sapiens*; for when the latter offers a gift he does understand its nature and that of its recipient. *Nec tamen* (23) must have an adversative force ("none," Fraenkel; "weak," Büchner) to make the distinction between claims and truth in each case. Having stated Maecenas' merits as a benefactor, he must now (as beneficiary) either bask in his own praise or find a tactful escape from charges of doing so. So he says that he will try to live up to Maecenas' implied opinion of him. There is ambiguity in *dignis* (22), and not by chance: *dignitas* should be a criterion of both gift (i.e., ablative) and recipient (i.e., dative). Similarly the genitive *merentis* (24) can be either subjective (i.e., Maecenas) or objective (i.e., Horace). Either way (or both) it is a modest acknowledgment of the compliment. Cf. Naevius (Cic. *Fam.* 15.6.1): "laetus sum laudari me aps te, pater, a laudato viro." All the arguments to date over *dignis* seem needlessly exclusive.
29. *Off.* 1.14.45-46: "ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; in quo et mores cius crunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata; ... collendum autem esse ita quecumque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa de qua multa iam dicta sunt, iustitia."
30. *Locupletem* should be taken in its etymological sense ("when you bestowed property upon me"). The entire analogy of the Calabrian is *ex contrario*. See also McGann, *Studies*, p. 49.
31. Büchner, "Der siebente," p. 75, alone seems to have seen in the weasel "irgendwelcher neidischer Betrachter." *Procul* (32) supports this view. (But Büchner also goes on to make Horace speak in the role of the fox; i.e. he will sacrifice whatever luxuries he must to get out of Maecenas' cage.) If one must have a zoological justification for the reading *vulpecula*, that of S. Borzsak will do ("Bemerkungen zu Horazens Briefen," *Phil.* CXIII (1969): 225-234): that the fox was there to feast on mice.
32. If *resignare* does mean "give back" in *Ode* 3.29.54, it must acquire this sense from the context. (Yet, if Fortuna flies away, one has really no option but to relinquish her gifts.) "Write off" comes close to Horace's meaning there: "go cheerfully into bankruptcy." The synonym of *resignare*, *conturbare*, can mean "declare bankruptcy." But the language here is unmistakably legal, not commercial.
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33. The sentiment is also used as a precept in *Epist.* 1.2.49–50: “valeat possessor oportet, / si comportatis rebus bene cogitat uti.” And with Horace’s “ligna super foco / large reponens” (*Ode* 1.9.5–6) cf. Cato RR 37.5: “ligna in caminum... compone.”

34. Büchner’s paraphrase (“Der siebente,” p. 76): “Für einen bescheidenen Mann wie mich passt eben dieses Leben nicht, was du als einer der Grossen dieser Welt in der Pracht des koniglichen Rom führst. Mir sagt Tibur oder Tarent zu.”

35. Büchner, “Der siebente,” p. 77. O. Hiltbrunner’s article, “Volteius Mena: Interpretationen zu Hor. *Epist.* 1.7,” *Gym.*, LXVII (1960): 289–300 traces the origins of the two characters in this anecdote. He identifies Philippus as the consul of 91 (censor 86), mentioned by Cicero (*De Or.* 3.1.4) who had a friend named Sextus Naevius (a *praeco*). He concludes (p. 300): “Das Gedicht kündet, wie die auf *sapientia* gegründete Lebenskunst eine Freundschaft in äusseren Divergenzen ungetrubt zu halten vermag, wie Freundschaft und innere Freiheit sich nicht ausschliessen, sondern zu edler Harmonie zusammenklingen.” If the interpretation of *Epist.* 1.7 put forth here is correct, the thrust of the Philippus-Volteius Mena anecdote is really quite different. It appears to complement the story of the Calabrian farmer, in which at least the recipient’s reactions appear consistent with those of a *vir bonus et sapientis*. This final story is the complete reversal of the ideal, except that the *agellus* (81) itself seems neutral: it is potentially *dignum*, unlike the pears. Of the four *exempla* in 1.7, only that of Telemachus and Menelaus is not *ex contrario*.

36. The fable of the fox (29–33) is the only apparent exception. The *mustela* can have nothing to do with the fox’s predicament, since he entered the bin *forte* (29) and speaks *procul*. The uniqueness of this fable within the plan of the epistle may remind us that it is presented by someone other than the poet, in order that the latter may refute it.

37. That an “assertion of independence” is the main point of this epistle seems to have been the assumption of critics who have handled it. The one exception is Büchner, who recognized the importance of the themes of giving and receiving, and the warm treatment of the friendship between the two. His article remains, in this writer’s view, the most sensitive reading to date.

38. Wickham judges this poem as an “‘Epistle’ in form only.”

39. Martial (*Epig.* 10.10 cited proudly by Pliny, *Epist.* 3.21), combines the two formal ideas of *Epist.* 1.8; i.e., by telling his Muse to make the delivery.

40. The combination of the plural *volumina* (2) and the term *carmina* (17) supports this identification. Some scholars (e.g., Lachmann, Mommsen) believe these *carmina* to be the *Epistles* themselves.

41. A complicated question. See especially the commentaries of Wilkins, 170 f., and Heinze in KHB, *Briefe*, p. 112f.

42. Williams, *TORP*, p. 13, sees no possibility of a real letter to Vinnius here, since Vinnius has already set out. (But it is not too difficult to imagine Horace’s sending another messenger to overtake the first.)

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44. For other discussions of these implications see Wilkins and M. J. McGann, "Vinnius Valens, son of Vinnius Asina?" CQ XIII (1963): 258–9.

45. Sarcina: once only in Horace, freq. in Caesar, esp. as burden (B.C. 3.24.3, B.A. 75.3); but abicere with arma (freq.); viribus uti: B.A. 58.1 (Horace always uses vires of conflict (Epod. 16.1, Sat. 1.3.110, Epist. 1.18.51) whether of soldiers or beasts); victor: freq. in Caesar & Horace (who invariably uses it in military contexts); propositum: freq. in Caesar, servare: B.G. 1.70.2 (impedimenta). McGann, "Vinnius Valens," p. 258, had noted victor propositi as appropriate to a soldier.

46. Sack, p. 139, includes ala, portare, vinosa, and pilleolus as strikingly colloquial language.

47. The Ps.-Acro commentary shows considerable confusion by citing both Asellus (on v.1) and C. Vinnius Fronto (on v.8) as his name. These notes are probably all conjectural.


50. Neither R. Hanslick, "Vinnius," RE IX (1961): 122–127, nor M. Lamberitz, "Valens," RE VII (1948): 2096–2098, picked up Pliny's reference to Vinnius Valens, which should be regarded at least as second-hand epigraphical evidence. But neither does he appear in Prosopographia Imperii Romani III (Berlin, 1898). There was a well-known freedman T. Vinius Philopoemen who was made a knight by Augustus, but he was never a soldier to our knowledge. Valens is recorded by Cicero as the Latin for Ischys (N.D. 3.55), and shows up in 162 A.D. as an epithet of Jupiter. It is common as a soldier's name by the second century, the fourth most common one. The likelihood that it would have been still (in Augustus' time) an unusual honorific cognomen or agnomen seems reasonable. McGann shows that Horace uses paternum with no sense of inheritance implied; but Pliny's Vinnius could have preferred his new cognomen over an older one for his tombstone, for understandable reasons.

51. This is speculation, but it fits the internal evidence and date of publication. Still one might argue that Augustus is in Rome and Horace, say, at Baiae.

52. See Nisbet.

53. See Courbaud, p. 316.

54. We are reminded of this in Epp. 1.1, 1.2, 1.7, 1.10, 1.16.

55. Williams, TORP, p. 4, is certainly right in his assessment of the irony here.

56. In that poem there is no reference, anticipatory or otherwise, to any public reaction to the Odes. This does not suppose that Augustus is receiving an advance copy. The setting is artistically limited to the segment of the world of letters shared by Horace and the emperor, with its exclusiveness pointed out and then lightened and relaxed by the personalities of Horace and Vinnius.


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58. Villeneuve, p. 28. Cf. Maurach, p. 120. The most emphatic denials of a bitter tone in this epistle are those of Williams, TORP, p. 25ff., and J. Perret, Horace, translated by B. Humez (New York, 1965), p. 102ff.

59. Wili, p. 263.


62. See the commentaries; and now N. B. Crowther, "Water and wine as symbols of inspiration," Mmem XXXII (1979): 1–11. Aristophanes quips (Pax 700) that Cratinus had dropped dead at the sight of a full wineskin burst open! See also the epigram Anth. Pal. 13.29. The allusion to Old Comedy helps set the tone.

63. Sat. frag. 21 W (=64 V = Prisc. G.L. 2.434.6 K).

64. I.e., from the point of view of extremes. A praetor’s edict would indicate which particular body of law would guide him in his policies, and would not be a comprehensive legal statement. Cf. Sat. 2.3.227.

65. Cf. Ode 1.18.3. Horace sketches the opposite view of Democritus (and his slavey followers) at Ars P. 295–301.

66. I.e. servum, libera, vacuum, princeps, non aliena, sibi fidet, dux reget examen.


68. I.e., in both the Epodes and Odes. When he refers to the ground as vacuum he does not exclude some earlier experiments such as Catullus’.

69. The controversy over the meaning of these three lines (28–30) can be traced in Fraenkel’s account, pp. 341–347. He is correct in dismissing such constructions as Archilochi . . . pede and pede mascula. Similarly important is the explanation of what temperare . . . pede would have meant in terms of ancient metrical theory, pp. 341–347. Caesius Bassus (G.L. 6.271.5 K), for example, could call silvae laborantes geluque a trimeter minus cmetic. There is another consideration here. If Sappho and Alcaeus moderate the poetry of Archilochus metrically, and change the res and ordo, the animi must still be accounted for. Alcaeus’ animi can be reasonably called Archilochean, but what of Sappho’s? Mascula might be used to distinguish between two sides of Sappho’s poetic personality, the vigorous and the feminine, and link the former only with that of Archilochus. It seems clear that Sappho was capable of biting attack (Herod. 2.134 ff.; see M. Bowra’s note, Greek Lyric Poetry, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1961), p. 209), although this was not her usual tone. If we may understand mascula in a partitive sense it is in the correct position (preceding its noun). Cf. “the (more) traditional Picasso . . .”

70. This kind of polemical defence of one’s style of imitation can be found in Terence (Andr. 19 ff.). The comedian justifies his practice of contaminatio by appealing to his models, Naevius, Plautus, and Ennius (19), quorum aemulari hexoptat neclegentiam / potius quam istorum obscuram diligentiam. Horace quotes from the Andria elsewhere in this epistle (v. 41).

71. For the identification of this critic Tigellius, see Rudd, Satires, pp. 292–293.
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73. The reconstruction of the literary background of Sat. 1.10 is an interesting problem. B. Otis, “Horace and the elegists,” TAPA LXXI (1945): 177—190, sees Horace there as antagonistic towards the excessive Alexandrianism and anti-Augustanism of the school in general, and specifically towards the tendency to praise Lucilius for his extensive use of invective and grecisms, and thus to “defend their principles in terms of his” (p. 179). But they may also have been most influential with their critical views in the collegium poetarum (n. 5), in spite of this political vulnerability. Rudd, Satires, pp. 118—121, while not referring to Otis directly, minimizes the certainty we can have regarding the political aspects of these controversies as viewed by G. L. Hendrickson and T. Frank. The final glimpse of Horace’s adversaries there is that of the grammatici Demetrius and Tigellius, now driven from the field of serious criticism to their girls’ schools to lament their defeat. The significant change in the situation lying behind Epist. 1.19 is simply that the academics (now unnamed) now long for Horace (who has by this time “arrived” in reputation and social status) to dignify their schools with recitations.

74. Sat. 1.9.48—52.

75. The meaning of nobilium scriptorum auditor et ultor, p. 39 is still troublesome. Horace is alluding clearly to recitations of poetry, but there is even disagreement as to whether these nobiles scriptores are the great writers of the past (Fraenkel, pp. 348—349) or contemporaries of Horace. It is sometimes argued that nobilium is ironic (e.g., by Heinze in KHB, Briefe). However, the antithesis in the context appears to be between the nobiles scriptores and the grammaticae tribus: between intimate recitations with Horace and his peers and the ones solicited by the grammatici for their schools. (Horace’s refusals to cooperate earn him resentment.) Ultor is the crux of the problem. Horace uses this word only in one other place: Caesaris ultor (Ode 1.2.44), “Caesar’s avenger.” To suppose with Ps.-Acro that Horace is defending his colleagues from criticism is possible. But the give and take of single combat is a metaphor used elsewhere by Horace to describe the rivalry of a recitation: caedimur et totidem plagis consumimus hostem (Epist. 2.2.97). The idea of the poet listening to others, then getting even, is clear in Juvenal 1.1. (Semper ego auditor tantum? numquam reponam?) and in much friendlier way in Catullus 50.6 (reddens mutua). A passage of Cicero has been cited (Cluent. 1.41) to show ulciscor in a parallel courtroom context: Crassus tum ita Brutum ultus est ut illum recitationis suae paeniteret. On the subject of Horace’s opinion of recitations see O. A. W. Dilke, “Horace and the verse letter,” Horace, edited by C. D. N. Costa (London/Boston, 1973), p. 171.

76. The reference of illae is ambiguous, and must be determined by the context. It refers back to Maecenas’ question scire velis cur . . . (35), and to the behaviour of the critics, not to himself. In the Terentian passage where this quotation originates (Ter. Andr. 126), Simo’s remarks are about Pamphilus, not himself. So here illae = illorum. (Horace has no reason for tears.)

77. Cf. also the ironic conclusion to Sat. 2.3.

78. Contrast Fraenkel, p. 349: “The mood of resentment does not soften in the
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brief dialogue that enlivens the last section of the epistle (41—47). The cold irony of the other speaker is most offensive.”


CHAPTER 2

1. See Fraenkel’s note 2, p. 315. He agrees with Dessau and Gessner that this is not the consul of 21; nor can he be proven to be that man’s son. The name Lollius suggests a nobilis.

2. Frigidum Praeneste (Ode 3.4.23) seems to have been a favourite retreat for Horace, ranking with the Sabine hills, Tibur, and Baiae in its appeal. The season implied is high summer.

3. Some commentators believe that scriptorem must be taken as the object of declamas as well. Some MSS of Ps.-Acro argue against this: “Dum rhetoricam Romae legisti, ego legi Homerum.” The intransitive sense of declamas would allow stronger antithesis. Homer is a fresh idea for the young man occupied with other things less dulces and less utiles. (Homeric themes could be material for declamation.)

4. Off. 1.2.6. Cicero includes the Peripatetics with the Academics and Stoics the only guides to true honestas, or “moral goodness.” (Wilkins points out that even Cicero was still studying rhetoric at age 28!) See O. Luschnat, “Horaz, Epistel 1.2.,” Theologia Viatorum IX (1963): 142.

5. It is useful to recall the close connection between all these terms: honestum, decorum (decens), pulcrum, rectum, perfectum. (McGann, Studies, p. 9—32). The most important source is the De Officiis (e.g. 1.2.4—1.3.9). For pulcrum in sense of decorum, see Off. 1.35.129—36.130.

6. Off. 2.3.9, 3.12.40.


9. As early as Plato (Rep. 10.614). See W. B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme (Oxford, 1954), pp. 118—127. Chrysippus himself was an allegorizer (Cic. N.D. 2.24.63; and Mayor’s commentary ad loc.), and Horace might have known Heraclitus’ Homeric Allegories. Seneca denied that Homer was a philosopher on the ground that he had no system (Epist. 88.4—5). See Campbell, p. 276.

10. For a review of the problem see Wickham, ad loc. and E. L. Harrison, “Horace, Epistles 1.2.31.” Er LIII (1955): 200—204. (Bentley rejected curam on the basis that the youth of Phaeacia had no cares; so he was forced, like most since, to emend the line to accommodate somnum.) Everyone has curae, for which relief is to be found in wine (Epod. 9.37, Sat. 2.7.114, Ode 1.7.31, 2.11.18), celebration (Ode 3.14.14), song (Ode 4.11.36), and sleep (Sat. 2.7.114). A marginal note (“somno” based on Sat. 2.7.114 and prompted by the picture of their somnolence) may have displaced curam in some MSS. Both the expression (cf. anxietas cessat, Juv. 13.211) and the syntax (cf. ducere me auditum, Sat. 2.4.89) are unexceptional. We do not need a
reinforcing of the idea of sloth in terms of sleep; that comes in terms of vanity. The note in Ps.-Acro has little point, since sonitus is not always strepitus (the latter always a loud sound, although it can be dulcis). Luschnat, p. 143, n. 2, argues for cessantes ducere cenam.

11. Cf. [Plat.] Kleit. 408c; Sen. Epist. 53.8; Persius (see below).
12. Hellebore was a remedy for dropsy (cf. Plin. H.N. 25—54; Dioscorid. 4.151).
14. For the pains of irrational voluptas, cf. Cic. Fin. 1.10.32, 2.9.28.
15. Cf. Cic. Parad. 33: “refrenet primum libidines, spernæ voluntups, iracundiam teneat, coerceat avaritiam;” also Am. 1.22.82: “... homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri servient imperebunt....”
17. Cf. the sequence in Cic. Parad. 33 (n. 15 above).
18. Off. 3.23.117. Temperantia is given as the third of four sources of honestum (prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia, iustitia).
19. Off. 1.4.14, 1.29.102.
20. Acad. 1.45, 2.135, 2.18 etc.
21. Cicero admits (Off. 3.26.97) that there was another side to the tradition (with tragic origins), in which he chooses the utile to the detriment of honestum. Cf. Sat. 2.5.
23. Cf. Hor. Epist. 1.2.36 (studis honestis).
24. KHB, Briefe, pp. 22—23; Morris, p. 89; and McGann, Studies, p. 37, are of the view that this piece lacks epistolary unity and coherence. See Luschnat, pp. 148—155, for a thorough discussion.
26. McGann, Studies, p. 41, is a notable exception to the lack of interest: his interpretation is very helpful.
27. See esp. KHB, Briefe, and Dilke, “Horace and the verse letter.”
28. Tiberius Claudius Nero, the son of the empress Livia by her first husband.
29. It is difficult to weigh the praise here against Horace’s concern that the task be too difficult. Fraenkel, p. 341, n. 1, sees considerable scepticism behind the words. The theme and imagery (see also v. 20) were to be used again in Ode 4.2. For the significance of ampullatur (14), see J. H. Quincey, “The metaphorical sense of ΔΙΚΥΘΘΩΣ and Ampulla,” CQ XLIII (1949): 32—44. Quincey detects “an unmistakeable tone of light ridicule” of Titius’ audacity, but only in the context: “ampullae are the tragic style par excellence” (44). If this is all a joke at Titius’ expense it is a gentle one.
30. While McGann seems not to accept any clear links between the discussions of literature/law (1—25), and philosophy/friendship, he takes exception to E. P. Morris’s view of an “abrupt” introduction of philosophy (p. 99).
31. Morris, pp. 53 ff., 64.
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32. McGann, Studies, p. 40, n. 1, rightly rejects Stégen's interpretation as "without foundation." Macleod, "The poet," pp. 362-363, interprets frigida fomenta as poetry; i.e., inferior to philosophy as the remedy for curae.

33. Epist. 1.8 is addressed for Celsus himself, and admonishes him not to let his advancement go to his head.

34. McGann, Studies, p. 41, comments: "This is not escapist advice unsuitable for a young man serving the state, for philosophy benefits a man's country as well as himself (28 f.). This is significantly the only occasion in the book when the pursuit of wisdom is recommended in terms of patriotism." A different emphasis for patria will be suggested below that may qualify even this "exception."

35. Plato (Diog. Laert. 1.3.63) called philosophy: orexis tês theias sophias. Cicero (Tusc. 5.4.10) says of Socrates: primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo (in the sense that he was the first to apply it to men's affairs). Cf. Lucretius (of Epicurus): nos exaequat victoria caelo (1.79).

36. This paradox is attacked in Cic. Fin. 4.19.55, and presented fully in Cic. Parad. 3.

37. Laelius goes on to discuss the connection between amicitia and virtus: "qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest" (6.20). Cf. 18.65: "Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse."

38. Cf. also Cic. Leg. 1.8.24 for the divine origin of the animus.

39. The common interpretation of frigida as "vain" (e.g. McGann, Studies, p. 41, n. 2) yields adequate sense, but something more is implied. Cf. the use of frigus (Sat. 2.1.61-2; Sen. Epist. 122.11); of frigidus in Cic. Quint. Frat. 3.33, Fam. 10.16.1; and of frigeo/frigesco (Ter. Eun. 268, Pers. Sat. 1.107). D. West compares Georg. 4.230 (sprinkling cold water on bees); "legal studies are dampering his poetic ardor" (p. 35). For frigus as destructive of friendship cf. Suet. Aug. 66 (ex levi frigoris suspicione). Antonius Musa's cure of Augustus by frigida fomenta was well known (Suet. Aug. 8).


42. Cic. N.D. 1.44.121.

43. Sen. Epist. 9.5.

44. "Only here is his tone when speaking of the young men's studia free from irony and amused disapproval." (McGann, Studies, p. 41). It is hard to see how much irony his remarks about Titius really contain (see n. 39 above). Horace's views about Titius seem mixed.

45. For the irrationality of anger, see Cic. Tusc. 3.9.19 (numquam igitur sapiens irascitur). Also Sen. de Ira 1.9.2, Epist. 85.10; and of course Hor. Epist. 1.2.
And ubicumque locorum vivitis recalls the questions at the beginning of the epistle (106); cf. Cic. N.D. 1.44.121: "ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligitur." In Carm. 2.7, the injunction ergo obligatam reddo lovi dapem (17) must refer to a sacrifice, but in contrast to Epist. 1.3, it is the traveller (not the waiting friend) who has made the vow.


49. Cf. esp. 1.2, 1.3, 1.9.
51. See Wickham, ad loc.
52. For recte in a strictly ethical sense see (inter al.) Cic. Par. 3: (δύν ἵσα τὰ ἄμαρτματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα) aequilā esse peccata et recte facta (cf. Epist. 1.16.17). κατορθώματα here means "success due to correct calculation (Rackham). For suavis (etc.) cf. Lucr. 2.1; Cic. Acad. 2.139. Vita rustica is described as honestissima et suavissima (Cic. Sex. Rosc. 48).
53. See Ps.-Acro: "Quae passio vocatur lethargica sive accidia (akedia) quae hominem somniculosum et obliviosum reddit cum dolore capitis." The source of this gloss is probably Sat. 2.3.27–30.
56. Cf. Ode Carm. 3.4.20 non sine dis animosus infans. For grex in this sense, cf. Cic. Fin. 1.65.
57. Tiberius was born in 42 B.C. per bellum Philippense (Suet. Tib. 5), the event which was for Horace the turning point in his life, consule Plano. On the dating of the two battles see “An interpretation of Horace, Epodes 13,” CQ XX (1970): 137–138, n. 2.
58. See below, n. 121.
59. Suet. Tib. 70. The compliment in v. 4 may be itself an allusion to Pindar, (O. 1.13): δρέπων μὲν κορυφας αρεταν ἀπο πόσαν, “harvesting the peaks of all excellences.” Thus honesta legentis would be encomium, as well as literary compliment to Tiberius, who would have been familiar with Titius’ imitations of Pindar (Epist. 1.3.9–14). Horace’s admiration for Pindar is well known. (See E. L. Highbarger, “The Pindaric style of Horace,” TAPA LXVI (1935): 222–225.) Honesta may be the equivalent of honestos. As self-praise
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in the mouth of Septimius, it would be a breach of tact for Horace to repeat it. The compliment must fall upon Tiberius alone or its point is lost. *Legentis* should be the equivalent of *colligentis* (cf. *Epist.* 1.12.1), not of *eligentis* (*Ps.*-*Acro*).


61. Courbaud, p. 304, is also troubled that Horace seems to make no mention of Tiberius’ *exploits* in any epistle.


63. See the commentary of Tyrrel and Purser, p. 235, for this letter and its background; also Suet. *Tib.* 4.

64. Tyro, Cicero’s freedman, published Cicero’s correspondence after his patron’s death in 43 B.C. Some scholars believe *Fam.* XIII to have been the first published.

65. *Fam.* 7.5 (Tyrrel and Purser, p. 134) is enlivened by interjections (e.g. *vide quid mihi sumpserim, 1; mercule, 1; sustulimus manus et ego et Balbus, 2*). Attention has been drawn to the similarity of purpose between *Fam.* 7.6 (to Trebatius himself) and *Epist.* 1.18.

66. This relationship is seen from the other side in *Epp.* 1.17 and 1.18.

67. The opposite of *frons urbanus* would be the *pudor subrusticus* (*Fam.* 5.12.1) which prevented Cicero from making his request to Lucecius in person. See also *Fam.* 13.2.1 for the “inhibiting” effect of the writer’s modesty.


70. For this apparent commonplace in *commendatio*, see also *Fam.* 13.6.3.

71. Cf. *Sat.* 2.6.32: “hoc iuvat et melli est, non mentiar.”

72. Horace had previously been charged with this kind of falseness: *Sat.* 2.6.39, 53–54, 57–58. Cf. also *Epist.* 1.19. 43–45. And he knows that Lollius would resent such a charge (*Epist.* 1.18.1–4).

73. Cf. Cicero’s commendation *bonum et fortem* (*Fam.* 13.77.2), and other combinations of flattering adjectives in the extant letters of recommendation. Cf. *modestum et prudentem* (*Fam.* 13.10.3), *probos, bonus, pudens* (*Fam.* 7.5.54) etc. Horace uses the formula (*Ode* 4.4.29) of the Claudii: *fortes creantur fortibus et bonis*. For the excuse that he has been prevailed upon to write under pressure of friendship, cf. *Fam.* 13.1.5 (Cicero agreed that Patro was a nuisance, but Atticus had asked him to write).

74. The expression *scribe tui gregis* is reminiscent of *Epist.* 1.4.16, where humour is also intended. *Grex* is frequently used of a circle of friends (*Att.* 1.18.1, *Fam.* 7.33.1), and with an Epicurean slant (*Epist.* 1.4.16). Perhaps the full humour here comes from an allusion to keeping records of new stock on a farm. For a slightly different sentiment, cf. *Fam.* 13.6.1: “haberes eos in numero meorum necessariorum.” Cicero too sometimes leaves the choice of desired *beneficia* to the recipient (*Fam.* 7.5.3). See Macleod, “The poet,” pp. 360–361; Gantar, p. 6.

75. Courbaud’s apt assessment of the letter (p. 307) is as a masterpiece of the
genre ("dans ce genre de lettres les nuances sont tout"). He speaks of "l'agrement, la legereit, l'aisance, l'esprit": Horace, si habile au jeu delicat des nuances, etait ne, comme Voltaire, pour ecrire des lettres de recommandation."

76. Both Porphyrio and Ps.-Acro identify the Scaeva of 1.17 with the Lollius of 1.18 (Lollius Scaeva) and call him an eques. Porphyrio regards the two epistles as one poem. Like Courbaud, whom he closely follows in his criticism of the Epistles, Fraenkel, p. 321, finds 1.17 "upsetting"; he feels that Horace does not care for Scaeva and gives him advice on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in the tone of shrewd expediency, general scepticism, and frightening impartiality. The main theme (according to Fraenkel) is whether it is justifiable to become a scurra, and how to exploit a patron without annoying him. Morris, p. 103, sees the satire against "the selfish and grasping abuse" of what is otherwise an honorable mode of gaining a livelihood, and intended to support a defence of his own personal career; yet this "defence" is that of a man of the world framed with cool judgement: "no exhortation to virtue... no technical terms of philosophy." J. Perret, p. 104, regards this as a "true satire" in the tradition of Sat. 2.5, in which Horace expounds in ironic terms the art of parasitism, and in which virtue, reserve, and independence mark the coward, and greed is of the essence. His perception of Horace's tone is one of "humour," "causticity," and "needling," in which Horace reveals a strange "sympathy and attraction toward values not proper to him." Maurach, p. 114, sees an exposition of the "nature of a tactful client relationship." McGann's analysis (Studies, pp. 75-77) brings us almost up to date: a distinctively Roman treatment of poikilia, "adaptability," in the sense that virtus is necessary for both greatness and friendship: "The life of a friend of the great is praiseworthy in terms not only of traditional Roman values, but also of an ideal of human behaviour which derives from Greek philosophy." Still, while McGann does not overreact to any unpleasantness in vv. 43-51, he sees the passage of advice as materialistic and selfish and one in which "any idealization of maioribus uti is undermined." The reader at the end "is left at a considerable distance from that topic, with the harsh reverberations of the last line of the kerb-side scene (v. 62)." Not least interesting is Maurach's agreement that there is a sense of incompleteness at the end of the epistle, somehow related to the resumption of the topic in the following one (1.18). Within the book he finds this conclusion without parallel. Williams, TORP, pp. 14-17, believes 1.17 to be humorous and ironic throughout: he is not giving serious advice, but "making splendid fun of philosophers and their silly, pompous pronouncements."

77. McGann, Studies, p. 76, Campbell, p. 270, Maurach, p. 114, and Fraenkel, p. 321, feel a strong interdependence between Epp. 1.17 and 1.18. See also Macleod, "Poetry of ethics," pp. 18-19: "In effect, in these Epistles Horace has written in his own manner a De Amicitia..."

78. That Morris, p. 103, missed a good deal of the pointed philosophical terminology is curious even here.


80. pauper ad opulentum (Porphyrio).
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81. The MSS read *uncta plena*; Heinsius proposed the order as printed by Buecheler. See also A. Noirfalise, “L’art de réussir auprès des grands dans les *Epitres d’Horace*,” *LEC* XX (1952): 359, n. 12, on the translation. G. Williams’s translation (*TORP*, p. 16), “a well-oiled one” implies the host pomaded for a party. *Ars P.* 422 (*unctum qui recte ponere possit*) shows *unctum* in the sense of the dinner itself (cf. *Epist.* 1.15.40). Dry food (*aridus victus*, Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 27.75) was the mark of poverty to Catullus (23).

82. Plays upon *rex* (“king”/“patron”) are always difficult to translate.

83. Gordon Williams, *TORP*, p. 17, sees Horace making fun of philosophers with a straight face, giving “the sort of picture of the relationship which the Greek philosophers had done, and not the respectable, but philosophically uninteresting Roman reality.” But while the positions of Diogenes and Aristippus are extreme ones (and the anecdote intended to amuse) this contrast of extremes serves a serious purpose in preparing for a sincere consideration of this “Roman reality.” In v. 33 it is important to catch the grand tone of *ree gerere* etc. With the exception of Williams, *TORP*, p. 17, critics assign v. 36 to an interlocutor. I read it as complementary to v. 35, v. 37 being then an anticipated comment upon vv. 35–36: i.e., the man who does not impress great men (or “get to Corinth”) fails because he fears failure. Horace allows the point, but not to excuse Scaeva; some *do* succeed, after all, and there is a criterion by which to evaluate true success. I would depart from Klingner’s punctuation (q.v.) and remove all quotation marks here. The same kind of dialectic pattern with *atqui* can be seen in vv. 44–45.


85. The sentiment is paralleled in *Epist.* 1.20.23 with reference to Horace’s relationship to his greater contemporaries: *primis urbis belli placuisse domique.* (See also Terence, *Adelph.* 18 f.: “eam laudem hic ducit maxumam, quom / illis placet, qui vobis universis et populo placent.”)

86. Ovid’s phrase *experientis Ulixis* (M. 14.159) may recall Horace’s use of Ulysses as the model of virtuous resolve and discretion (*Epist.* 1.2.17–23).

87. *decus et pretium* is difficult. Decus has the sense of “glory”/“esteem” (cf. Ode 1.1.2) and can be in hendiadys with *pretium*. But its ethical sense is pervasive. For another interpretation see Williams’s translation (*TORP*, p. 17): “or the enterprising man is justified in trying to win position and money.”


89. Cf. the envy which Maecenas’ favours to Horace had stirred up (*Satt.* 1.6, 1.9, 2.6) in his younger days.

90. *Ps.-Aero ad loc.* The beggar’s plea (*victum date*, 48) is offensive in terms of the immoderation and importunity of the client. The proper sharing of the patron’s *victus* with his client is described in Laelius’ recollections of Scipio (Cic. *Am.* 27.103): “una domus erat, idem victus isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes.” Contrast the scandalous behaviour of the virulent Virro (he is well-named) toward Trebius in Juv. *Sat.* 5.

91. The more the poem’s sincerity emerges, the more a play upon the name “Scaeva” seems improbable to me. A. Bourgery, “A propos d’Horace,” *RPh*
IX (1935), 130—132, identifies Scaeva as the son of the Scaeva of Caes. B.C. 3.53, and Luc. 6.118, 262. Sallust uses scaevus in the sense of “perverse” or awkward (Hist. fr. 1.55.5): scaevos iste Romulus. (Servius [Ecl. 3.15] cites scaevus.) A. Y. Campbell (supported by Fairclough) alludes cryptically to a discussion of skaiotés by Chrysippus the Stoic. The comic collocation of skaios and apaideutos (Arist. V. 1183) may remind us of Horace’s ironic use of docendus and discē. G. Williams remarks on the occurrence of the cognomen “Scaeva” in the gens Iunia and gens Cassia and the unlikelihood that this Scaeva is any less real than Horace’s other formal correspondents.

92. Williams’s translation, “the blind leading the blind,” would not fit.

93. Reminiscent of the Epicurean ideal of lathe biōsas; cf. fallentis semita vitae (Epist. 1.18.103) and Ovid’s imitation (Trist. 3.4.25).

94. Cf. Cic. Am. 27.103.

95. Terminology is important. The scurra is implied only in Aristippus’ comments: “scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu” (19). While Aristippus may use this of himself and Diogenes, it is humorously intended by Horace, and Aristippus does not play the fool in public like Diogenes. Fraenkel’s statement of the theme (p. 321) is off the mark. If the characteristic of the scurra was to be a buffoon, that of the parasitus was to fawn and be a “yes-man” (Cic. Am. 26.98). An umbra (Sat. 1.8.22) is a companion brought as an uninvited (or unspecified) guest to another’s party. When Augustus proposed that Horace move to his circle from Maecenas’ he joked (?): “veniet ergo ab ista parasitica mensa ad hanc regiam” (vit. Hor. 5—6 Kl.). What Horace is advocating is amicitia.

96. Cic. Am. 27.100, etc.

97. Cf. Satt. 1.9, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8; Epist. 1.19.

98. Perret, p. 104.

99. To Williams, TORP, p. 17, “Scaeva is not to be imagined as having approached Horace with a complacent account of his intentions.” We ought to infer some correspondence with Scaeva, although there is no sign that he is complacent. Rather, he has rejected such pursuits as futile and degrading.

100. Against Morris, p. 103, in particular, and Williams, TORP, p. 17. The advice is sincerely and seriously intended, with (Maurach, p. 114) much attention to tact. The idealization of maioribus uti (pace McGann) is not undermined but maintained, and to this purpose (as well as the unity of the epistle) the ending is well designed.


102. Satires 1.3, 5, 6, 9, 2.6. The consensus appears to be that Lollius is contemplating an amicitia but has not yet embarked (e.g., Rohdich, p. 264).

103. Rohdich, p. 264, sees this formula as both colloquial and important. Fraenkel, p. 137, calls the opening “playful.” It is partly a reminder that we too have met Lollius before.

105. The actual translation of *scurrus* can be a problem. Here it is compounded by the fact that Horace uses it in two senses of “jester.” Corbett, pp. 118–131, points out a clear distinction between the *scurrus* and the professional *parasitus* or *ridiculus*. In *Curc.* 477 ff. the *scurrus* makes fun of the *parasitus ridiculus* (Corbett, p. 124). See also Cicero’s discussion of the *duplex iocandi genus* (Off. 1.29.103–104). Rohdich, p. 266, gets into difficulty with his interpretation as a whole, partly because he makes no distinction between the two *scurrusses*, but rather between the “*scurrus*” and the “Cynic,” and sees the question of *libertas* in too wide a context, in which conflicting claims of freedom and friendship with the great create problems for the addressee (p. 264). Cf. Courbaud, pp. 256–261.

106. The second actor in a mime mimicked the first, and was frequently a parasite (Fest. 326).

107. *Simplicitas* of the right degree is essential to a friendship, while *fides* is its foundation (Cic. Am. 18.65). While the *scurrus liberior* has the potential for friendship the *scurrus infidus* can never qualify. See Sen. *Tranquill.* 6.3 on *amicitia fidelis et dulcis*. Elatrem (18) suggests the cynic.

108. *Caprae lanatae* are prodigies in Livy (22.1.13). The *Digest* (32.70.10) records a judgement that goats’ hair is real wool. There may also be an allusion to Arist. *Ran.* 186 (onou pokas, “donkey’s fleece”).


110. *Scurrarum locupletionem libidines* (Cic. *Harus.* 42, Corbett, p. 124). The *libidines* are *ira*, *excandescentia*, *odium*, *inimicitia*, *discordia*, *indigentia*, *desiderium*, etc. (Tusc. 4.8.17). *Intemperantia* is defined as “omnium perturbationum rēs” (Tusc. 4.9.22) and “a tota mente et a recta ratione defectio.”


112. *Iracundia* is the disposition to be angry, *ira* the actual working of *perturbation*. (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.19.43).

113. There may be a play on this name (Wickham, ad loc.). Cf. his behaviour with that of Philippus (Epist. 1.7.46–95). We may appreciate the moral fibre of Volteius Mena by comparison with Eutrapelus’ clients (Epist. 1.7).

114. See Cic. *Off.* 1. 150 for *quaestus illiberales* or sordidi.

115. The characteristics of the *scurrus* were described as *infidus* (4), and (by implication) *liberier* (8) and *asperier* (6).

116. Reading *ullius* (37) with the majority of MSS (ΞΨ). *illius* (ς) is usually printed. *ullius* is far more emphatic, and permits a pointed narrowing of the scope with *ille* (40).

117. This is sensibly qualified by Cicero (Am. 30.107), using the examples of Scipio and Laelius, whose differences were complementary, not lacking in *ratio*.
Notes

118. See Bruno Snell’s reconstruction of Euripides’ Antiope in Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 70–98.
119. I.e., a reference to the legendary hunt for the Caledonian boar.
120. Pliny wittily combines the two bioi in his Epist. 1.6. Severitas is all right, but “amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior” (Cic. Am. 18.66). “Suavitatem sermonum et morum” should prevail.
121. Duce (56) is usually understood to be Augustus, although Tiberius actually led the expedition into Parthia (Suet. Tib. 9) and was a tribunus militum in the first campaign against the Cantabri (25 B.C.) led by Augustus. (Lollius could have served under Tiberius.) Suetionius’ note, “recepit et signa quae M. Crasso ademerant Parthi,” makes vv. 56–57 (refiget) more applicable to Tiberius, who is also mentioned in Epp. 1.3 and 1.9. Reference could be to the restoration by Tiberius of the throne of Armenia to Tigranes (Suet. Tib. 9). (The figure on the armour of the “Prima Porta” Augustus should be Tiberius receiving the spoils of Carrhae.)
122. Satt. 1.6. 1.9. Maecenas’ discretion in accepting the introduction of Horace by Vergil and Varius (Sat. 1.6. 52–64) is evident in his “nine month” waiting period (61). The scrra asper (Epist. 1.18. 7) introduces himself!
123. Friends must be loyal and trusting, and not accept accusations against their amici (Cic. Am. 18.65; Sat. 1.3.32–34).
124. The textual authority for v. 91 is very slim, and the Latinity questionable. It was probably inserted in the Middle Ages to supply a subject for oderunt (92—see Wickham; Wilkins; KHB, Briefe). If the line is excised, porrecta pocula must be taken as subject: “proffered cups loathe one who refuses them.” See also L. Herrmann’s discussion on p. 373.
125. Fraenkel, p. 318, sees Horace’s advice as “not to pamper his solitary self-indulgence.” Cicero gives much the same injunction to Caesoninus (Prov. 4.8): “lateant libidines eius illae tenebricosae, quas fronte et supercilio, non pudore et temperantia contegebat.”
126. Zeno’s definition of perturbatio (Tusc. 4.6.11) is “aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commoto.” The Greek term is pathos. Virtue and peace of mind are the Peripatetic summa bona posited by Piso in De Finibus (5.8.23, 24.71, etc.).
127. Critics have been struck by the amount of autobiographical and biographical data in this epistle: the “epistolary signals” (Williams, TORP, p. 17). Cf. Morris, p. 104.
129. “Quid est enim dulcius otio litterato?” (Cic. Tusc. 5.36.105).
130. The aequus animus (aequitas) is a virtuous characteristic which precludes libidines (see Cicero’s contrasting catalogue, in Cat. 2.25), closely associated with temperantia, fortitudo, and prudentia, as well as rectum (Fam. 13.14.2). Cf. Ode 2.3. 8; Satt. 1.5.8, 2.3. 15; Epp. 1.11.30, 1.17.24. This is not a frequent Ciceronian expression (but see Tusc. 5.37.108).
131. N.B. lenibus imperii. Lenitas is the mean between iracundia and lentitudo (Cic. Tusc. 4.19.44); v. 87 is also a call for moderatio. See H. D. Jocelyn,
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133. McGann, *Studies*, p. 79.

134. Maurach, p. 119.


139. For *aequus animus* as an Epicurean ideal (one it shares with the other schools) see Lucr. 5.1116: “quodsi quis vera vitam ratione gubernat/divitiae grandiis homini sunt vivere parce/aequo animo.” For the particular philosophical significance of vv. 97–103, see Orelli ad loc. *Lenitas* (97) is reminiscent of *lenibus imperis* (45); i.e., demands that really are made reasonably and for the purpose of honest companionship. Freedom from *cupido*, and the *pavor* and *spes* (e.g. *Epist.* 1.6.9–10) over “unessentials” (a Stoic notion) is a frequent theme in Horace, who posits *aequus animus* (or *mens*) as the remedy (e.g. *Ode* 2.3.1–8). Horace makes it clear that much self-examination and philosophical enquiry must precede the achievement of *aequus animus*. (Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.4.8 ff.) *Te tibi reddat amicum* (101) is akin to the concept of fundamental self-esteem (Cic. *Fin.* 5.10.28, 29; cf. *Epist.* 1.3.29) of the Peripatetics. The thrust of this *protrepticus* includes the invitation to consider *inter cuncta* the gospel (not Epicurean alone: e.g. Sen. *Tranquil.* 13.1) of rejection of vain political and material goals in favour of a quiet life (102–103).

**CHAPTER 3**

1. The number of poems in each group present ratios of 2:3 (i.e. A:B = 2:3, B:C = 2:3).


3. Fraenkel, p. 323.

4. Compare other uses of *candidus* by Horace: *candide Maecenas* (*Epod.* 14.5), *vos Bibule et Servi, simul his te, candide Furni* (*Sat.* 1.10.86), *animae qualis neque candidiores / terra tulit* (*Sat.* 1.5.41), *candidus inperti* (*Epist.* 1.6.68). “Bright,” “unsullied,” “attractive,” “kind,” “sincere” are some connotations,

5. I.e., taking quid dicam (2) literally. Plautus plays upon this expression in Cuc. 12 (KHB, Briefe).

6. Pedum was an old Latin town between Tibur and Praeneste (Liv. 8.13), two favorite places of Horace (Fraenkel, p. 323, n. 3).

7. A. Browers, p. 59, prefers to see Albius as a tragic poet instead, imitating the plays of Cassius of Parma. Terranova, pp. 194–195, sees Albius (Tibullus) deviating from his own métier to a violent passionate poetry foreign to him (agreeing with Fraenkel, p. 323, that the point of the allusion is lost). We are not even sure that a negative judgement (Otis, p. 188) of Cassius of Parma is implied.

8. On elegy in general, Horace’s views were not very positive. Otis, pp. 177–190, argues for Horace’s strong opposition to elegy as representing neoteric and anti-Augustan sentiment. See also McGann, Studies, pp. 97–98. T. Panzerhielm views Albius as a critic, poet, and philosopher (accepting Porphyrio’s gloss on silvas as “philosophical books”). The sense of opuscula will depend upon the general tone of these lines. Otis, p. 183, and Stegen, L’Unité, p. 11, sense disdain here; this is not necessary, as Pliny shows (Epist. 8.21.4). The neutral sense of “poems” seems best (against Otis, p. 187), in the absence of a fully equivalent term in English. Putnam, p. 85, sees little importance in what the opuscula were, since they were only one aspect of vita contemplativa.

9. An normally excludes one alternative (B. L. Gildersleeve and G. Lodge, Latin Grammar (Boston, 1894), sec. 458, n. 4); but it need show no strong distinction from aut/vel (R. Kühner and C. Stegmann, Ausführliche Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache, Vol. II, 3rd ed. (Leverkusen, 1955), p. 235.2). See also Terranova, p. 196; Ullman, p. 156; Otis, p. 188; and Becker, p. 41, insist on the priority of the second alternative (philosophy) and a beginning of the admonition in v. 5. Tacitum has a positive sense in Sat. 1.6.123. Paulum silvae (Carm. 1.22—9, 3.16.29—30) was a feature of his own Sabine property (Sat. 2.6.3). The view that silvae is a conventional term for philosophical books (Porphyrio ad. loc.) is unnecessary. For Cicero’s melancholy forest seclusion, cf. Att. 1.15: “In hac solitudine (Asturae) careo omnium concluqio, cuunque mane me in silvam abstrusi densam et asperam, non exeo inde ante vesperum. Secundum te nihil est mihi amicius solitudine. In ea mihi omnis sermo est cum litteris. Eum tamen interpellat fletus; cui repugno quoad possum, sed adhuc pares non sumus” (Putnam, p. 87). Cf. Verg. Aen. 6.442–444; Plin. Epist. 1.24.
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10. For the opposite view see Otis, p. 187.

11. Fraenkel's reading of v. 6 (i.e., eras = es) is unnecessary (p. 324). See also H. Hommel, Gnom XXXVI (1964): 169, McGann, Studies, p. 43, n. 3. Terranova rejects any interpretation of pectus as Stoic logos, equating it with animus or cor: a lack of pectus praeparatum would rule out aequus animus. J. K. Schönberger, "Zu Horaz," PhW LIII (1933): 509, compares Eur. El. 387.

12. Cf. Pers. 2.31—40, Sen. Epist. 60.1, Juv. 10.280 ff. (and Mayor's notes ad loc.). Qui is probably the equivalent of si is in a future less vivid condition (Roby, Grammar: sect. 1558).

13. Cf. Nep. Att. 13.5; Cic. Fin. 2.23; Hor. Epist. 1.5.7, Carm. 1.5.5.


15. Cic. in Pis. 16.37. Cf. Tib. 1.10.21 (a more serious context) "hostiaque e plena rustica porcus hara."

16. Lucr. 1.140—141; Cic. Fin. 1.20.65 ("at vero Epicurus... quam magnos tenuit amicorum greges"); see Préaux ad loc.

17. See McGann, Studies, p. 44.

18. Another debated point. See Becker: "wird die Dichtung dem ethischen Thema untergeordnet" (p. 41, n. 9). Also Ullman, (p. 156), Courbaud, p. 81, and Terranova, (pp. 191, 196, 201). Becker and Terranova see the fundamental motif here as the invitation to Epicureanism (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.31.76). V. 12 would therefore suggest that Albius is seeking comfort in Stoic thought, which (given the situation and person) is of no help to him (Terranova compares Cic. Tusc. 3.7.14—15, 18—20). Courbaud feels that the grossness of the call to the sty is deliberate: to amuse and console. Terranova sees curantem... inter curam as expressing the mood of Albius in seeking relief in Stoicism. "To Horace, therefore, Tibullus' elegy was a blot upon the scutcheon of a friend who might otherwise have been relatively congenial" (Otis, p. 180).


20. One might possibly exclude Epist. 1.14 (to the bailiff). Epist. 1.20 (to his liber) is too singular an exception (standing outside the main structure of the book). See also Allen et al., pp. 253—266.


23. A role Horace is prepared to assume (Epp. 1.1, 1.15).

24. See n. 18 above.
27. See also von Albrecht's discussion of Horace's use of clause and line patterns (p. 202), word groupings, ictus and accent, and elision (p. 205).
28. See Courbaud, pp. 83—84. Terranova (p. 192), suggests that a cheating woman might explain *spes* (a lover's hope for serenity); without relating *cura*, *timores*, *iraе* directly to erotic anxieties. *Iraе* would result from Albius' failure to alleviate his anxieties by philosophy (p. 192) or from the failure of his mistress to live up to his ideal of her (p. 197).
29. See also Tib. 2.3.31, 2.6.51 [3.6.29, 2.17.1, 3.18.1] (many more might be found in Propertius and Ovid.)
30. Cf. Tib. 1.2.24, 1.8.39, 2.1.17 [3.10.11—15], 1.6.75.
31. Wagner would emend Tib. 1.6.56 (*illa*) to *ira*.
32. E.g. Maecenas, Lollius (?), Torquatus, Fuscus, Iccius.
33. Assuming this is Tibullus.
34. There are no dramatic improbabilities in this. Torquatus is a man devoted to his work, and he may not have given the coming holiday any thought. It is suggested below, however, that Torquatus (hearing Horace to be in town) had sent a messenger over to suggest a get-together; this epistle is to be imagined as written while the messenger waited for a reply.
35. The occasion (*eras nato Caesare festus*, 9) could be either Julius Caesar's birthday (July 11) or Augustus'. But to imagine a dramatic date of July 10 would put these events right in the middle of the *Ludi Romani* (6—13 July), when Torquatus would not be at work. Augustus' birthday (Sept. 23) had been celebrated since 30 B.C.; so what better reason for Horace to be in Rome at his house (*domi*, 3) than to join in the celebrations the following day (perhaps a levee on the Palatine)? The expression *aestiva nocte* could apply generally (a "summery" night): September 22 was officially the last day of summer (*Dig.* 43.19). Horace reminds us that the weather in Rome in late summer was oppressive (*Sat.* 2.6.19, *Ode* 3.23.8, *Epist.* 1.7.5—9).
36. *Ode* 4.7 (published ca. 13 B.C.).
37. See F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 240—245, for a discussion of the literary characteristics of such invitations: "All these things create an aura of compliment and encomium suited to the superiority of the addressee" (p. 242). For the immediacy of the invitation, cf. Cat. 13. Williams, *TORP*, pp. 7—10, is sceptical about the plausibility of the occasion of 1.5: "the poet's motive for inventing a setting for the letter which made its substance factually implausible was artistic... The more immediate the prospect of the party the better motivated were the poet's reflections on its details and the 'philosophy' behind it..." (p. 10). He concludes "that Horace has no actual occasion in mind" (p. 9). Juvenal (11.96) suggests that small couches are the mark of antique simplicity. In Apuleius the miser Milo reclines *exiguo grabattulo* (*M.* 1.22.69).
42. My colleague, Professor A. J. Marshall, points out that the XII Tables (6—9
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W = Cell. 17.2.10 stipulate the time limit of legal proceedings to be sunset: "si ambo praesentes, sol occasus suprema tempestas esto." (Maecenas also was usually too busy to dine before the lights were on: Sat. 2.7.33, Ode 3.29.17–24.)

44. Nisbet, pp. 73–76.
45. Liv. 8.11.11; Cic. Sull. 32.
46. Titius Statilius Taurus was the colleague of Augustus in the consulship of 26 B.C.
47. Liv. 8.7.8–22, Cic. Fin. 2.32.105.
48. KHB, Briefe, ad loc.
49. Sen. Epist. 86.10.
50. Liv. 34.44.5.
51. Cf. Ode 3.29.5: . . . iamdudum apud me est. Supellex may have a legal connotation (Dig. 33.7, 10), and focus may refer by synecdoche to the whole house: cf. domus focusque (Ter. Eun. 4.7.45); Hor. Epist. 1.14.2.
52. Cf. Ode 3.29.11: . . . omittte mirari . . .
53. Is Moschus the cliens molestus referred to in v. 31? (Tacitus refers to the case (Ann. 4.13.)) Volcacius Moschus was a Pergamene rhetor defended by Torquatus and Pollio on a charge of poisoning (Porph.).
54. Cf. also Ode 1.4.15: "vitae summa brevis sper nos vetat incohare longam.
56. Also rescribe (30), "render a legal opinion" or "answer a petition in writing." There is probably a legal pun here at Torquatus' expense: inconsultus haberi, "to be ill-advised" (Cf. Aen. 3.452). Cf. calore inconsulto, "in a fit of passion." (Mos. et Rom. Leg. Coll. 4.3.6.) Inter amicos (v. 24) in legal language means "before witnesses" (see F. de Zulueta, Commentary on the Institutes of Gaius, Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1953), p. 26). Coire (v. 25) can mean "form a compact."
57. Epist. 1.1.101–103 (and Heinze's note in KHB, Briefe).
59. The Institutiones (327) give recludere the legal sense of "bar" (reclusum opp. apertum). The word appears in prose only after the Augustan period.
60. Onus = "burden of proof": Dig. 31.1.22 and Cic. Rep. 1.23.37.
61. Cf. Horace's use of technical terminology to characterize Vinnius in Epist. 1.13 (Chapter 1, above). Inconsultus, ratas, procurare are hapax in Horace.
62. Is there a pun on contracta (i.e., both "fixed by contract" and "narrow")? Macleod, "The Poet," p. 361, offers parallels to the relating of wine and wisdom.
63. Ode 3.21.24. The echoes of that ode are unmistakeable here. Even the wine intended for Messalla has connections with Torquatus' family. (L. Manlius Torquatus, 3.21.1, was consul in 65 B.C.) The scholia add that Messalla and Torquatus were colleagues in the defence of Moschus! Horace saw Messalla as a consultus iuris (Ars P. 371). Kenneth Quinn's suggestions about the genesis of dramatic monologues in the Odes are very helpful (Latin Explorations, p. 108).
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64. Courbaud, for example, tried to come to grips with what he saw as an apparent contradiction between the two parts of the poem (p. 105). The various attempts by scholars to rearrange the lines of the poem to suit themselves are discussed by M. Musurillo, "A formula for happiness: Horace, Epist. 1.6 to Numicius," CW LXVII (1974): 194.

65. Morris, p. 46; Wili, p. 287; Perret, p. 111; Becker, p. 47, n. 2; McGann, Studies, p. 46.

66. Also Orelli (Excurs. 446).

67. Nothing further is known of this Numicius. The only distinguished members of the gens Numicia known to us are T. Numicius Priscus (cons. 469 B.C. (Liv. 2.63)), and Ti. Numicius (Tr. Pl., 320 B.C.; Cic. Off. 3.30.109) (see Broughton). The family had been “distinguished” in both its patrician and plebian branches (Ti. Numicius, the tribune, had been surrendered for unlawfully sanctioning an armistice after the Caudine Forks) but for exactly 200 years nothing further is known, except for the P. Numicius Pica Caesianus suggested by H. Dessau as Horace’s friend (Prosopographia Imperii Romani Vol. II (Berlin, 1897), p. 165; see Musurillo, p. 194, n. 6). J. Préaux, Q. Horatius Flaccus (ad vv. 19—20), infers that he may be a lawyer; this is not unlikely, particularly since a letter explicitly to a lawyer (1.5) has preceded (cf. also 1.2.23—24).

68. Cf. Democritus (Strab. 1.3.21), Pythagoras (Plut. de aud. 13), Epicurus (ataraxia), Stoics (autarchia, athambeia, athaumastia, apatheia). Cicero identifies nil admirari with the vita beata (Tusc. 3.14.30) but excepts the obsession with honestum decorumque from his strictures (Off. 1.20.66). Seneca accepts only the animus as mirabilis (Epist. 8.5). Plato had accepted to thaumazein as the pathos which is the beginning of philosophy (Theat. 155d). Aristotle was careful to accept the principle of the mean even in pathê (N.E. 2.6.12). A typically neo-Academic stance is to be seen in Cic. Tusc. 5.28.81: “sapientis est enim proprium... nihil cum accident admirari, ut inopinatum ac novum accidisse videatur, omnia ad suum arbitrium referre, suis stare iudiciis. Quo quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest.”


70. Cf. Lucr. 5.1183. Cosmic events do not trouble the Epicurean. Sextus Empiricus (Math. 9.24) cites Democritus (Diel A.75) on these pathêmata in early man. (See C. Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex: with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Translation and Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1963) ad loc.)

71. I.e., the standard pairing of “hope” and “fear”: cf. Epistles 1.18. 99, 1.4.12; Ode 2.10.3. The proximity of these two pathê can be seen in the English words “envy” and “jealousy.” See Cic. Tusc. 4.7.16 ff. for a discussion of pavor. The pavor caused by improvisa species is further discussed by Cicero (Tusc. 3.13.28, 5.28.81). The opposite to such a man is extolled in Ode 2.10.13—15: “ sperat infestis, metuit secundis / alteram sortem bene praeparatum / pectus. . . .”

72. Aristotle, regarding virtue itself as the mean between excess and deficiency would have found it difficult to imagine an “excess” of virtue. Cf. Cic. Mur.
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63. Brut. 149 for the mean (mediocras) in virtue. But of course the excess applies to the pursuit of the virtue, not the virtue itself: "ludido ipsa tollenda est... etiam si virtutis ipsius vehementior adeptus sit" (Cic. Tusc. 4.29.62).

From the viewpoint of practical wisdom, sole supremacy of virtue is contrary to nature (see Fin. 4.27, Fat. 21, Tusc. 2.46; and W. Görler, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1974), pp. 34, 106–118). Again one is reminded of the paradox, "all sins are equal," one which destroys the normal basis for human relations (Cic. Acad. 1.43.133; Hor. Sat. 1.3). Another paradox stated that only the sapiens was "sane" (Cic. Parad. 4; Hor. Sat. 2.3).

73. i nunc (17) is the signal of ironic exhortation: cf. Sat. 2.2.76, Pers. 4.19, Juv. 6.306, 12.57, Sen. Cons. ad Polyb. 2, etc. The attack is upon materialism, class jealousy, and political ambition.

74. Préaux sees the reference (pp. 24–26) as a tribute to Agrippa. Under various names, his portico is mentioned by Juv. (6.153), Mart. (11.1.10–12), and Tacitus (H. 1.31). See also Ode 1.6.5; Sat. 2.3.185; Epist. 1.12.1, 26. (The Appian Way is a gloomy image.) These references add concreteness to the catalogue of obsessions.

75. Pl. Euth. 278e.

76. KHB, Briefe compares the words of Brutus before his suicide at Philippi (Dio Cass. 47.49).

77. Vive valeque is the complimentary (not epistolary) close of Sat. 2.5.

78. Recte should be understood. Valeo recte is a common colloquial expression for "I'm fine" (Plant. Amph. 582–583, Trin. 50. Merc. 387; Cic. Fam. 14.24.1). The challenge in vivere recte is really that of achieving happiness, the summum bonum. (Cf. Mart. 1.15.11: "Non est, crede mihi, sapiens dicere vivam / sera nimis vita est crastina; vive hodie." ) For Epicurean overtones, see Lucr. 2.16–33 (well-being as the absence of pain). For the importance of valetudo to the vita beata outside the Epicurean sphere, see Cic. Am. 6.22 (for some qualifications, Fin. 2.13.43, 3.15.49, 4.9.23). At Fin. 4.13.62 the Stoics are said to view valetudo as eligenda, if not expetenda. The traditional Roman view (ibid.) is that the man "qui honeste viveret" had a life which was optabilior and melior, "si idem etiam bene valeret, bene audiret, copiosus esset."

79. For Musurillo's analysis of Epist. 1.6, see his article, pp. 194–196: A (1–27)—generic discussion of search for vita beata, and B (26–68)—concrete exhortation. He feels some disjunction in style between the two parts, with some reiteration of A in B, but recognizes a wholly different approach and technique: the strength of B would depend upon the sequence of moral syllogisms presenting five options: virtus, res, fortuna, cenare, amare.

80. Cf. Pers. 3.98; Juv. 1.142 (Mayor's note).

81. Contrast Musurillo, p. 201: "Knowing Horace, we probably would not be far from the truth if we found in the last, undeveloped option, the life of amor iocique (65–66). For here the statement of Minnernmus' view seems moderate enough... some place should be left for amor iocique."

82. The construction of the pronouns istis (67) and his (68) has aroused controversy (see Musurillo, p. 203, n. 22). Using O. Skutsch's punctuation in
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"Horaz, Epistein 1.6.66—67," H LXXXVIII (1960): 504–505, I have referred istis to all the stated options, from virtus to amor iocique (with McGann). Musurillo attributes to A. J. Maclean (1853) the idea that istis refers to all the options except virtue. But this goes back at least as far as Alexander Pope, who paraphrases: “Adieu—if this advice appear the worst, / E’en take the Counsel which I gave you first: / Or better Precepts if you can impart, / Why do; I’ll follow them with all my heart.” (“Imitations of Horace” (Book 1.—Epistle VI to Mr. Murray)). Candidus (68) implies the warm and generous qualities of a true friend: i.e., “true,” “sincere.” (Cf. Epist. 1.4.1, and n. 4 above.) His (68) refers naturally and specifically to the pregnant vive valeque (67). With siquid novisti rectius, cf. Cic. Tusc. 5.18.82: nisi quid tu melius attuleris.

83. Epist. 1.7 (to Maccenas) tactfully declines an invitation.
84. Only one full length article is devoted to 1.10: G. Stegen, “L’Epitre d’Horace à Aristius Fuscus,” LEC XXVII (1960): 23–29. See McGann, Studies, p. 58 (“the impression left by the opening lines is of a friendship closer and warmer than any to which the earlier epistles have borne witness”) and Macleod, “Poetry of ethics,” pp. 24–27. See Martens, pp. 65–77, for a discussion of Horace’s use of the vita rustica theme in Epist. 1.10.
85. Wickham sees a continuity of tone between Carm. 1.22 and Epist. 1.10. The scholiasts refer to Aristius Fuscus variously as: “scriptor tragoeidiarum,” “scriptor comoediarum,” “grammaticorum doctissimus.” Nisbett, p. 74, supports the grammaticus identification (cf. Courbaud, p. 117; Williams, TORP, p. 508) as giving point to v. 45 (nee me dimittes incastigatum) citing Haupt’s emendation (G.L. 7.35K): “Aristi Fusci grammatici liber est ad Asinium Pollionem.” (Fuscus and Pollio appear among Horace’s literary friends in Sat. 1.10.83.) “C’était, en tout cas, un homme de goût, fin lettré, esprit aimable, caractère enjoué, capable de comprendre la plaisanterie et de s’y plair” (Courbaud, p. 118).
86. Epist. 1.20 (as the envoi) is supernumerary, but reminds us indirectly of both Maccenas (28) and Lollius (28), as well as Horace’s own dispositions (20–25).
88. The etymology is Varro’s (Ps.-Acro, ad loc.). See Courbaud, p. 130. E. C. Evans, “Horace’s Sabine Goddess Vacuna,” TAPA LXV (1934): xxxi; and Macleod, “Poetry of ethics”; also Sir James Frazer, The Fasti of Ovid (on 6.307), Loeb Classical Library (London, 1931), pp. 432–436. Vacuna was a deity of manifold aspects, with shrines all through the region. Vespasian, who was born there, renovated a temple to her (as “Victoria,” CIL 14.3485) near Rocca Giovane, a hill town about 2 km from the probable site of Horace’s villa. See (e.g.) E. K. Rand, A Walk to Horace’s Farm (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), pp. 21–24; and Dilke, Epistles, pp. 9–12. The site and remains of the temple are described by G. Lugli, Horace’s Sabine Farm, translated by G. Bagnani (Rome, 1930), pp. 31–33. What Horace actually means by post fanum is not clear: perhaps “the other side of the temple” (i.e., further down the valley from the Digentia toward Varia (Vicovaro) or “behind the temple”
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(i.e., in a secluded or sheltered spot). A pleasant walk is implied, perhaps of half an hour. Fuscus would probably know the exact spot meant.

89. Cf. Cic. Fam. 2.11, etc. quid quae ris (8) is also a common formula in Cicero (KHB, Briefe).

90. See Varro, R.R. 2.7.

91. Cf. Prop. 3.1. 3.3.

92. The theme of libertas is picked up later (39ff.). Comparison of himself with the temple slave effectively dispels any grand pretensions (10—11).

93. Cf. Epist. 1.7.98; and Cic. Off. 3.3.13, Fin. 5.9.24, 26, etc.

94. See Williams, TORP, pp. 595—596, on natura and on the Roman attitude to gardens.

95. But see Williams, TORP, p. 593.


97. Cf. Carm. 2.16.

98. Cf. Juvenal, Sat. 3.223—231, for the economies of retreat to the country.

99. As retold by Aristotle, Rhet. 1393b8—22. The fable is later used by Phaedrus (4.4) with a boar in place of the stag.

100. Cf. Tib. 1.1.1—10, and Seneca’s definition (Epist. 87.40): parvi possessio. Also Mart. 11.32.8. (See K. F. Smith’s note on Tibullus 1.1).

101. The text of v. 37 has been much discussed. The vulgate reading, victor violens (violens victor C) was emended by Bentley (violens victor), Haupt (victo ridens), and Holder (victor inludens). But the received text stands up very well. The alliteration is grand, and violens describes the horse’s state of mind at the moment of victory he has so greedily sought. Cf. Ode. 3.30.10 (violens obstrepit Aufidus); rivers in spring flood are “wild” (cf. also Ode. 4.7.4, 1.2.13—16), like the momentarily triumphant horse. (There is also an echo of v. 25: [natura] victrix.) This sense of violens fits the probable etymology of the word (vi + olens). See C. D. Buck, Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (Chicago, 1933), pp. 335—336, sect. 483. Persius’ use of violens (ferus et violens, 5.171) to compare the frustrated lover to a beast caught in a net also shows the state of mind the word conveys. Perhaps a proverb is implied, such as “Bis vincit qui se vincit in victoria” (Publ. Syrus).

102. If not an image of windlass or well-rope (see Williams, TORP, p. 598), tortum will mean either “twisted into strands” (an epithet emphasizing the thickness and strength of the rope) or “taut” (strained by the pull). Cf. Aen. 4.575 (tortos incidere funes) and 7.666. See also T. Maguire, “Horatiana,” Hermath V (1885): 335.

103. Cf. Sat. 1.1.73—75.

104. See n. 95 above. One might compare his reference to leisurely Praeneste (Epist. 1.2.2).

105. Ps.-Acro, ad loc. The Varronian influences upon this epistle seem strong.

106. Cf. Horace’s appeal at the conclusion of Epist. 1.3.

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108. See Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum VI 13660.
109. See below. Westerwick, pp. 1184, locates Bullatius at Lebedus while on a tour; Stégen, at Ulubrae, back home and bored with travel (though claiming to have enjoyed himself). Heinze thinks that Bullatius has perhaps never been to Lebedus.
110. The significance of the names of places has been variously interpreted, whether pleasant spots on a grand tour or places of political exile.
111. Quasi respondit Bullatius (Ps.-Acro). Waltz gives the lines to Horace, as do Heinze and Morris. Wickham, Wilkins, Klingner, Westerwick ("mit der grossen Mehrheit der Horazkritiker"), and the codex. Bland assign them to Bullatius, as do all the scholia.
112. See Stégen, Essai, p. 67.
113. Epist. 1.16.41—43. But even here it is easier to read a rhetorical question. Epist. 1.19.40—44 is a dialogue of sorts, but not involving the correspondent.
115. Horace seems to have been at Clazomenae (Sat. 1.7), about 33 km from Lebedus.
116. See also Westerwick, p. 1184.
117. For storms at sea as an image of civil war, cf. Ode 2.7.15—16 ("te rursus in bellum resorbens / unda fretis tulit aestuosis") and Ode 1.14 (if this is a political ode).
118. Plautus (Cas. 309—311) gives a different view of being in an oven.
121. Bean, p. 151.
122. Approx. 15 km from Rome, midway between the Via Appia and Latina. Gabii is some 20 km east of Rome on Via Praenestina. Fidenae (destroyed 438 B.C.) is 10 km north on the Tiber.
123. Fam. 7.18.3: “Has litteras scripsi in Pomptino, cum ad villam M. Aemili Philemonis devertissem, ex qua iam audieram fremitum clientium meorum, quos quidem tu mihi conciliasti; nam Ulubris honoris mei causa vim maximam ranunculorum se commosse constabat.”
125. Horace’s message to Plancus (Ode 1.7) is very similar.
126. Waltz, p. 316. Horace’s word incolumis (17) should refer to one who has not been condemned by any court or judge. Cf. Cic. Arch. 5.9; Sen. ad Helv. 14.3 (also Ov. Tr. 1.1.19: salvus).
127. The passage in the Tusculans is decidedly Epicurean in tone, and equates Pacuvius’ bene with beata.
128. As has Pompeius Grosphus (Ode 2.16). The ancient commentators and their successors assume that Iccius is Agrippa’s procurator. Of more use to us than this guess is Ps.-Acro’s remark that there was disagreement here among ancient scholars: “alii dicunt quod agros illi in Sicilia donaverat Agrippa.” Courbaud mysteriously concludes that taking usus as the opposite to man-
cipium confirms Icicius as procurator, but he dismisses Ps.-Acro’s explanation (“ridicule”). What has been written about Agrippa’s holdings in Sicily is based on this epistle, on Cass. Dio 54.29, and (apparently) Ode 2.16. See M. I. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, revised by P. M. Fraser, 4th ed. (New York, 1959), p. 562. n. 17, who concludes in his note that Agrippa had large cattle-breeding estates in Sicily; followed by R. T. Pritchard, “Land tenure in Sicily in the first century B.C.,” Hist XVIII (1969): p. 547; and F. A. Wright, Marcus Agrippa. Organizer of Victory (London, 1937), p. 83. Inscriptions from Catania show there were Vipsanii in Sicily, some of whom may have been freedmen of Agrippa (see M. Reinhold, Marcus Agrippa, Dissertation (Columbia, 1933), p. 42, n. 100). Pompeius Grosphus, a cattleman in Sicily (Carm. 2.16) may have been a freedman of Sextus Pompeius, who was left in charge of estates confiscated after Mylae and Naulochus (36 B.C.) and now a client of Agrippa; or he might have owned those herds outright as gifts from his late patron. Clearly he is very well off. The Rupilian settlement of 132 B.C. resulted in a great revival of cereal farming in Sicily, where latifundia had become numerous (Pritchard, p. 547), but later under the empire it declined again and latifundia became predominant (See OCD, 2nd ed, “Sicily,” sects. 6—7). But there seems to be no way of determining either what kind of estate Icicius is living on (fructus could refer to either grain or cattle), where it is, or exactly what are his rights over Agrippa’s property.

129. This exhortation to ethical, not natural, philosophy is closely paralleled in Lucian (Nec. 21), where Teiresias advises: “You will act more wisely if you stop speculating about heavenly bodies and discussing final causes and first causes, spit your scorn at those clever syllogisms and counting all of that sort of thing nonsense, make it always your sole object to put the present to good use.” (trans. A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library.) The higher things (sublimia, 15) are the same speculations Socrates disclaims (Apol. 18B); Icicius, a one-time “Socratic,” should understand. E. Bignone, “Una dottrina eracleitea in Orazio,” SIFC IV (1924): 69—74, sees a reference to a specific doctrine of Heraclitus in concordia discors; but McGann feels that it is vague enough to be associated with Empedocles (Studies, p. 64, n.4). The section ends with a reference to the apparently long-winded Stoic Stertinus (according to Ps.-Acro, he wrote 220 books). The context suggests that Stertinus had written on physical matters as well as ethics, but it is to be noted that recte uti is one of his slogans (Sat. 2.3.109—10, 166—7), as well. Since the theme of Sat. 2.3 (and Stertinus’ sermon) is “every fool is mad,” v. 20 might mean, “whether Empedoclean physics or Stertian ethics is the crazier.” Empedocles is mad at Ars P. 464—466; Stertinus, in Sat. 2.3.

130. Not, strictly speaking, manscipium (provincial land is involved), but rather possessio.

131. See esp. J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome (London, 1967), pp. 149—152. For ancient sources see the Institutes of Justinian (and J. B. Moyle’s notes), 5th ed., (Oxford, 1912) 2.3: de servitutibus. Horace uses only the term usus, which strictly speaking is even more limited than ususfructus (2.5.1), but the inclusion of fructibus (1) and frueris (2) may imply that he has the wider
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servitude in mind. (If Iccius has only usus, he cannot even sell his fructus, only consume them.) "Testamentary disposition or legacy: this was com-
monest in personal servitudes, especially usufruct, which could either be bequeathed directly (tit. 4. 1 inf.) or the heir could be directed to create it in
favour of the legatee" (Moyle, p. 218, n. 1). If Agrippa had voluntarily
consigned the usus to Iccius, the latter might feel obliged and therefore all the
more trapped. See also Alan Watson, The Law of Property in the Later
Roman Republic (Oxford, 1968), pp. 203—221: "Usufructus and Similar
Rights." An owner could sell the right to the fructus (p. 204) but this would
give only a contractual, not a real right (p. 205). A play upon the contrasting
notions of usufructus and mancipium is found even in comedy (pp. 203—
204); so Horace might expect to be understood here (cf. Plaut. Cas. 836—
837).

132. See Pritchard, pp. 555—556.
133. Inst. Iust. 2.5.1—2.
134. Ode 3.11.52; 2.21.2, 2.17.1, 2.9.18; Ars P. 98.
135. Horace may be thinking of Solon's comment (fr. 14D: 24E). If so, Iccius may
recall how Solon goes on: "No man takes with him to Hades all his material
wealth." (See Plut. Vit. Sol. 2.)
136. For the ranging minds of Epicurus and Archytas, see Lucr. 1.72—90 and
Hor. Ode 1.28.4—6. The first instance of the topos is Plat. Phaedr. 249c.
137. Ars P. 463—466.
139. Mem. 2.10.4. See also Maguiness, "Friends," p. 42.
140. Cf. Courbaud, p. 150. Whatever Iccius' connection with Agrippa, it could
have made him a man of some influence. (We are reminded of Agrippa's
prestige in Sat. 2.3.185.)
pp. 143—144.
143. Mon. Anc. 5.
144. Tarn, CAH X (1934): 145—146; and Reinhold.
145. A further argument, I believe, against Bignone (note 129 above). The refer-
ence to Democritus' negligent husbandry may also have been a Ciceronian
reminiscence (Fin. 5.29.87; Tusc. 5.39.114). The belittling of the
philosophers is also a theme found in the De Amicitia (5.18—19), which
offers a gloss on verum et aequum, too (22.82). This is the essence of verecun-
dia: "Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit qui tollit verecundiam."
146. For discussions of Epist. 1.14, see Courbaud, pp. 158—168; Martens, pp.
84—93; Wili, pp. 288—290; Fraenkel, pp. 310—314; Becker, pp. 20—23;
Stégen, L'Unité, pp. 72—83; McGann, Studies, pp. 66—70; O. Hiltbrunner,
Williams, TORP, pp. 11—12.
147. Maurach, p. 108, sees 1.13 (like 1.9) as a "separating epistle."
148. See Martens, p. 84; Epist. 1.20 does not name the slave addressed except in
his capacity: he is Horace's liber epistularum.
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150. In Sat. 2.7 (96) Davus admits to a taste for meretriculae, but retorts that his master's is for others' wives! This theme is related to the Stoic paradox: Solum sapientem esse liberum, et omnum stultum servum, which Horace treats also in Sat. 2.3 (Cf. Cic. Parad. 33.)

151. Cited by Nonius for rarenter. P. Guthrie "A note" (CP XLVI (1951): 116–117, cites Columella 1.18.1–2; i.e., "city people are idle; so don’t choose one for a bailiff." In Petronius (69a), Trimalchio had been rusticated (in vilicationem relegari) for seducing his mistress.

152. See Hiltbrunner, pp. 305, 307, etc.

153. There is some difficulty and some disagreement as to the aspect of the participle habitatum (2) intended by Horace, since it affects the present picture of the farm. Does Horace still have tenant farmers, or just the material remains and local memories of such? The verb aspect is ambiguous: "though it has supported five hearths" (i.e., whether it has and still does, or has in the past but no longer does). The scholiast glosses as aliquando.


155. The relation between curae and animus was discussed by Lucretius: 3.142, 606, 615; 4.758; 6.1183. See also Epist. 1.11.27, 30, etc. Hiltbrunner discusses the image of the purgatio agris (pp. 306–307). Cultura anima is, in fact, one of the major themes of the Epistles. Cicero had used the analogy in the Tusculans (2.5.13): "ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus... cultura autem animi philosophia est, haec extrahit vitia radicitus" (cited by Wili, p. 289). The inspiration of the Tusculans upon this epistle is, as Wili believes, probably considerable.

156. See Hiltbrunner, p. 304, for mediastinus (14). Hiltbrunner argues that tesqua (19) is not a rustic Sabine word (Ps.-Acro) but one drawn by high poetry from the language of augury; e.g., Ennius 422W (Festus, 538.14). This would be appropriate as the antithesis of amoena (20).

157. Inconsistency had been dealt with by Horace already in Sat. 1.3.

158. The opposite picture had been given in Sat. 2.7.


162. Sat. 2.6.77.

163. The tone of censebo is one of studied ambiguity. Horace has almost implied that he may let the vilicus and calo change places. The aphorism is pronounced in such a way as to convey a "considered opinion," "recommendation," "formal opinion," or "last word on the matter" (see OLD: censeo). Morris (ad loc.) remarks that the future tense conforms with the
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future implication of the jussive. Also KHB, Briefe: "Das Futurum censebo in konjunktivischen Sinne mildert den kategorischen Ausdruck: Plaut. Mil. 395." Highet, n. 149 above, refers to this line as "a singularly unconvincing aphorism"; this view seems to be the end result of an attempt to make 1.14 conform to his theory of Horace's constant striving to remain free.

164. The word division of v. 43 has significance, as it affects the relationship of the adjective piger. (Is it the ox or the horse that is lazy?) Bentley (supported by later commentators, such as Orelli, Wickham, Wilkins, Fairclough, Dilke) argued for piger caballus. Arguments for this can be from metre (diaeresis at line-centre is avoided) or sense (bos piger might imply the same motive to each; or make the lazy ox yearn for the horse's work). But bos piger (e.g., O. Keller and M. Holder, KHB, Briefe, Klingner) is paralleled metrically by Epp. 1.6.48, 2.2.75, 2.2.89; and the diaeresis suits the antithetic sense. Heinze (KHB, Briefe) points out that the motive of the horse (like that of the calo) is invidia (41); that of the ox (like that of the vilicus), pigritia (see v. 29). Of course neither sees the other's lot in objective or realistic terms! See also B. Baldwin, "Bos piger or piger caballus?" G&R XX (1973), 122—123.

165. Recall his earlier remarks on the vanity of discontent: Sat. 1.1.1—22. The master's power and acquired insight is like Jove's: "quid causae est, merito quin illis Jupiter ambas/iratus buccas inflet neque se fore posthac/tam facilem dicat, votis ut praebeat aurem" (20—22).

166. The scholia to the Wasps classify this as a popular expression. See also Keller and Holder.


168. See notes 173—177 for the details. Again, Highet's view of the poem as "hard-hearted" (n. 156 above) must be rejected. See also Fraenkel, pp. 312—313. The Aristippan approach may be suggested here (Epist. 1.1.18—19).

169. One is reminded once more of the range of views as to the degree of fiction in the Epistles. Fraenkel (with Courbaud, p. 159) sees a real vilicus: "a true letter spontaneously written in circumstances which are still recognizable" (p. 311). Orelli, Heinze, and Hilbrunner, p. 298, see a poetic fiction with a genuinely human warmth.

170. Perret's remarks are to the point (p. 114): "But even if we suppose that the letter was not sent, what is important is that without the existence of the "gardener," without the spiritual—and thus vividly evoked—presence of that man near to him, Horace would not have gained access to that part of himself which he disclosed in the Epistle.... Our ideas we can maneuver very well by ourselves, but to grasp our own essence we have need of others" (p. 144, French edition (Paris, 1959)).

171. Most obviously in Epp. 10 and 14. Courbaud, p. 195, insists that this must be an early letter. Maurach sees 1.8 and 1.15 as "lapses".

172. Cf. Lucr. 3.1060—1067 for the topos.

173. See McGann, Studies, p. 72, on Epist. 1.2.29.

174. Morris, p. 96, sees here a "fussy, incoherent little man, who wants a dozen
things done all at once.... No other Epistle gives plainer evidence of interested and undisguised workmanship." The most clearly recognized of his devices is that of parenthesis. For similar effect, cf. Robert Browning, An Epistle ("Karshish, the picker-up of learning's crumbs....")

175. See M. Galdi, "Per un luogo di Orazio," RSS (1937), 3–8, for this Q. Numonius Vala (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum X. 481); and Courbaud, p. 102. (There were Numonii Valae in Lucania, as an inscription from Paestum suggests.)

176. Antonius Musa had cured Augustus of a serious illness in 23 B.C. by cold baths (Suet. Aug. 59, 81; Dio Cass. 53.30). This would have made his services much sought-after. (That same year his hydropathic treatment failed to save Augustus' nephew, Marcellus.) Cf. the assumed hypochondria in Epist. 1.8. See also J. D'Arms, Romans on the Bay of Naples (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 149. n. 153.

177. E.g., Satt. 2.4. 2.8.

178. Sat. 1.5.82–85.

179. Epist. 1.7.27–28.

180. Odes 1.9.7. 1.20.1.


182. Epist. 1.12.7–8.

183. Cic. Fam. 7.20.2. Cicero (writing from Velia to Rome) envies Trebatius his perfugium at Velia, which he refers to as in a remoto, salubri, amoeno loco.

184. Strabo 5.4.8. See D'Arms, p. 118.


186. See D'Arms, pp. 217–218, who supposes his villa was at Salernum.

187. Sat. 1.3.21–23. See Wickham, p. 12; Rudd, pp. 140–142.

188. The earlier use of hostis (20) as the equivalent of peregrinus is attested by Cicero (Off. 1.12.37) who cites the Twelve Tables. Horace's use of cive... hostem here has a proverbial ring. The MSS at v.37 offer two variants: correctus (Ψ var., Bl) and correptus (θρΦλιπιπιπιπι), all well attested. Some late and inferior MSS have correptor; hence corrector (Lambinus). If we read correctus, then Bestius (likely a Lucilian character) had been reformed, or Maenius reformed into a Bestius. Evidence for correptus seems more secure. The name suggests bestia (see Rudd, pp. 141–146 for Horace's use of significant names—excluding Bestius), of course. In Persius (6.37), Bestius appears clearly as a censorious character (Bestius urget doctores Gaios) of some sort. Now Maenius is compared to Bestius in his violently censorious views of his nephew's dissipation (cf. Satt. 2.2.97, 2.3.88; Ode 3.12.3), and fits the role of the iratus patruus of comedy and Horace's Satires (2.2.97). The nature of the punishment (lamna candente... urendos) reflects great wrath. Correctus can refer to the passions in the sense of "agitated" or "upset" (Ov. M. 9.734, Prop. 1.3.12). Gellius (1.26.11) uses it with ira. Translate here as "in a fit (of passion)," or "enraged."

189. Sat. 2.3.308.

190. Sat. 1.3.1–19.

191. In Baiae, Horace is forgoing a place famous for fast living. See McGann, Studies, p. 70, n. 4; and D'Arms, pp. 119ff.
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192. His “adaptability” is pilloried by his slave, Davus (Sat. 2.7.30): “laudas securum holus” (until, that is, an invitation comes from Maecenas). Horace is exploring the ambiguities of this adaptability. See McGann, Studies, pp. 72—73; Juvenal 5.12—23.

193. conspicitur and nitidis (46) go together to colour the imagery of the line, with the idea of wealth and grandeur. The villas must be high up for them to be seen from afar. nitidis suggests an alluring attractiveness or glitter like that of precious metals (Epist. 1.6.25) and of the human body. The visual imagery is of marble and mosaics (see D’Arms, p. 131). The pecunia of Vala is fundata (respectably invested in real estate) whereas the scurra vagus Maenius squandered all his inheritances. Cato was one of the first to criticize villae expolitae (D’Arms, p. 10).

194. KHB, Briefe, p. 125.
197. Horace uses optimus of Maecenas, Vergil, Trebatius, Fuscus, and his father, associating the word with deep affection and warm respect, and a little self-depreciation. See M. J. McGann, “The sixteenth epistle of Horace,” CQ X (1960): 205—212, on this (p. 207) and on the identification of Quinctius. McGann is intrigued by one T. Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus, consul in 9 B.C. (and a lover of Julia). Velleius Paterculus refers to him as “singularem nequitiam supercilio truci protegens” (2.101). “A lesson on the difference between real and seeming virtue might well be read to such a man” (McGann, “Sixteenth epistle,” pp. 207—208). If this were the same Quinctius Hirpinus addressed in Carm. 2.11, the contrast in the two messages would be interesting.

199. The other citation is Col. 8.1.2: op. mensam pretiosis dapibus.
201. Whether Horace grew grapes or not, wine was produced in Sabine country (Odes 1.20.1, 1.9.7). Cornel cherries were regarded as inferior food, as McGann points out: “Sixteenth epistle,” p. 205: cf. Aen. 3.649, Hor. Sat. 2.2.55.
202. The reference to Tarentum may also relate to the connections (discussed below) between this epistle and Carm. 3.5. In that ode Tarentum represents the peace, serenity, and beauty which Regulus is forgoing.
203. See D’Arms, p. 9.
204. Serv. ad Aen. 5.734.
205. Ps.-Acro sees the transition correctly: “tu recte vivis: hoc est si tam recte vivis quam fert opinio tua.”
206. Cf. Persius 1.7: ne te quaesiveris extra. This antithesis was an established one (e.g. Plato’s Apology).
207. Cf. Epp. 1.5, 1.7; Sat. 2.6.
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210. For such vanity of political ambition, cf. Carm. 1.1.7; Epp. 1.6.53, 1.19.37.

211. Sat. 2.2.1—3; “rusticus, abnormis sapiens, crassaque Minerva.”


213. See Cic. Parad. 3.20 for the paradox, “aequalia esse peccata et recte facta.” Horace studies this paradox in Sat. 1.3, and finds it wanting in the field of human relationships. In this epistle it seems acceptable as far as it goes. (See also Cic. Off. 1.2.5.)

214. Persius alludes to this same prank in Sat. 5.111. His scholiast explains how the boys did it. They are intent upon seeing the codger muddy himself and lose his dignity. (The moralist deplores the fact that he would do it for money.)


216. Vv. 20, 39, 41.

217. Cic. Off. 2.2.6. Juvenal too (Sat. 10) requires that vir bonus must also be sapiens.

218. Cf. Plut. de Tranquill. 18, and passages from Epictetus, Cicero, Zeno (Orelli, ad loc.).

219. Cf. the use of perferre patique in Epist. 1.15.17 for a mock-serious effect.

220. Persius uses supellex in the opposite sense: “intellectual furnishings” (4.52). Cicero goes on to cite the words of the sage, Bias: omnia mecum porto mea (Parad. 1.7—9).

221. Cic. Parad. 5.34.

222. I would alter Klingner’s punctuation to include the remainder of the last line (79) with moriar as the imagined thoughts of the vir bonus. This seems to me less abrupt and more lofty in style, and suits a citation from tragedy. Such a final reflection suits the Stoic sage. The final word rerum, is pregnant. Cf. sunt lacrimae rerum (Aen. 1.4.62).

223. Ode 3.5.49—50.

224. Horace seems to be following a view expressed by Cicero (Rep. 6.15) and later by Epictetus. W. R. Halliday, The Pagan Background of Early Christianity (New York, 1925), pp. 217—221, points out that Seneca was much more tolerant of suicide than was Epictetus: “As the training of the will progresses, as the Divine in us becomes strengthened, perfect surrender of the will to God becomes easier. . . . This complete identification of the will with the will of God is the secret of Epictetus’ happiness. . . . We are soldiers of God and must serve with uncomplaining obedience. We may not lightly abandon the post which he has allotted to us; we must wait his signal to depart” (pp. 218—219). Halliday cites Epict. Disc. 2.17, 23—24; 1.16, 20—21; 1.24, 20.


2. Reading *quis* (7) with Heinze. Most MSS give *quid* and most editors (including Klingner) print it. My choice is made on grounds of emphasis and the strength of the writer’s feelings here. *Quid* dampens the drama. See KHB, Briefe, p. 385. Klingner’s commas (p. 22) should be removed.
3. It is difficult to find an exact equivalent in English for *peccantis* (9). It frequently does have the sense of “sexual offence” (Sat. 1.2.63; Ov.H. 16.205; Mart. 1.35.2).
4. In KHB, Briefe, Heinze rejects the possibility of *Romae* being a dative (10), arguing that *Roma = Romani* occurs only in the nominative and vocative. A dative here (=Romanis) would be very vigorous, however.
5. The double-entendre encompasses “lice” and “bookworms” (12).
6. What exactly Horace means by *praecanum* (24) is hard to tell (grey in front? prematurely? very?). He refers to his greyness also in *Ode* 3.14.25.
8. How far the difference in quantity would affect the pun is not clear (*Liber/ liber*). See Macleod’s notes on the puns in Epist. 20 (“Poetry of ethics,” pp. 23–24).
9. The lively personification in this poem has been compared by Heinze to a remark of Cicero’s to Atticus about publishing his *De Temporibus Suis* (4.83.3): “De poemate quod quaeris, quid si cupiat effugere? quid? sinam?” Shackleton Baily adopts the reading *sinam* (over *sinas*). See his Cicero’s Letters to Atticus, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1965), p. 190.
10. A frequent prophecy to unwilling courtesans. Cf. Epod. 8; Odes 1.25, 3.15, 4.13.
11. Horace may be recalling his own experience at a provincial *ludus* in Venusia (Sat. 1.6.71–75).
12. The late E. T. Silk once pointed out to me some striking parallels between this epistle and *Ode* 3.27. The parallels suggest that this ode is also an *envoi.* (See my article, “Remember us, Galatea: Horace, *Ode* 3.27.” Grazer Beiträge III (1975): 191–203.)
14. Cf. Epist. 2.2.20 and *Ode* 2.20.
17. Cited in KHB, Briefe (Att. 1.17.4). (Translation by Shuckburgh.)
18. See above Chapter II, note 1. For his eventual disgrace and ruin—and his wealth—see Syme, pp. 381, 428–430, and passim.
19. Suetonius tells us that the later Epist. 2.1 and *Odes* IV (as well as the Carmen Saeculare) were written at the request of Augustus.
22. KHB, Briefe, p. 369.
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25. The principate has been seen as the result of the thinking of Panaetius, Scipio, and Cicero (R. Reitzenstein, Das Römische in Cicero und Horaz, p. 21).
26. See Nisbet and Hubbard, Commentary, Horace Odes Book I (pp. 376—378) and Fraenkel, pp. 254—255. See also M. N. Porter Parker, "The consistent Epicureanism of the first book of the Epistles of Horace," TAPA LXXII (1941): xxxix—xl; and Martens, p. 98. See also KHB, Briefe, pp. 392—393, for views of Horace as a Stoic.
27. The Epicureans would lie between the Stoics and the Hedonists. See Epist. 1.1.17.
28. Epist. 1.1.16.
29. See Maurach, pp. 75—76, for a survey of views. Also KHB, Briefe, pp. 374—378. Karl Buchner also supports Heinze (Römische Literaturgeschichte (Stuttgart, 1957) pp. 320—321). Klingner insists that the self portraiture is not Horace's only motive (Phil XC [1935], 464).
32. Sat. 2.1.30—34.
35. Langbaum, p. 57.
36. Cf. the characters of Karshish and Abib in R. Browning's "An Epistle."
37. See Williams, TORP, p. 28.
38. Turolla, p. 290; Presta, p. 165.
40. McGann, Studies, p. 94.
41. McGann, Studies, p. 93.
42. KHB, Briefe, p. 386.
43. McGann, Studies, pp. 97—100.
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